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Abstract of a thesis submitted in partial fulfilment of the 
requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy 
Abstract 
Organizational Factors in Aviation Safety Management Failures:  
the Case of Indonesia 
 
by 
Dessy Aliandrina 
 
On 28 July 2007, the European Union (EU) banned Indonesian airlines from flying to 
Europe. This threatened reputations, and caused psychosocial harm and economic damage to 
the country. The ban was imposed because: (1) there were verified serious operating 
deficiencies in all certified airlines in Indonesia; (2) the US FAA downgraded Indonesia’s 
IASA safety rating; (3) the ICAO USOAP identified serious shortcomings in the ability of the 
Indonesian authorities to perform their safety oversight responsibilities; and (4) the ability of 
the Indonesian authorities to properly implement and enforce safety standards. These 
deficiencies were further evidenced by the high accident and incident rates. 
The aims of this study were to: develop a reasoned and logical understanding of the causes of 
a series of accidents or incidents in the Indonesian air transport system; and contribute to the 
knowledge of aviation safety management failures.  
The study was grounded in a synthesis of theories of organizational failure and learning. 
Based on this framework, discourse analysis was employed to examine how the airline safety 
environment changed over time. This study developed an understanding of the social and 
organizational construction of safety management in the Indonesian air transport system.  
In sum, this study presented empirical evidence of: the origins of the Indonesian aircraft 
accidents and incidents; the deteriorating of Indonesian air transport safety management; how 
the vulnerability of a system may, sooner or later, lead to a crisis; and four barriers to 
learning from accidents.  
Keywords: aircraft accident, air transport system, organizational learning, deficiencies, 
system failure 
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    Chapter 1 
Introduction 
1.1 Background 
On 28th July 2007 the European Union (EU) announced that it would impose an operating 
ban to all Indonesian airlines. The operating ban forbade all Indonesian airlines from 
commercial services to European countries because the EU had verified evidence of 
deficiencies in Indonesian aviation safety. Consequently, the operating ban impaired 
reputations of Indonesia, created fear, uncertainty and chaos in the country. Furthermore, it 
also caused psycho-social harm and economic damage (Department of Transportation, 2008). 
Indonesia, and especially the aviation industry, was in shock.  
According to the EU Press Release from Brussels, IP/07/1014 on 4th July 2007, the Vice-
President in charge of transport, Jacques Barrot said,  
“Once more, the EU black list will prove to be an essential tool not only to prevent 
unsafe airlines from flying to Europe and to inform passengers travelling worldwide 
but also to make sure that airlines and civil aviation authorities take appropriate 
actions to improve safety.”  
In reference to Barrot’s statement, it clearly stated that there were airlines, including 
Indonesian airlines, facing safety issues.   
The reasons for the operating ban were elaborated in the Official Journal of the European 
Union on 5th July 2007. There were four reasons stated: (1) there were verified serious 
deficiencies in all certified airlines in Indonesia; (2) the United States Federal Aviation 
Association (FAA) downgraded the Indonesian safety rating in its International Aviation 
Safety Assistance (IASA)  programme; (3) the ICAO Universal Safety Oversight Audit 
Programme (USOAP) indicated there were serious shortcomings in the ability of the 
Indonesian civil aviation authority to perform its safety oversight responsibilities; and (4) 
there was insufficient ability in the Indonesian authorities to implement and enforce the 
safety standards.  
13 
 
Furthermore, the high rate of accidents and incidents in Indonesia contributed to the 
downgrade, with a global accident rate that rose from 0.65 in 2006 to 0.75 in 2007 (IATA, 
2008). The USOAP audit was conducted by ICAO on 6–15 February 2007. It pointed out not 
only serious shortcomings in the Indonesian civil aviation authority’s ability to achieve safety 
standards, but also lack of effective implementation (LEI) in eight critical elements. There 
were deficiencies in the areas of aviation regulations, human and technical/technological 
resources and the authority’s enforcement of safety standards.  
Thus, without a doubt, the deficiencies in the system that were evident by the high accident 
and incident rates, indicating there must be something wrong in the system. Similarly, Fink 
(1986) said that accidents and incidents were evidence of vulnerability in a system and also 
notified the presence of problems in the system. Reason  (1990, 1997) identified that 
vulnerability in a system was not only caused by active failures but also by hidden conditions. 
In summary, the safety issues in the Indonesian air transport system are the raison d’ȇtre for 
this study. Consequently, the Indonesian air transport system was examined to: 
Understand how the phenomenon of high accidents and incidents rate in Indonesia 
developed. 
1.2 Rationale and Significance of the Study 
Studies on aviation accident have developed significantly. In 1990, Reason’s introduction of 
the concept of an organizational accident (1990, 1997), in fact, gave a new perspective on 
accident studies, particularly in aviation. This concept took the perspective that aviation 
accident studies were not only about human errors or technical failures but also a 
combination of multiple-causal factors that interacted with each other. Thus, there was a 
process occurring before an accident or incident happened. 
An aviation organization is near-unique, but has parallels, notably medicine, which in the UK 
and the USA, employs error reporting systems. However, what marks aviation out is that it is 
reliability-seeking and also demands high performance (both operationally and financially). 
Because of these ‘error-free’ performance and effectiveness requirements aviation 
organizations aim to be high-integrity organization (Westrum & Adamski, 2010).  
High integrity systems like other complex systems are surrounded by a human envelope that 
has three elements: operations, maintenance and design. A strong human envelop facilitates a 
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strong, high-integrity system but if it is weak then the system will be fragile and vulnerable. 
Thus, if there is a high-integrity system in which accidents or incidents were likely to occur, 
one or more of these principles were compromised (Westrum & Adamski, 2010) or, in other 
words, there are adaptations’ breakdowns to cope with complexity (Woods et al., 2010). 
Drawing on failure theories, Reason  (1990, 1997) identified there are a period in which 
active failures and hidden conditions interact to weaken a system before an accident or 
incident occurs. This argument aligns with what Man-Made Disaster (MMD) theorists 
(Turner, 1978; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) refer to as the incubation period. Both theories see 
an accident as a product of the linear breakdown of system defences; therefore strengthening 
layers of defences will enhance safety. These concepts seemed oversimplified the complexity 
of a system such as aviation. 
Therefore, there is a need to draw insight from socio-technical system theories. Charles 
Perrow (1984; 1999) developed Normal Accident Theory (NAT) that sees an accident in any 
interactively complex and tightly-coupled technology system is inevitable. Thus, the higher 
the degree of system complexity, the higher the potential for accidents achieved. Despite the 
pessimism of NAT, High Reliability Theory (HRT) (LaPorte, 1996; Roberts, 1990a, 1990b; 
Roberts, Bea, & Bartles, 2001; Rochlin, 1996) finds that a system with an excellent safety 
record is a high reliability system. This concept sees that an accident or incident is possibly to 
be avoided by applying several strategies. Nevertheless, both concepts agree that learning 
from a failure is essential to understand the complexity and apply lesson learned to enhance 
safety. 
Understanding a complex system from both theories, organizational learning and failure, 
aimed to fill the needs for considering time to analyse the events – accidents and incidents. 
Therefore, a development of the system will be understood so any values, beliefs, and norms 
existed and practiced will be determined. 
This study addressed two broad assumptions and an initial model as guidance. Following the 
development of this study, two broad assumptions were elaborated into four specific 
assumptions while an initial model became a revised model. Finally, this thesis presents a 
final model that describes how the Indonesian air transport system was deteriorated through 
the time.  
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This study provided empirical evidence of (1) the origin of the Indonesian aircraft accidents 
and incidents, (2) the deteriorating processes in the Indonesian air transport system, and (3) a 
model that describes how the Indonesian air transport system was deteriorated. Furthermore, 
compilation of the various sources used in this research revealed some insights that were not 
expected at the beginning of this research; there were four barriers to learning to be 
identified.  
Thus, on the basis of the organizational failure and learning theories, particularly in aviation 
studies, this study addresses new insights to aviation safety management. From a practical 
perspective, this study will give further consideration to aspects that were not included in 
prior aviation-related studies. 
1.3 Aims of the Present Study 
The overall aims of the present study were to develop a reasoned and logical understanding 
of the causes of a series of accidents or incidents in the Indonesian air transport system; and 
contribute to the knowledge of aviation safety management failures.  
The specific objectives of this research were to: 
1. Investigate the origins of Indonesian aircraft accidents and incidents; 
2. Investigate how and why Indonesian aviation safety is vulnerable, as evidenced by a 
series of accidents and incidents in the Indonesian air transport system; and 
3. Further develop the knowledge of aviation accident studies through addressing the 
systemic causes in an air transport system in the context of my theoretical framework. 
In order to achieve the research objectives, two research questions are addressed. 
1. What is the origin of the Indonesian aircraft accidents and incidents? 
2. How did accidents and incidents keep occurring in the Indonesian air transport 
system? 
The objectives and questions above are used to construct assumptions for this study.  
1. First Assumption: There is a deteriorating process in the Indonesian air transport 
system. 
2. Second Assumption: A series of accidents and incidents indicate failure to learn. 
These assumptions are related to the concepts below: 
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1. There is a deterioration process before an accident occurs (Reason, 1990, 1997; Toft 
& Reynolds, 1997; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
2. There are accumulated, unnoticed failures in pre-conditions (Pauchant & Mitroff, 
1992; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miclani, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
3. Recurrences of the events indicate failures in learning from previous events (Pidgeon 
& O'Leary, 2000; Sagan, 1993; Toft & Reynolds, 1997) 
4. Accidents can lead to crises (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992)  
1.4 Study Approach 
This study is typically not concerned with theoretical verification nor justification, but more 
about developing an understanding of the events through generating empirical grounded 
theories. This is typical of research into ‘theorizing on disasters’ (Le Coze, 2008); for 
example, the works of Turner (1978), Vaughan (1992, 1999, 2004) and Snook (2000) who 
generated theories about disasters from different cases (the accidents and disasters in the 
United Kingdom, the Challenger case and Friendly Fire in Iraq). In such exemplar, the 
theorizing on a disaster approach is based on the scope of the study, which not only involves 
the micro- and meso-levels but also the macro-level. In the context of the present research, 
the logic of this approach led to an analysis at the inter-organizational and societal levels 
applied in the Indonesian air transport system.  
1.5 Research Overview 
This thesis is structured in seven chapters. Chapter 2 reviews studies on organizational 
learning and failure. Chapter 3 places the study in context by providing an overview of the 
global aviation and the Indonesian aviation. Chapter 4 presents the First Field Work of the 
study. Chapter 5 presents the Second Field Work of the study. Chapter 6 draws together the 
main findings and interprets them. Chapter 7 concludes this study and gives some thought for 
future study. 
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    Chapter 2 
Organizational Learning and Failure 
2.1 Introduction 
Organizational studies have captured scholars’ attention for the last five decades. It cannot be 
denied that there are still many aspects in this area need to be explored further. In line with 
the growth of organizational studies, this chapter presents the organizational studies in the air 
transport system. This chapter is structured into six sections that describe organizational 
studies. Section 2.2 describes learning processes in organizations. Section 2.3 describes 
organizational failure. Section 2.4 describes complex socio-technical systems. Section 2.5 
describes organizational studies in aviation. Finally, Section 2.6 summarises the chapter and 
gives a conclusion.   
2.2 Learning Processes 
Scholars view learning as something ‘new’; for example, a new knowledge that is the result 
of detection and correction of errors (Argyris, 1976, Argyris & Schön, 1978), an introduction 
of new systems (Miles, 1982) or an expansion of new ways to look at the world (Stead & 
Smallman, 1999). Learning processes grow from individuals into systems or organizations. 
Individuals who are in a system or organization contribute to the learning processes in any 
group to which they belong. Thus, learning processes in a group of individuals (e.g., a system 
or an organization) are inseparable from individual learning, but organizational learning 
cannot be simply seen as cumulative learning of individuals within organizations. 
The processes of learning rise through the participations and interactions among individuals 
in organizations (Easterby-Smith & Lyle, 2011) so learning processes in organizations 
continue even though members of organizations come and go (Hedberg, 1981). These 
processes that occur of and within organizations are labelled organizational learning (Tsang, 
1997; c.f., Smith and Lyle, 2011).  
Shrivastava (1983) summarised organizational learning as 1) the adaptation in which changes 
are made through readjusting goals, attention and search rules; 2) assumption-sharing in 
which improvements are obtained by sharing assumptions among members’ responses to the 
environment by detecting errors and correcting them; 3) development of a knowledge base, 
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defined as a continuing process of developing knowledge of action-outcome relationships; 
and, finally, 4) institutionalized experience, in which learning processes involve the entire 
organization. 
Nevertheless, these processes vary across organizations according to their choice in how they 
adjust to a change environment (Miles, 1982), but the objective of these processes is similar: 
to perform better in order to achieve system or organizational goals.  
2.2.1 Learning Loops 
The depth of learning applied by organizations has different levels. The most common levels 
of learning adopted by organizations are single- and double-loop learning. These levels of 
learning were first discussed by Argyris & Schön (1974, 1978) and have developed a wide-
spread acceptance. Two additional levels have since been added to the model: zero- and 
triple-loop learning.  
Zero learning level occurs when a fresh problem arises but there is no corrective action taken. 
This level of learning also called passive learning by Toft and Reynolds (1997). Here, the 
members of organizations simply fail to deal with the problem despite a recognition that 
something has gone wrong (Bateson, 1973; Snell and Man-Kuen Chak, 1998).  
In the next level of learning, single-loop learning, people in organizations react to problems 
that arise. However, they act only in the context of the organization’s present policies in order 
to achieve their current objectives (Argyris & Schön, 1978). So, in this level of learning, the 
organizational context – policies, norms and objectives – do not change. Single-loop learning 
deals with routine so corrective actions taken are under management’s control. By keeping in 
their context, organizations take immediate responses in order to manage errors. 
Consequently, the impacts of this level of learning are not widely spread in organizations; 
they might only affect specific units of organizations.  
Higher level of learning leads organizations to react and adapt to any changes not only by 
detecting and correcting errors, but also by modifying their present policies, norms, and 
possibly objectives. This level of learning is called double-loop learning (Argyris & Schön, 
1978). It is seen by Snell and Man-Kuen Chak (1998) as a transformation process and might 
result in a new organizational context. Thus, in this level of learning, members of 
organizations do not merely seek solutions. They may alter the organizations’ context in 
order to achieve organizational objectives. These members examine their recent context to 
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gain knowledge. Such an examination will result new insights used to guide organizations in 
achieving their objectives. 
A deeper understanding of the organizational learning by organization yields a higher level of 
learning. This next level is named deutero-learning (Bateson, 1973) or triple-loop learning 
(Flood and Romm, 1996; Snell and Man-Kuen Chak, 1998). Triple-loop learning provides an 
opportunity for members to participate in developing the infrastructure for learning, which 
simultaneously develops their competencies and skills to use the infrastructure (Flood and 
Romm, 1996).  Hence, a significant difference from the other three levels of learning is that 
an organization’s members work collectively to establish structures and strategies for 
learning. 
These three levels of learning – single-, double-, and triple-loop – reflect organizations efforts 
to learning. The efforts to learn is namely active learning that refers to organizations that 
know something but then taking corrective actions (Toft and Reynolds, 1997).  
Learning loops above show the depth of learning processes in organization. The loops also 
present the relationships of individuals and organizations; the higher level of learning in 
organizations, the deeper involvement of organizations’ members with the learning processes. 
The level of learning also is inseparable with time, in as much as higher levels of learning 
require more time. 
2.2.2 Barriers to Learning 
Organizations have the freedom to choose how to respond to problems so adoption of any 
type of learning is about how organizations take actions. Freedom of choice is inseparable 
from several existing factors in organizations; for example, an organizations’ culture, 
strategies adopted, and organizational structure. A change in the environment organizations 
will affect the way organizations see how the world works, its ideologies, norms and 
behaviour of the organizations. This will often result in a ‘new look’.  
Facing problems creates new experiences. Organizations use their knowledge in order to cope 
with any problems that arise. The processes of applying knowledge give new learning 
experiences to organizations. This type of learning is referred to as experience-based learning 
(Boin, et al., 2005). Similarly, Toft and Reynolds (1997) identified organization specific 
learning as learning in which organizations draw their own lessons from any event in which 
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they are directly involved. In such case, experiences gained from the event may provide new 
knowledge to improve the organization.  
Problems are, sometimes, unable to be simply resolved. Identifying errors solutions need 
deeper analysis. Some organizations employ a rational-scientific approach to examine the 
causes of failures and the effects of the responses taken. Boin et al. (2005) categorize this 
type of learning as explanation-based learning. An approach that is commonly used is 
implementing simple and ready-made tools in order to investigate root cause analysis (Le 
Coze, 2008). Competence or skill-based learning (Boin et al., 2005) occurs when an 
organizations are unable to carry out proper examination of the problems by themselves, and 
choose to seek for help from experts or skilled individuals with particular problems. Finally, 
if the appropriate lessons are learned by analyzing factors surrounding a particular 
organizational failure, it is called isomorphic learning. On the other hand, wider level of 
learning is referred to as iconic learning (Boin et al., 2005). This scale of learning takes place 
throughout the whole organization because there is a disastrous event that affects the whole 
organization. The event itself is a point where learning processes begin. 
However, studies show that not all organizations succeed in learning; i.e., there are 
organizations that fail to learn. Many studies have questioned how and why do organizations 
succeed and fail to learn. In spite of all efforts to learn, it is undeniable there are barriers to 
achieve successful learning. Those barriers are not easy to eliminate, but recognizing and 
anticipating them from the beginning may help organizations to take corrective actions.  
Perrow (1984) found that information is one of the barriers identified that may block 
learning. There is a high ambiguity of perceptions as the result of differences in 
interpretations of the information available, especially when an organization’s secrecy creates 
restrictions on information flow. Similarly, Vaughan (1996) implicitly stated that there are 
significant contributions of restricted information or information difficulties in organizational 
learning. She implies that an organization tends to cover failures within the organization for 
several reasons, such as protecting the reputation of the organization and preventing financial 
losses.  
In the same way, Pidgeon and O’Leary (2000) found information difficulties a barrier to 
learning since high uncertainty, higher levels of complexities, and poor structures in a system 
undermine attempts to learn. There are misunderstandings resulting from wrong assumptions, 
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inherent difficulties in handling information, ambiguity of regulations and denying danger. 
All of these will delay corrective action. 
Blaming is another barrier in organizational learning (Perrow, 1984, Turner and Pidgeon, 
1997, Hale et al., 1997). It is the easiest way to clean up the mess: ask someone to pay the 
bills. Other barriers may arise when it is in someone’s interests to prevent the truth (Perrow, 
1984). Thus, scholars have suggested that organizations inability to learn may come about 
because of the organization, itself. 
2.3 Organizational Failure 
Prior studies have identified that organizational failure does not occur suddenly, there are 
degradation processes that occur in organizations and lead to conditions wherein the system 
loses its capability to cope with unwanted and unplanned events.  
Turner (1978) called a period in which the deterioration occurs ‘the incubation period’. He 
highlighted the incubation period as a period in which unintended and complex interactions 
occur between contributory preconditions to defeat the established safety system (Pidgeon & 
O'Leary, 2000). He believes that an organization’s adoption of norms, culture and belief is 
essential in constructing a safety culture in an organization. The discrepancy of these values 
over a period of time will degrade the organization’s ability to cope with hazards.   
This posited degradation process in an organization agrees with the work of Toft and 
Reynolds ( 1997). They defined the degradation that occurs as a complex combination of 
technical, individual, group, organizational and social factors, including culture, affected 
assumptions and practices. These can be the aetiology of a disaster (Toft & Reynolds, 1997). 
At this point, they believed that disaster was created by people operating within a complex 
system (Toft & Reynolds, 1997) when the values adopted lead to failures.  
The concepts of incubation or precondition, described above, were similar to the 
organizational accident theory suggested by Reason (1990, 1997). He also agreed that there 
was a process of weakening in an organizational body that led to a state of vulnerability. 
Thus, there is a period in any disaster where the organization is weakened by some failures. 
Such degradation occurs as a combination of multiple aspects such as people, technology and 
social factors, which affect assumptions and practices within the system. All aspects may 
work together to increase complexities and, in time, an accident or incident occurs.  
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In the incubation period, there are degradation processes in organization that cause changes to 
values, norms and beliefs adopted by organizations. Consequently, the safety culture within 
the organization is affected. Uttal (1983) states that safety culture is about shared values 
(what is important), beliefs (how things work) and behavioural norms (the way we do things 
here). The first two elements interact with the organization’s structures and control systems to 
create the last element. Similarly, Mitroff et al. (1989) define that the culture of an 
organization as a set of rarely articulated, largely unconscious beliefs, norms, and 
fundamental assumptions that the organization makes about itself, the nature of people, in 
general, and its environment.  
Reason (1997, p. 113) addresses the importance of a well-established safety culture in any 
organization.  He notes how changes of the top management or the organization’s leaders will 
affect commitment of the organization as a whole to improve and maintain a certain safety 
level as every leader has different goals or objectives. So, safety culture refers to what an 
organization is like in term of safety and inseparable from the management involvements 
(Dien, Dechi, Guillaume,2012). 
Degradation processes affect the assumptions and practices, which are related to the safety 
culture developed in an organization. Thus, it works in conjunction with the establishment of 
any cultural elements. These are not immediate and instant but, rather, a lengthy process in 
which these elements are established, and become widespread and pervasive. Hence, time is 
an important aspect in both the degradation process and the establishment of safety culture.  
2.4 Complex Socio-Technical System 
Post-modern society has witnessed large-scale accidents; for example, Chernobyl, the 
Challenger and the Columbia space-shuttle accidents, and many more major aircraft 
accidents. The sophisticated design of a socio-technical system, such as aviation, leads to 
complex interactions amongst system components, many of which cannot be easily 
anticipated.  
Several scholars have suggested various causes by which systems become complex (see 
Perrow, 1984; Rasmussen, 1997; Vicente, 1999, Kirwan, 2001). For example, the non-linear 
nature of a system often confers unpredictable behaviours, and a small change in any one part 
of a system has the potential to change the whole system drastically. Likewise, the growth of 
a system through time will bring difficulties in predicting what will happen in the future, so 
23 
 
uncertainties increase complexity. Moreover, improvements to increase system efficiency and 
effectiveness will, naturally, also create complexity, as do changes in system design that may 
be caused by changes in requirements or by the environment. In such systems, there are 
complex interactions between social (e.g., multiple interacting parties, stakeholders), 
technological (e.g., various technical disciplines, automations) and environmental (e.g., 
market pressures, political interests) aspects. Consequently, complex socio-technical systems 
create high hazards with potential for high impact accidents. For these reasons, learning is 
essential in complex system.   
2.4.1 Learning in Complex Socio-Technical System 
Complexities in these systems are not easy to manage. Many scholars have examined major 
accidents in order to improve the understanding of such the complexities. For example, the 
first contemporary study on accidents was carried out by Barry Turner (1978), who examined 
84 accident and disaster reports published by British Government sources in the period from 
1 January 1965 to 31 December 1975. Turner found that organizations have shifted their view 
of the world after the past events. Therefore, learning processes will re-adjust organizations’ 
beliefs and norms.  
Another study conducted by Perrow (1979) after Three Miles Accident in 28 March 1979 
provided new insights on complex system studies. For him, an accident is ‘inevitable’ or 
‘normal’ in such system, particularly in interactively complex and tightly-coupled system. 
Perrow states that a system with interactive complexity is unable to recognise and predict 
independent failure events. If this system is also tightly-coupled, then the failure events will 
quickly become uncontrollable and cause a system-wide accident. Hence, these two 
dimensions act together to create unplanned, unwanted and unexpected failures, sooner or 
later, leading to an accident.  
Berkeley scholars (e.g., Roberts, Weick, La Porte) have examined several complex socio-
technical system; for example, the US Air Traffic Control (ATC), two aircraft carriers, an 
utility grid management system, the Diablo Canyon nuclear plant and fire-fighter teams 
(LaPorte & Consolini, 1991). They defined a high reliability organization as an organization 
with a good safety record or, in other words, an organization with the ability to deal with 
risks. A specific successful experience that avoided a catastrophe was used as an indicator 
when claiming the “reliability” of the organization. Learning extensively from experiences of 
accidents, incidents and near-misses (LaPorte, 1996; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) and 
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translating the lessons learnt into practice (Pidgeon, 1997) are some strategies to improve the 
reliability of an organization.  
In contrast, some scholars indicate their pessimism regarding learning from an accident or 
incident experience (Caroll, 1995). They viewed each accident and incident as unique and, 
therefore, have unique causes behind accidents and incidents. Reason (1997) argued that 
complex systems do not learn. While he found that actors in the system, in this case air 
transport industries (e.g., pilots, regulators), attempt to learn from any accident and incident, 
there was a tendency to learn just on the surface. However, the accumulation of intense 
learning from the past events (accidents, incidents and near-misses) has succeeded in 
reducing the aviation accident rate and improving aviation safety levels (Ballesteros, 2007).  
Hence, learning processes in complex socio-technical system are not merely about one unit, 
one organization or one system but also experiences from a set of systems or events. 
2.4.2 Failure in Complex Socio-Technical System 
Studying failure in a complex socio-technical system is a challenge because underlying 
causes of accidents and incidents in this system are often due to  a complex interaction 
between actors at all levels in the system (Rasmussen and Svedung, 2000). Therefore, one 
should consider the nature of the system so the event is not seen as a sudden occurrence but, 
instead, a consequence of processes that occurred over a period of time. 
Understanding failure in complex socio-technical system is inseparable from investigation. 
An event occurs if the safety of a system falls below its safety level, which is possibly caused 
by technology, persons, socio and technical subsystem, and dysfunctional relationship 
between organizations. These factors are also marked the development of studies on system’s 
failure – technical period, human error period, socio-technical period (Reason, 1993), and the 
latest period, inter-organizational relationship period, was added by Wilpert and Fahlbruch 
(1998). Once an accident or incident occurs in a complex socio-technical system, an analysis 
will be carried out in order to understand how the event developed. This is known as an event 
analysis. The analysis determines the causes of the event and proposes corrective actions to 
enhance safety in the system. 
The study of how a complex system works needs a comprehensive analysis. An event – 
accident or incident – is only a starting point to determine direct and immediate causes. By 
analysing backward, as far as possible, the analysis moves from direct causes towards root 
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organizational causes. Thus, failure should be understood from historical dimension 
(temporal aspects), organizational networks, and vertical (hierarchical) relationship in the 
organization (Dien and Llory, 2006). At this point, the understanding is developed through 
carrying an investigation. 
2.4.2.1 Accident and Incident 
Everyone might think they know what an accident or incident is, but there are differences in 
perceptions and definitions. What an accident is for one person may not be one for someone 
else. An important aspect of accident definition is the context. Centuries ago, an accident was 
seen as an ‘Act of God,’ as this explanation came from religious beliefs and superstitions 
when things went wrong.  Since then, the development of knowledge and technologies 
worked in conjunction with an understanding of accidents and, also, incidents. Consequently, 
definitions of accidents and incidents have been refined. 
Perrow (1999, p. 70) defines accidents and incidents based on their consequences, either 
causing damage to property and/or injuring persons. An incident has a smaller impact 
compared to an accident; it only damages part of the system, while an accident damages a 
subsystem or even the whole system. An accident may result in the immediate shutdown of 
the system or even lead to a catastrophic situation if the consequences are large enough.  
Similarly, Strauch (2004, p. 24) views an accident or an incident according to its impact; an 
accident has more severe consequences than an incident.  
Wells and Rondrigues (2003, p. 74) define that an incident as a near-accident. Both have 
similar causal factors since all accidents begin as near-accidents. In regards to the 
transformation of incidents to accidents, and agree with Hendrick and Benner (1987, p. 27), 
who describe an accident as a process of transformation of a stable state activity to an 
unintended state, with a harmful outcome. This process occurs as a result of a group of 
dynamic-interactive and interconnected events. Similarly, Reason (1990, 1997) sees the 
process as a series of actions and conditions that interacted each other to weaken system 
defences. He illustrated this process by using slices of cheese; hence, this model is now 
widely known as the ‘Swiss Cheese Model’.  
Although an accident or incident has various definitions, scholars agree that it is an outcome 
of deviations from the usual interaction of actions and conditions. This core definition of an 
accident has aided in the development of an understanding of accident causation.  
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2.4.2.2 Crisis 
As noted, an accident in a complex socio-technical system could easily lead to a system-wide 
accident, especially, if the system is highly interactive and tightly-coupled (Perrow, 1984). 
Thus, a pervasive impact of an accident is its potential to lead to a crisis as it emerges from 
threats, urgency and destruction that are often on a monumental scale (Seeger, Sellnow, & 
Ulmer, 2003). Although a crisis can occur slowly or suddenly, it always causes loss whether 
physical, emotional or financial and is able to threaten reputations (Seymour & Moore, 2000). 
There is no one single definition for a crisis that is accepted universally (Mitroff, Pearson, & 
Harrington, 1996).  Crisis is defined differently in many studies although scholars generally 
agree that a crisis affects the entire organization as there are always sudden changes in an 
organization that are unpredictable, and which cause uncertainties and shock in the 
organization. 
In socio-technical systems, a crisis is based on the event’s origin and impact. For example, 
Mitroff, Shrivastava and Edwadia (1987) founded that a corporate crisis was able to cause 
extensive damage to human life, nature and the social environment. The crisis, itself, was the 
result of a disaster precipitated by people, organizational structures, or technology. Human 
agencies were also named as the cause of an industrial crisis and this type of crisis sometimes 
has effects beyond geographic boundaries and even into the next generation (Shrivastava et 
al., 1988). In contrast to previous studies, Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) defined a crisis 
according to the  impacts of disruption. A minor impact to the system is caused by an incident 
that only occurred in a subsystem, where accidents and crises affect the whole system. But, 
an accident only affects the entire system physically while a crisis affects the entire system 
physically and symbolically. 
In relation to socio-technical systems, Seeger et al. (2003) defined three categories of causes 
of a crisis. The first group of crises occurs as the result of a complex, tightly-coupled 
technological system. Because, in this system, an accident is unavoidable, it is called Normal 
Accident or an Inevitable Accident (Perrow, 1984). The second group of crises are those 
caused by failure in foresight (Turner, 1978; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). These were 
fundamental failures to observe or attend to some emerging risk as the result of some 
inaccuracy in norms and beliefs. The third group are crises that occur are the result of failures 
in decision-making processes or breakdown in decision vigilance (Janis, 1972). 
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Thus, a crisis occurs where there are deteriorating conditions inside a system that are 
uncontrollable. Pauchant and Mitroff (1992) stated at least two conditions were needed: (1) 
the whole system is being affected physically, and (2) there is a deterioration in members’ 
basic assumptions in which they were forced to realize the faulty foundation of their current 
assumptions. Ray (1999) has suggest that a crisis is created by the organization’s 
imperfection and vulnerability to its environment, while Turner (1978) explained that the 
organization’s imperfection is a result of false assumptions, poor communication, cultural lag 
and misplaced optimism.  
Therefore, prior to a crisis, there are a set of preconditions – accumulated failures – that may 
come from internal or external failures of technology, humans and organization (Shrivastava 
et al., 1988), early warning signals (Fink, 1986; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993), or even the 
operational, regulations and risk perceptions (Pearson & Clair, 1998). These failures have the 
potential to be unnoticed (Tarn, Wen, & Stephen, 2008; Turner, 1978; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997).  However, prior to accidents, a system always sends early warning signals (Fink, 
1986; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993) that are produced from the long-term interaction of social, 
psychological, and cultural factors (Seeger et al., 2003) and complex interactions of 
technological and structural elements (Perrow, 1984). Nevertheless, these warning signals 
are, occasionally, ignored or overlooked.  
2.5 Organizational Studies in Aviation 
The first commercial aviation accident occurred on 10 January 1954. The aircraft, a de 
Havilland DH-106 Comet, operated by BOAC, crashed off the coast of Italy, killing 39 
passengers and crew. This fatality warned the aviation community of the need to improve 
safety. Early research in aviation safety focused on mechanical or technical failures and new 
inventions in aircraft technology succeeded in reducing the number of accidents caused by 
technical faults. Recently, the development in aviation safety studies used organizational 
learning concepts to improve safety and, in fact, this approach succeeds to improve safety in 
aviation operations (Balesteros, 2007).  
2.5.1 After-the-Fact 
Learning in aviation studies means to improve safety because safety is a crucial element in 
any complex socio-technical organization and it is engineered into a system (Huber et al. 
2008).  
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Definition of safety varies with people, but it is universally accepted that safety means 
dealing with hazards and their associated risks, which is not always easy but is, nevertheless, 
still possible to achieve.  The United States Supreme Court (1972) notes that being safe is not 
the equivalent of being risk-free. In contrast, the Royal Society Study Group (1992, p. 6) 
defines the concept of safety as freedom from risks that could not be guaranteed, even if the 
risk was accepted when judged against some criterion of acceptability.  
Harms-Ringdahl (2004) sees safety as a prominent feature in a complex system. In 
commercial aviation, safety is one of the priorities and most important characteristics (Janic, 
2000; Netjasov & Janic, 2008).  The ICAO defined safety as, 
‘the state in which risk of harm to persons or property damage was reduced to, and 
maintained at or below, an acceptable level through a continuing process of hazard 
identification and risk management’ (ICAO, 2006, p. 11).   
Like the U.S. Supreme Court, this definition does not equate safety and freedom from all 
risks; only that risk is controlled at an acceptable level. However, ever since “the Glider 
King”, Otto Lilienthal, invented the glider in 1891 and was killed in one of his experiments, 
world air transport has faced the same problem: accidents.  Therefore, investigation into 
aviation accidents is essential to improve aviation safety because, without improvement, 
occurrences will be high and likely to continue. 
2.5.1.1 Investigation 
An investigation of aircraft accidents or incidents is aimed at determining probable causes 
and recommending control measures (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003, p. 134). For those reasons, 
an aviation accident investigation should be used only for preventing a recurrence in the 
future without any intention to apportion blame or liability (ICAO, 2001). However, Perrow 
(1986a, p. 146) concluded, according to his experience, that there was a strong tendency to 
blame operators who committed errors in almost all accident investigations.  
An investigation is after-the-fact analysis that is started from an event; in this case, either an 
accident or incident. From the event, the analysis will trace back any factors connected to the 
event. Thus, it follows what Dekker et al. (2011) have labelled a “Newtonian” approach to 
investigation. The Newtonian approach looks for equality between cause and effect. So, a 
chain of causal reasoning is established from a premise to a single outcome along linear 
processes. This approach tends to simplify the reasons behind an accident or incident. Dien et 
al. (2012) noted that such an approach often used for event analysis. This is known as the 
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event-chain approach. Applying this approach will result in a picture that shows how a single 
event is connected to its causes. These causes can be, and often are, interlinked. They may 
even overlap; i.e., they may be present at the same time with effects of mutual strengthening 
or reduction.  
Sagan (1994) stated that an investigation should not only focus on organizational systems 
after accidents but also investigate the organizations’ safety systems. Likewise, an 
investigation should also consider the historical background and unfavourable organizational 
contexts (Dien, Llory, & Montmayeul, 2004). 
Le Coze  (2008) proposed an approach to accident investigation based on different levels of 
analysis; whether the focus will be at the micro level (human error), meso level (collective 
and organizational level), or macro level (inter-organizational and social level). These levels 
of analysis will affect the type of data collected, whether it will be from a normative 
perspective (data should fit the model) or use a descriptive strategy (the model should fit the 
data).  
Consequently, there were different methods or models applied to investigate an aircraft 
accident or incident. Netjasov and Janic (2008) placed these accident assessment models into 
four categories: causal models (e.g., Fault Tree Analysis, Common Cause Analysis, Bayesian 
Belief Network), collision risk models (e.g., The Reich-Marks Model, The Intersection 
Model, The Geometric Conflict Model), human error models (e.g., HAZOP, HEART, 
HFACS) and third-party risks, which normally used statistical analysis to define risks to 
persons and the area surrounding airports (e.g., the NTSB analysis estimated the probability 
of being killed by an aircraft crash around an airport and measured the risk around 
Amsterdam’s Schipol airport, which included the individual risk, the societal risk and the risk 
of potential loss of life over the year). These models used technical applications in an 
investigation and aim to understand an accident or incident to improve safety.  
Smart (2004) claimed that aviation accident investigation practices and procedures were able 
to establish public and industry trust. These were applicable to other modes of transport 
because the aviation world has been standardised internationally since a standard of 
investigation from the ICAO – Annex 13 – was adopted as a framework by all contracting 
States.   
30 
 
Ascertaining the causes of an accident and using safety recommendations from the 
investigation to mitigate the cause may prevent a future accident. Janic (2000) stated that a 
safe or unsafe system is seen from its ability to deal with factors that cause an accident or 
incident to happen. A system is considered as unsafe if an accident occurred due to known 
and avoidable factors. However, a system was considered safe if the causes of an accident 
were unknown and had unavoidable factors.  Hence, although there were difficulties in 
conducting aircraft accident investigations because they generally arose from a complex 
system that was mutually dependent on each part (Owen, 1998), an aircraft accident or 
incident should be investigated to determine causal factors and produce safety 
recommendation to guide corrective actions and prevent recurrences.   
2.5.1.2 Biases 
Investigating an event may lead to biases because investigators or analysts already know the 
outcome. Dien et al. (2012), for example, noted the possibility of investigators or analysts not 
being neutral while they were conducting an investigation. These weaknesses will affect the 
investigation so any lessons learned from the event might need to be questioned. 
Hindsight bias is believed to influence how people learn from an accident or incident. 
Scholars (for example, Weick, 1995, Reason, 1990) demonstrated how hindsight bias steered 
humans understanding of an event when they know the outcome. This bias blocks one’s 
ability to study the deeper story of systemic factors that led to that outcome (Woods et al., 
2010). So, a judgment is made based on the outcome known (Baron & Hersey, 1988; 
Lipshitz, 1989), which can lead to an oversimplification of the causal factors. This bias is 
hard to remove, but Dekker (2006) stated that there is possibility to overcome the bias by 
using, for example, methods to identify factors that tended to influence the behaviour of the 
people in a situation before the outcome is known.  
The second potential bias is local rationality. Human beings perform according to their view 
of situations and use their knowledge to achieve their goals (Woods et al., 1994) but this can 
lead to restricted investigation and short-sighted determinations. As with hindsight bias, the 
investigation into an event often ignores this issue because investigators know the outcome. 
The most immediate and (to the investigators) most apparent decisions are regarded as the 
failures that led to the outcome. For example, a pilot decided to land his aircraft instead of 
‘go-around’, which was caused an accident. Investigating this accident would lead to blaming 
the pilot because he made the fateful decision and, thus, the conclusion of the cause of that 
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accident was that it was human error (pilot error). At this point, the investigators have 
oversimplified the causes of an accident because their knowledge of the outcome led them 
directly to judge that pilot committed an error. Instead, they should investigate further and 
determine why he took that decision. Therefore, examining the situation in order to 
understand how and why a decision was taken is essential in an investigation. 
In sum, these biases should be considered both when conducting an investigation and when 
judging the validity of the lessons learned. 
2.5.2 Degradation of an Air Transport System 
2.5.2.1 The Causes of Accidents and Incidents 
It is not surprising that the aviation industry and investigators have also viewed human error 
as a cause of an accident. Human error is a very elusive concept (Woods et.al, 2010, p. xv) 
and it first emerged at the Flight Safety Foundation 28th Annual Seminar in 1974. In the 
following year, the IATA 20th Technical Conference focused on the theme of human error 
and human factors in aviation safety.  At this point, human error was defined as a deviation 
from expected human performance (Allnutt, 1976; Chapanis, 1972; Goldberg, 1984; Peters, 
1966; Senders & Moray, 1991) that resulted in accidents. Later, Rasmussen & Pedersen 
(1984), Perrow (1984) and Reason (1990, 1997) argued that although human error was a 
cause of accidents, it could be as the consequence of system characteristics.  
So, here, there were two different perspectives on human error. The conventional perspective 
sees human error as a cause of an accident but a more contemporary perspective views 
human error as a consequence of multiple-causalities occurring prior to an accident. Woods et 
al. (2010) has discussed two of these perspectives: the Ptolomaic world view and Copernican 
world view. Ptolomaic world view leads to a focus on people because a safe system means 
eliminating any potential for errors. In this view, the system has to be protected from 
unreliable people. Once an accident or incident occurs, they will seek ‘who’ is responsible for 
the event. In contrast, Copernican world view sees people as part of a system that is working 
together to create safety. Thus, enhancing safety is an accumulative effort of people in the 
system to cope with complexities. At this point, instead of blaming the humans, the 
Copernicans’ view complexity as the enemy of safety. 
It is noteworthy, here, that research shows that the human contribution to aircraft accidents is 
approximately 70% (Boeing Commercial Airplanes, 2007; McFadden, 1996; McFadden & 
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Hosmane, 2001; McFadden & Towell, 1999) and sometimes up to 80% (Gaur, 2005; 
Wiegmann, Neil, & Paul, 2001; Wiegmann & Schappell, 2003).   
This is simple recognition that people have limits to their abilities and capabilities. Human 
factor studies aim to understand these limits (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003), which affect 
human performance. Rasmussen (1982) and Reason (1997, 2008) provide three levels of 
human performance: skill-based performance, rule-based performance and knowledge-based 
performance. The classification is based on psychological and situational variables.  
Skill-based performance reflects individual routine tasks (Reason, 1997, 2008) or familiar 
activity and can become unconscious behaviour (Rasmussen, 1983). Routine activity helps 
build individual skills; thus, a person becomes familiar with his or her tasks and 
unconsciously also develops behaviour. In skilled-based performance, possible reasons for 
any failure or mistake tend to be failures of attention or lapses of memory (Reason, 1997). 
Rule-based performance presents a mix of consciousness and unconsciousness behaviour 
(Reason, 1997). Reason (1997, p. 75) defined six behaviours of an individual in the 
performance of his tasks. His performances can be correct or in error if he meets with good 
rules, bad rules or even no rules. Furthermore, Rasmussen (1983) stated that errors in this 
category often occur in highly structured tasks that consists of lots procedures. The last 
category is knowledge-based performance – that is, conscious behaviour (Reason, 1997) – 
and generally results from a shortage or limitation of knowledge of how to react in unfamiliar 
situations (Rasmussen, 1983). Here, error often occurs as result of information shortage or 
inadequate training to deal with new tasks.  
The classification of human performance described above indicates that poor performance is 
not only caused by individuals but also influenced by situation around them. Recent 
development in accident causation study regards an accident as a product of the complexity 
of people’s activities in an organizational and technical context. Accidents are not simply 
viewed as consequences of human and mechanical failures. Instead, accident causes also 
include organizational factors, such as norms and procedures.  
Reviewing aviation accident causation studies, there were some classifications on the most 
probable causes of aviation accidents or incidents. For example, the most probable causes of 
aircraft accidents or incidents are: human errors, mechanical failures, hazardous weather, 
sabotage and military operations (Janic, 2000; Wells, 1997; Wells & Rondrigues, 2003). 
Similarly, the Office of Technology and Assessment (OTA) accident model (Wells & 
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Rondrigues, 2003, p. 135) places human performance in operations (controller and pilot 
capabilities) as the primary safety indicator, together with weather, traffic environment, 
aircraft capabilities and unpredictable events (e.g., sabotage, terrorism). The secondary level 
comprises the organizational influences in operations. The most distal category to an event is 
the tertiary category, a broad category that includes federal policy (regulations and budget), 
values, economics and commercial aviation industry policy (goals, acceptable costs). 
Although there were classifications on the most probable causes of aviation accidents, these 
classifications do not aim to point out a single cause because these factors mostly act together 
to result an accident.  
However, studies of accidents and incidents have shown that understanding failure is 
inseparable from the world views on safety. People with a Copernican world view will not 
stop their investigation after they find ‘Eureka Parts’ (Langewiesche, 1998) – parts or people 
who cause an accident or incident - but they will seek reasons behind these causes. They will 
go deeper in order to understand not only ‘what’ caused the event, but also to seek ‘how’ 
these causes worked and developed together. In contrast, people with a Ptolomeic world view 
only seek the Eureka Parts; once they find these causes, they stop the investigation and focus 
on determining control measures. Those investigators with a Copernican world view identify 
not only the direct or immediate causes of accidents and incidents, but also contributory 
factors and systemic causes inherent in the system or contributing to the system.  
2.5.2.2 Organizational Influence in Accidents and Incidents 
The review thus far underscore that the study of aviation accident causation cannot be 
separated from a concept of organizational accidents, first introduced by James Reason 
(1997). On its release, Reason’s organizational accident theory provided a fresh perspective 
on aviation accident studies. His theory, in fact, had a major impact on the study of aviation 
accidents. However, O’Hare (2000) criticised the applicability of the theory in practice. He 
developed a model, called the ‘Wheel of Misfortune’ that he proposed would fill Reason’s 
theory gap. The O’Hare model was based on Helmreich’s (1990) concentric spheres.  But 
lately, Reason’s “Swiss Cheese Model” had been developed further, by Wiegmann and 
Shappel (2003), to include the influence of the organization in an aviation accident. Their 
model was named the Human Factors Analysis and Classification System (HFACS) and is 
able to measure the organizational influence in an accident. HFACS has provided validation 
for Reason’s theory of organizational influence in accident creation by applying this model in 
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Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
(NASA) research (Netjasov & Janic, 2008).  
Several studies have applied the HFACS model to investigate aviation accidents in different 
countries and have demonstrated the significant contributions of organizations to aviation 
accidents.  For example, Gaur (2005) examined Indian aircraft accidents by analysing 48 
accidents and stated there were 52.1% of organizational influences in Indian aviation 
accidents, while Li, Harris and Yu (2008), who examined 41 commercial aviation accidents 
in the Republic of China, describe  a significant contributing relationship of operational errors 
within the higher levels of organizations. In Germany, Dambier and Hilkenbein (2006) stated 
that organizational factors in aviation accidents were much lower than in India, at only 15%, 
which might be caused by differences in recording data between the two countries.  
However, the concept of organizational accident that was emerged after Reason’s accident 
causation model was introduced still views an accident as produced by a linear proces. The 
concept views an accident as the result of each layer of system’s defense breaking-down. 
This happens slowly as the system has been weakened by latent conditions until all layers of 
defense have broken. Such a system becomes vulnerable to any unsafe acts and it is likely to 
lead to an accident. Reason compared this to a resident pathogen to illustrate the weakened 
processes in the system. Consequently, reviewing this concept, strengthening the layered 
defense or applying defense in-depth will increase system’s reliability.  
As a high-integrity system (Westrum & Adamski, 2010), aviation depends on personnel in 
operations, maintenance and design. This type of system also applies ‘error-free’ 
performance concept. Although there is no system is completely that immune to errors, there 
is always a potential to increase its reliability and resilience through consistent efforts to seek 
the best strategies applied to enhance safety.  
Since there are complex interactions among parts in the air transport system, control is 
essential to manage errors, from the engineering level (e.g., automation) to the administrative 
level (e.g., procedures) (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003). There are various strategies that they 
proposed to improve people performance in the aviation operations; for example, establishing 
appropriate recruitment system to attract qualified and competent people to conduct tasks in 
aviation operations, and maintaining and improving knowledge of people recruited by 
providing training.  
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This re-conceptualization has shifted people’s views regarding accidents as a consequence of 
processes occurring in a system in which people are involved either as direct causes or 
indirect contributors. Recent developments in the aviation accident studies have shifted the 
view of accident as a consequence of events to a view that an accident emerges from the 
multiple interaction of factors in the system, such as people‘s activities, objectives of an 
organization, and limited available resources. 
2.6 Summary 
An accident in a complex socio-technical system such as aviation is always a possibility since 
there are interactions of parts that cannot be anticipated, managed and controlled. It is not a 
single, linear process, but a dynamic set of complex open-ended and interactive processes. 
These processes, or pre-conditions, occur as a complex combination of technical, individual, 
group, organizational and social factors that work together with culture to affect assumptions 
and practices. The degradation process in an organization works in conjunction with the 
establishment of any cultural elements. It is not created instantly but within a lengthy period. 
The discrepancy of these values over a period of time will degrade the organization’s ability 
to cope with hazards which then result in an accident. Therefore, once an accident or incident 
occurs, there is a need to learn from it, so an immediate action to manage it can be applied. 
However, there are barriers to learning that need to be considered. Thus, failure to manage an 
accident or incident and to learn how to improve a system may lead not only to disaster but, 
possibly, move it even faster into a crisis.  
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    Chapter 3 
Context of Study 
This chapter illustrates the setting of this study in seven sections. Section 3.1 describes global 
strategy for aviation safety. Section 3.2 describes Safety Oversight Audit Program. Section 
3.3 describes the growth of the Indonesian air transport system. Section 3.4 describes 
accidents and incidents of commercial aircrafts in Indonesia. Section 3.5 describes the 
National Transport Safety Committee in Indonesia. Section 3.6 introduces an initial model 
developed to guide this study. Finally, Section 3.7 summarises and gives a conclusion.    
3.1 Global Strategy for Aviation Safety 
Safety is essential, and it is important to continuously promote safety in aviation. Thus, in 
May 2005, a consultation between the Air Navigation Commission of the ICAO with industry 
resulted in the formation of the Industry Safety Strategy Group (ISSG), which aims to 
collaborate and define strategies to enhance safety. Its members include: the Airports Council 
International (ACI), Airbus, Boeing, the Civil Air Navigation Services Organization 
(CANSO), the Flight Safety Foundation, the International Air Transport Association (IATA), 
and the International Federation of Airline Pilots Associations (IFALPA). 
This collaboration led to the development of a Global Aviation Safety Road Map, an action 
plan to manage safety in the aviation industry, which has primary objective is to provide a 
common frame of reference for all stakeholders, including States, regulators, airline 
operators, airports, aircraft manufactures, pilot associations, safety organizations and air 
traffic service providers. In particular, the roadmap aims to assist all stakeholders with the 
implementation of harmonised, consistent and coherent safety oversight and processes 
following the dynamic changes in aviation. Hence, information is the key to success to 
achieve all objectives. All information provided by all stakeholders will be treated 
confidentially but is accessible by authorised parties. 
Therefore, all stakeholders are responsible to achieve specific indicators and milestones that 
are provided by the roadmap. The program is a continuous cycle; it provides not only past-
event but also current-state information and future plans of States, regions or industry.  
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To be more precise, each group has different key focus areas, as follows (referring to the 
Global Aviation Safety Roadmap ICAO): 
For States, the key focus areas are: inconsistent implementation of international standards, 
inconsistent regulatory oversight, impediments to reporting of errors and incidents, and 
ineffective incident and accident investigation. 
For regions, the key focus area is: inconsistent coordination of regional programmes 
For industry, the key focus areas are: impediments to reporting and analysing errors and 
incidents, inconsistent use of safety management system, inconsistent compliance with 
regulatory requirements, inconsistent adoption of industry best practice, non-alignment of 
industry safety strategies, and insufficient numbers of qualified personnel, and gaps in use of 
technology to enhance safety. 
In sum, the road map of global aviation safety is a guideline for all elements in world aviation 
to enhance global aviation safety. 
3.2 Safety Oversight Audit Program 
In relation to the roadmap of global aviation safety, the ICAO developed the USOAP to 
understand a State’s status in implementation of safety with respect to compliance with 
international standards. The program was launched in January 1999, which aims to promote 
global aviation safety in all ICAO Member States through conducting regular audits of safety 
oversight system in each State. This program was developed to include safety-related 
provisions in all safety-related Annexes and the Chicago Convention (CC). In 2005, the 
program developed the USOAP Comprehensive Systems Approach (CSA) as a guideline to 
provide comprehensive audits in any State.  
There are eight Critical Elements (CEs) to determine the level of effective and consistent 
implementation of the CEs. The CEs include: 
1. Critical Element 1 (CE-1): Primary aviation legislation, 
2. Critical Element 2 (CE-2): Specific operating regulations, 
3. Critical Element 3 (CE-3): Civil aviation system and safety oversight functions, 
4. Critical Element 4 (CE-4): Qualification and training of technical staff, 
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5. Critical Element 5 (CE-5): Procedures and technical licensing guidance, 
6. Critical Element 6 (CE-6): Licensing and certification obligations, 
7. Critical Element 7 (CE-7): Surveillance obligations, 
8. Critical Element 8 (CE-8): Resolution of safety concerns. 
The CEs are elaborated in the audit protocol questionnaires according to the CC, SARPs 
established in the safety-related Annexes to the CC and any associated ICAO guidance 
material including, but not limited to ICAO Doc. 9734, the establishment of a State’s Safety 
Oversight System (ICAO, 2010). The questionnaires aim to standardize the conduct of audits 
and also the main tools to assess the State’s safety oversight capability.  
There were 135 states, which have been audited by the ICAO for the period of 2005 to 
August 2009. All finding of the reports were stated in the USOAP CSA report. So, this report 
is used to identify the Lack of Effective Implementation (LEI) of safety-related SARPs, 
associated procedures and guidance material. Based on the report, recommendations are 
formulated. The audit findings, including Significant Safety Concerns (SSCs), and 
recommendations will be addressed to the State so that, if required, they can be used to 
provide a Corrective Action Plan (CAP).  
The CAP provides information on actions of how a State plans to solve safety deficiencies, 
including a timeline for completing each action. The CAP is addressed to the Chief of Safety 
Oversight Program (SOA) within 60 days of the receipt of the interim safety oversight audit 
report. The implementation of the CAP will be audited through an ICAO Coordinated 
Validation Mission (ICVM) that aims to determine the status of corrective or mitigating 
measures taken by a State to address safety deficiencies, including SSCs identified in the 
USOAP report (ICAO, 2009). The audit result will determine a level of lack of effective 
implementation (iLEI). According to all audit results (the USOAP CAS and ICVM), the 
Audit Result Report Board (ARRB) will make the summary to the ICAO regarding to the 
current condition of the State. Considering the audit results, the ARRB will recommend 
further action to the ICAO; for example, whether a State will be removed from the list on 
safety issues, or remains in the list and needs further actions to improve the system safety.  
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3.3 The Growth of the Indonesian Aviation 
The Indonesian commercial aviation era began four years after Indonesian Independence 
Day, in 1945, with the launch of the country’s airline, Garuda Indonesia (GI) on 26th January 
1949. There were two regulations issued by the Dutch government used to provide general 
framework of the Indonesian aviation operations. The regulations were: 1) the Regulation on 
Aviation 1932 (Luchrvervoer-besluit) that was issued on 13th February 1933. This regulation 
was revised by the Staatsblad No.118/1933;  and 2) the Ordinance on aviation 1934 
(Luchtvervoer-ordonanntie), which later was revised by the Staadsblad No.2005/1934 and 
the Staadsblad No.36/1942. Specifically, the aviation operations were regulated by the 
Ordinance No.100/1939 (Luchtvervoer-ordonanntie) that has five sections and forty 
paragraphs to provide a detailed framework for aviation operations.  
On 27th December 1958, the government replaced prior regulations but the Ordinance on 
aviation No.100/1939. The new regulation was the Act no.83/1958, which was the first 
legislation in aviation after the Indonesian Independence Day. The Act has eight sections and 
28 paragraphs that provided more details to regulate the Indonesian aviation; for example the 
terminology in aviation operation (e.g., accident, aircraft).  
To provide a comprehensive framework in aviation, the government issued the Act 
No.15/1992 to replace the Act No.83/1958. The new Act has, 76 paragraphs, compared to the 
Act No. 8. The Act No.15/1992 provided comprehensive explanation on the aviation 
operations; for example, visions and missions of the Indonesian aviation and procedures of 
investigation, aircraft registration, airport and environmental impacts. The Act No.15/1992 
had given significant impact to the growth of the Indonesian aviation market because it was 
able to provide a guideline to the aviation operations.   
Nevertheless, the Act did not provide operational guidelines for commercial airlines. 
Therefore, the government issued the Government Regulation No.40/1995 on Air Transport 
on 17th November 1995 and the regulation was in conjunction with the Explanation of the 
Law. The regulation provided detailed information on commercial aviation; for example, 
definition of an airline, airline’s registration and operation, routes and hubs, licensing 
requirements, sanction, tariff and special services for disabled customers. Those explanations 
were elaborated into 10 sections and 49 paragraphs.  
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In 2000, a Ministerial Decree of the Ministry of Transportation No.10/2000 on the licensing 
of airlines was issued that stimulated Indonesian aviation industry. Thus, new entrants were 
able to enter the Indonesian aviation market and this brought in the Low Cost Carrier (LCC). 
This type of airline operated a low cost concept that was more affordable compared to fully-
serviced flights. The two new entrants introducing this concept were Jatayu Airlines and Lion 
Air. According to the Ministry of Transportation report in 2008, the LCC increased the 
growth of aircraft departures. Five years since the issuance of the Ministerial Decree, the 
growth in 2006 increased 169.72%. Furthermore, the growth in aviation industry was also 
supported by the growths of the national GDP and, in particular, the increase of household 
expenditure for domestic travelling by plane for leisure (Statistics Indonesia, 2010). 
In the period 1997-1998, the reformation year, the economical and political instability 
affected the growth of aircraft movements. But, a year after 1998, there were positive impacts 
in the whole country, including the aviation sector. The government attempted to stimulate 
the economy by issuing the Act on antimonopoly No. 5/1999 that opened privatization in 
industries, including aviation. Specifically, the aviation was growing rapidly as the 
government deregulated the aviation industry by issuing Ministerial Decree of the Minister of 
Transportation No. 95/1999 to reform the transportation sectors including air, water and land 
transports.  
The significant growth of the aviation industry reached its peak in 2003 following the growth 
of scheduled commercial service airlines (See Figure 5.2). The growth of aircraft movement 
was there until 2006 although the number of airlines operated was reduced every year in the 
period of 2004-2006.  Two severe accidents in the beginning of 2007 affected the number of 
aircraft movements. Those accidents also affected the number of the scheduled commercial 
service airlines because the government imposed penalties to some airlines as a result of the 
safety audit conducted by the government (Ministry of Transportation, 2008). Examples of 
the penalties were: imposing Aircraft on Grounded (AOG), reviewing airworthiness licenses 
and revocation of airlines’ licenses.  
  
Figure 3.1 Number of Aircraft Movements in Indonesia 1996 
(Source: Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010)
 
Figure 3.2 The Growth of the Indonesian airlines 1998 
(Source: Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010)
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3.4 Accidents and Incidents of Commercial Aircraft in Indonesia 
Following the growth of aviation activities, there was a significant growth of incidents and 
accidents in Indonesia. The terminology of accident and incident used in this study is 
according to ICAO Annex 13, below: 
Table 3.1 Terminology of accident, incident and serious incident according to the 
ICAO (Annex 13) 
Events When  Who/What How 
Accident The time any person 
boards the aircraft with the 
intention of flight until 
such time as all such 
persons have disembarked 
a person is fatally 
or seriously injured 
a result of being in the aircraft or direct contact 
with any part of the aircraft, including parts 
which become detached from the aircraft or 
direct exposure to jet blast except when the 
injuries from natural causes, self-inflicted or 
inflicted by other persons, or when the injuries 
are to stowaways hiding outside the areas 
normally available to the passengers and crew 
the aircraft sustains 
damage or 
structural failure 
adversely affects the structural strength, 
performance or flight characteristics of the 
aircraft and would normally require major repair 
or replacement of the affected component 
except for engine failure or damage, when the 
damage is limited to a single engine (including 
its cowlings or accessories), to propellers, wing 
tips, antennas, probes, vanes, tires, brakes, 
wheels, fairings, panels, landing gear doors, 
windscreens, the aircraft skins (such as small 
dents or puncture holes), or for minor damages 
to main rotor blades, tail rotor blades, landing 
gear, and those resulting from hail or bird strike 
(including holes in the radome) 
the aircraft is missing or is completely inaccessible 
Incident an occurrence, other than accident, associated with the operation of an aircraft which affects or could 
affect the safety of operation 
Serious 
Incident 
It takes place between the 
time any person boards the 
aircraft with the intention 
of flight until such time as 
all such persons have 
disembarked 
 
a manned aircraft There was a high probability of an accident. 
It takes place between the 
time the aircraft is ready to 
move with the purpose of 
flight until such time as it 
comes to rest at the end of 
the flight and the primary 
propulsion system is shut 
down. 
 
an unmanned 
aircraft 
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Janic (2000) stated that rapid growth in air transport often results in a series of accidents. 
That seemed likely to have happened in Indonesia as was evidenced there by 492 occurrences 
within ten years (2000-2009). The condition of Indonesian aviation contributed to the global 
accident rate that rose from 0.65, in 2006, to 0.75, in 2007 as released by the IATA (2008). 
The events were only six in 2000 but they rapidly increased to 23 events a year later. From 
2002 to 2005, the number of events seemed constant, except for two accidents and one 
incident in 2004 and 2005. The crash of MD-82 Lion Air PK-LMN in Adi Sumarmo Aiport, 
Solo had killed 25 people and 137 people injured at the end of 2004. Almost a year after the 
Solo’s crash, in September 2005, a B737-230, operated by Mandala Airlines, failed to 
become airborne and overran the runway 23 in Polonia Airport, Medan. The aircraft flew 
close to the ground and impacted several buildings and vehicles in the road before it was 
destroyed into three parts at the end of the road. The Mandala accident killed 100 passengers 
and crew on board and also killed 49 people on the ground.  
In 2006, the number of events decreased to 35 events comparing to 50 events in 2005. 
However, the impacts was not as severe as in 2007, when a missing B-737 4QB Adam Air 
plane and the crash of a B-737 497 Garuda Indonesia plane increased the number of fatalities 
from 18 fatalities in 2006 to 123 fatalities. Without a doubt, these events and impacts 
evidenced vulnerabilities in the Indonesian air transport system. 
Regarding the high accident and incident rates in all transport modes in Indonesia, the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia established the National Committee of Evaluation of 
Transport Safety and Security (NCETSS) or Komite Nasional Evaluasi Keamanan dan 
Keselamatan Transportasi (Komnas-EKKT). The establishment was through the Presidential 
Decree No.3/2007 that was issued on 11th January 2007. The Decree gave mandates to the 
Committee to conduct comprehensive investigation to the Indonesian transport system, 
including regulations, transport safety standards and procedures. The objectives were to 
determine causes and propose recommendations to improve safety and security in all 
transport modes in Indonesia. 
However, the Committee could not achieve the objectives within the assigned period of three 
months. Therefore, referring to the Presidential Decree No.16/2007, the working period for 
the Committee was extended to another six months to provide more time to conduct in-depth 
investigations.   
  
Figure 3.3 Commercial Aviation Events in Indonesia, 1999 
(Source: Ministry of Transportatio
 
Figure 3.4 Commercial Aviation Fatalities and Injuries 1999 
(Source: Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia, 2010)
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3.5 The National Transport Safety Committee in Indonesia 
The authorised organization to investigate any transport accident and serious incident is the 
National Transport Safety Committee (NTSC) or Komite Nasional Keselamatan Transportasi 
(KNKT). Prior to 2011, as an organization in the Department of Transportation, the NTSC’s 
was responsible to the Ministry of Transportation of the Republic of Indonesia that regulated 
and controlled the aviation operations. Since 2011, the NTSC is responsible directly to the 
President of the Republic of Indonesia. 
The NTSC was established according to Presidential Decree No.105 Year 1999. For air 
transport investigations, prior to the establishment of the NTSC, accidents or incidents were 
investigated by the Air Transport Accident Investigation Committee (1994 – 1999) and, prior 
to 1994, by the Directorate General of Air Transport. 
As an organization that was under, and directly responsible to, the Ministry of 
Transportation; the NTSC did not have its own budget, but was included in the Department of 
Transportation budget. The NTSC’s organization and structure was explained in the 
Ministerial Decree No.46/2004. The Decree has five sections and nineteen paragraphs, which 
stated the establishment of new units in the NTSC’s organization. There is a new unit in the 
NTSC, the Secretariat that has three sub-units: secretariat; research and investigation; and 
information and internal affairs. 
Prior to 2010, the NTSC only investigated serious incidents and accidents, so the Directorate 
of Airworthiness Certification (DAC) investigated incidents.  Investigation of aircraft 
accidents or incidents in Indonesia comply with the ICAO Annex 13 and its Standards and 
Recommended Practices (SARPs), and the ICAO Manual of Aircraft Accident and Incident 
Investigation (Doc 9756). Prior to 2008, there was no manual produced by the NTSC for 
investigations. So the investigation process relied on the ICAO Annex 13 and Civil Aviation 
Safety Regulations (CASR) 830.  
For providing explanations related to an aircraft accident, aircraft incident and aircraft delay, 
the Minister of Transport issued a Ministerial Decree No.1/2004 on reporting accident, 
incident or delaying of aircraft and aircraft accident/incident investigation procedures. The 
Decree was issued on 13th January 2004 and it has five sections: definitions, notification of 
event, protecting any item related to the event, reporting the event and investigating 
procedures.  
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However, the NTSC’s independency, lack of financial support and limited duties to only 
investigate accident and serious incident, seemed to be issues that were need to be considered 
by the government so the objectives of investigation of accident and incident will be 
achieved. 
3.6 Initial Model 
An initial model was developed based on theoretical guidance (Chapter 2) and preliminary 
data collected (see Section 3.4). A combination of theories and the preliminary data collected 
indicated there was something wrong in the Indonesian air transport system. The high 
accident and incident rate evidenced there were deficiencies in the system. Referring to the 
theories, these deficiencies led to implications, below. 
The first implication of the serious deficiencies was high accident and incident rates. The 
phenomenon exemplifies Westrum and Adamski's proposition (2010), which states in a high-
integrity system (such the air transport), high accident and incident rates that indicate the 
system is fragile and vulnerable. Similarly, Fink (1986) said that accidents and incidents were 
evidence of vulnerability in a system and also notified the presence of problems in the 
system. A combination of the phenomenon, the high accident and incident rates, and the 
theoretical framework used to develop the first research question and assumption of this 
study.  
The second implication of the serious deficiencies was that accidents and incidents kept 
occurring. The phenomenon was in line with Perrow (1986a) and Reason (1997). They stated 
their optimism that airlines are able to learn from accidents and incidents. The optimism was 
evidenced by Ballesteros (2007) who found that the accumulation of intense learning 
succeeds in reducing the aviation accident rate and improving aviation safety levels. 
Therefore, if there is a system in which accidents or incidents keep occurring, the system is 
indicated failure to learning. A combination of the phenomenon, the high accident and 
incident rates, and the theoretical framework used to develop the second research question 
and assumption of this study. 
The third implication is a combination of all phenomena: the high accident and incident rates, 
and the repeat occurrence of events. Together these offer warning signals about the condition 
of the system (Fink, 1986; Pearson & Mitroff, 1993), these are produced from the long-term 
interaction of social, psychological, and cultural factors (Seeger et al., 2003) and complex 
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interaction of technological and structural elements (Perrow, 1984). Therefore, the 
phenomena above indicated a pre-crisis stage prior to the EU’s operating ban, which meant a 
crisis event as it caused to psycho-social, physical or economic instability in Indonesia. This 
implication emphasized the analysis of this study to a condition prior to the EU’s operating 
ban.  
In summary, the key propositions guiding the study are: 
1. There is a deterioration process before an accident occurs (Reason, 1990, 1997; Toft 
& Reynolds, 1997; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
2. There are accumulated, unnoticed failures in pre-conditions (Pauchant & Mitroff, 
1992; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miclani, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
3. Recurrences of the events indicate failures in learning from previous events (Pidgeon 
& O'Leary, 2000; Sagan, 1993; Toft & Reynolds, 1997) 
4. Accidents can lead to crises (Pauchant & Mitroff, 1992)  
The combination of all together was used to develop the initial model used to guide this study 
and achieve the objectives of this study. Figure 3.5 is shown, below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3.5 The Initial Model 
3.7 Summary 
The Indonesian aviation grew quickly after the deregulation on transport sector in 1999. 
Following the growth of the wider aviation industry, Indonesian aviation was faced with 
accidents and incidents, which caused injuries and fatalities. Comparing to the global aviation 
safety, the events of accidents and incidents in the Indonesian aviation had affected the 
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average global safety rate. To understand the events and prevent that similar cases happened 
in the future, the NTSC investigated the events and proposed safety recommendations. 
However, the NTSC’s issues of dependency, lack of financial support and the limited duties 
for only investigating accidents and incidents needed to be considered in order to achieve the 
objectives of investigation. 
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    Chapter 4 
First Field Study 
This chapter describes the strategy and approach used in first field work of this research. 
There are six sections in this chapter. Section 4.1 discusses the rational choice of the research 
method and approach. Section 4.2 describes discourse analysis approach. Section 4.3 
describes the method used to generate information, followed by Section 4.4, which describes 
the method used to analyse the information collected and analysed the first data collected. 
The first data collected was presented in this section. Section 4.5 describes the development 
of the initial model in this study. Finally, Section 4.6 summarises the chapter and gives a 
conclusion. 
4.1 Rational Choice of the Research Method and Approach 
Conducting research in social science leads to two paradigms used as a basis for choosing 
approaches. The paradigms are positivism and post-positivism. Positivism is studying social 
phenomenon by seeking facts and causes that tend to rely on testing of hypotheses. Here, 
understanding of the phenomenon uses a predetermined set of answers to a question of a 
certain phenomenon from the researcher’s perspectives (Miles & Huberman 1994). In 
contrast, post-positivism is trying to understand social phenomenon through perspectives of 
the participant of the research, which are developed subjectively by individuals according to 
their views on how the world works; for example, through symbols and languages. Thus, the 
qualitative approach is developed understanding on a phenomenon through an investigative 
process in which the researcher compiling and comparing participants’ perspectives on the 
phenomenon. 
Furthermore, the context of this research needed to be understood. As a starting point, an 
ontological assumption was set. Blaikie (2000) asserted that an ontology is about claims and 
assumptions. Those are the nature of social reality, claims about what exists, what it looks 
like, what units make it up and how these units interact with each other. Air transport system 
is surrounded by a human envelope (operations, maintenance and design), consequently, this 
study cannot be separated from the human dimensions relating to the air transport system; for 
example, values and perceptions on safety. However, understanding the system can never be 
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an objective process since subjectivity influences how people see the world (e.g., safety, 
accident) and, of course, interpret meaning. Accordingly, the Indonesian air transport system 
is viewed as a socially constructed reality.  
Air transport system is complex and dynamic and accordingly any change in the system 
needs to be understood from multiple perspective. Consequently, a post-positivist or 
interpretive paradigm or qualitative approach is the most suitable method to investigate the 
phenomenon in the Indonesian air transport system (Barley, 2006; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 
2007; Rynes & Gephart, 2004), in particular, by applying a qualitative inductive approach 
(Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  This qualitative inductive approach was applied to develop a 
theory about the phenomena under investigation. 
The method adopted enabled the author to obtain a range of data and to develop and explore a 
holistic representation of reality through written texts and listening to research participants 
expressing their perspectives on the social reality of the Indonesian air transport system.   
To determine a suitable tool for this research, once the ontological position was set, an 
epistemology of this research was used to define a framework for ways to obtain knowledge 
from the social reality.  
Epistemological questions refer to what and how knowledge can be obtained about the nature 
of what exists and how it exists (Grix, 2002, p. 177; Guba, 1990, p. 26). This research fell 
under a hermeneutic or interpretive position since it tried to understand diverse meanings of a 
safety concept and its implications in the Indonesian air transport system. Thus, a 
combination of objectives, norms of practices and epistemological position led this research 
to discourse analysis approach. 
4.2  Discourse Analysis 
Qualitative research has a wide variety of strategies to be applied to achieve research 
objectives. But the researcher’s bias in choosing a most suitable strategy is a critical issue that 
must be considered. So research objectives, norms of practices, and the epistemological 
position taken will affect qualitative research (Creswell, 2003; Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007; 
Rynes & Gephart, 2004). Specifically for the organizational studies, Buchanan and Bryman 
(2009) stated that not only the above factors need to be considered in choosing a method, but 
also organizational, historical, political, ethical, evidential, and personal factors. These 
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factors, by time, developed the setting of this research and reflected a creative process of the 
research.  
Differing from other qualitative approaches (e.g., grounded theory, narrative analysis), 
discourse analysis is able to identify social functions; not only by analysing the content but 
also how it is structured and organized. Wetherell et al. (2001) stated that doing social life 
studies means to do discourse because it is the study of language-in-use and human meaning-
making, and it aims at understanding how knowledge is constructed. So ‘to do’ social life 
means ‘to do’ discourse (Wetherell et al., 2001, p. 4). 
The conventional approach of discourse analysis focuses on language as an abstract entity.  
Most recent approaches use both spoken and  written forms of language, as used in social 
practice (Wood & Kroger, 2000). This is in line with Phillips and Hardy (2002, p. 3)  who 
stated, 
“Social reality was produced and made real through discourses, and social interactions 
cannot be fully understood without reference to the discourse that gives them meaning”.  
Consequently, spoken and written data are interrelated since the actual practice of both 
speaking and writing is discourse.  
Discourse analysis can be applied to research about individuals, organizations and societies 
since, in use, it endeavours to uncover the ways in which discourse is produced (Phillips & 
Hardy, 2002). Chia (2000) stated that discourse analysis suited studies about organizations 
because, 
“Discourse itself is the form of organization and, therefore, organization analysis is 
intrinsically discourse analysis”.  
Based on this, discourse analysis was, therefore, employed as it was believed it will reveal the 
social construction that constituted social and organizational life (Phillips & Hardy, 2002) in 
the context of Indonesian aviation safety management.  
4.3 Generating Data 
Data in discourse analysis refers to the words spoken (e.g., interview, conversation) and to 
written text (e.g., reports, emails) because discourse analysis relates to language; it does not 
refer to language in the abstract, but to language in use (Wood & Kroger, 2000).  Yin (2003) 
suggested the use of multiple sources of evidence with the intention of strengthening and 
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achieving credibility of the research. The notion of saturation in discourse analysis is 
‘elastic’, so when a researcher reaches the ‘end-point’, it does not mean that the researcher 
stops finding new things, but that the data collected were sufficient to make and justify an 
interesting argument (Wood & Kroger, 2000).  
Although it was important to generate a very large amount of data, it was also most important 
to collect relevant and valuable data within a certain time span in order to achieve the 
research objectives.  
Therefore, an effective and efficient strategy was used to obtain the important data. Data 
collection and management of data was particularly challenging for discourse analysts 
(Putnam & Fairhurst, 2001) because of the large amount of data available. It is simply not a 
matter of deciding which texts to use as data (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). Here, the critical issue 
faced by a discourse researcher was choosing between texts. It was not only about the choice 
but also justifying that choice to reviewers (Phillips & Hardy, 2002). 
Spoken and written data may be gathered from different sources and situations. First, spoken 
discourse can be gathered by having conversations face-to-face, via telephone or using media 
(Wood & Kroger, 2000).  Conversations and telephones gathered data directly from the 
source, such as a conversation at home, school or, office, while telephoning can also be 
conference calls and calls for information and complaints. Conversely, data gathered using 
media were secondary data; for example, data from television, film documentaries or voice 
records. Finally, written texts may be gathered from several sources, such as media articles, 
reports, minutes of meetings, notes and bills. 
4.3.1 Written Discourse 
To gather important and relevant information for this study, a broad conceptual framework 
was used to choose the data required. Phillips and Hardy (2002) stated that texts may be the 
best constituted data, but it depends on what the researcher is studying. If the research’s topic 
is about an organization then texts that are naturally produced offer advantages over 
interviews. However, if the topic is about an individual, then an interview is often the best 
and least problematic approach. Since this research focuses upon broader societal discourses, 
then texts that were disseminated widely (e.g., government reports, newspapers, magazines) 
seemed to offer the best sources of data.  
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This study is similar to prior studies in disasters that used investigation reports for analyse 
pattern of accidents and disasters; for example, Turner (1978; 1997) analysed 84 accidents 
and disasters in the UK, he analysed only the reports. Toft (Turner’s doctoral student) and 
Reynolds (1997), extended this type of analysis to include a wider body of data, which 
strengthened their findings, but they did not strictly account for time and history in their 
analysis.  
Therefore, beside analysing accident and incident investigation reports, to partly fill a gap left 
by previous studies, this study used articles from the media and other reports or publications. 
The media articles aimed to provide ‘day-to-day’ information of the Indonesian air transport 
system. The reports and publications from credible organizations or institutions would 
provide information such as Indonesian aviation history and its development. Criteria of each 
source of data were developed in order to maintain credibility of the study as shown in table 
4.1, 4.2 and 4.3, below.  
Table 4.1 Selection of media 
Selection Criteria Logical Reasoning 
National newspaper/magazines The scope and percentage of news written were mainly 
in national context 
Cooperation of media To achieve level of accessibility to gather and collected 
any related information from the media’s databases 
Time frame The time frame of article collected was from beginning 
of1999 to end of 2007. Beginning of 1999, there were 
numbers of articles related to establishment of the 
NTSC. Furthermore, there were numbers of articles 
until end of 2007 that were provided extensive and 
comprehensive reports regarding to the EU’s operating 
ban applied to all Indonesian certified airlines.  
 
Table 4.2 Selection of other reports/publications 
Selection Criteria Logical Reasoning 
An organization/institution has credibility to 
provide information-related to aviation 
operations 
To maintain the credibility of the reports or publications 
produced 
Accessibility To achieve level of accessibility to gather and collected 
any related information from the organization’s or 
institution’s databases 
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Table 4.3 Selection of accident/incident cases 
Selection Criteria Logical Reasoning 
Case study is an official report from the 
investigation bureau in Indonesia 
To maintain credibility of the report 
The events occurring between 1999 to 2007  The NTSC was established in 1999, therefore aviation 
accident and incident investigation officially started in 
1999. The operating ban was announced in July 2007 
after a series of incidents and accidents occurred in 
Indonesia and used as a top event in Indonesian 
aviation. Thus,  the time frame 1999-2007 was  used to 
guide this research (see details in Chapter 2) 
Case study is officially published by the 
NTSC in their website and/or had been 
announced to the public 
Therefore transparency of investigation reports will be 
maintained 
Case study is any incident or accident that 
occurred in Indonesia and the operating 
airline is registered as an Indonesian 
commercial airline. This airlines operates a 
scheduled flight service 
To achieve the context of research that analysed the 
Indonesian commercial air transport system. This 
research has limited the context to analyse only 
scheduled flight services. 
4.3.2 Spoken Discourse 
The written texts were used to develop initial model and there were six open-discussions that 
were conducted with six experts who were involved in the Indonesian air transport system. 
Open-discussions aimed at generating thoughts and ideas from people who were involved in 
air transport related activities. There were no particular criteria used to determine the key 
persons in order to let the discussions flow naturally. All discussions were conducted while 
getting permission to obtain data from the NTSC, the Department of Transportation, and 
Kompas daily newspaper. 
4.3.3 Conducting First Field Work 
Field work was conducted twice and for different purposes. The first field work, from April 
to July 2009, aimed to explore issues in the Indonesian air transport system by generating 
written information.  
Prior to the commencement of the field works, permission was needed to obtain that 
information. Letters were prepared and addressed to the institutions and organizations where 
the information would be gathered (for example, the Ministry of Transportation, the 
Department of Airworthiness, Kompas daily newspaper, Gatra Magazine, Tempo Magazine 
and Angkasa Magazine).  
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The letters were delivered either by post or email. Some appointments with the proposed 
sources were agreed to beforehand, but at the time of the commencement of the first field 
work, some appointments needed to be re-arranged as Indonesia prepared for a Presidential 
Election.  
Reports and publications from government institutions and organizations were generated at 
the Directorate General of Commercial Aviation (DGCA) and the National Transport Safety 
Committee (NTSC). Furthermore, publications were generated from one daily newspaper, 
one aviation magazine and two weekly magazines. A daily newspaper, Kompas, approved 
access to their database so information was generated directly at the Kompas Information 
Centre (Pusat Informasi Kompas) while the other two weekly magazines (Gatra and Tempo) 
were accessed online. Later, an aviation magazine, Angkasa, was included as a source of 
research after direct access to their journalists was approved. In summary, there were 1,438 
articles from the media, 63 policies, 36 reports and 174 other related sources (e.g., cartoons, 
notes) collected1.  
4.4 Data Analysis 
Data analysis aimed to reduce the large amount of data collected to a clear, concise and 
accurate summary.  It was conducted following the initial data collection and concurrently 
with further data collection (Patton, 2002). Therefore, the analysis began with the first field 
work and continued throughout the course of the research as new sources of information 
became available. Richards (2005) states that qualitative data are messy records, so they need 
to be organized to reach a stage of understanding about the context of the research and to 
prevent the loss of complexity.  Therefore, an operational framework was established to 
guide the analysis, before the details of the analysis were constructed.  
4.4.1 Operational Framework 
This study started from a phenomenon in the Indonesian air transport system. This 
phenomenon was the high incident and accident rates (see Section 3.4), which indicated that 
there were safety deficiencies in the system.  Therefore, an initial model was developed to 
understand how this phenomenon developed. The more information collected, the greater the 
understanding achieved, which resulted in the development in the findings of this study. The 
                                                 
1
 Some written information was generated during the second field work directly from the interviewees. 
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understanding was also guided by the theories. The development of this study is shown in 
Figure 4.1, below. 
The first stage of the study was developing the research design. This was constructed from 
secondary data (e.g., the ICAO reports, the EU’s reports, Government press releases) 
retrieved from the internet and was compared later to the theories to define a gap in the study. 
In this stage, a research question and two broad assumptions were addressed with the aim of 
achieving the research objectives. Finally, an initial model was drawn to guide the study.  
The second stage expanded the initial model by analysing the data collected from the first 
field work. The revised model was a factual picture of conditions in the Indonesian air 
transport system. Laying out this framework clearly exemplified, emphasized and framed the 
problems that would then be analysed more deeply. At the same time, analysing the collected 
data resulted in groups that explained this framework in detail. Thus, both findings were 
determined simultaneously.  
The third stage of this study was to confirm, validate and strengthen the findings derived 
from the previous stage. Then, there was a need to conduct a second field work to investigate 
the consistency of the findings. Afterwards, the data collected would be analysed and the data 
collected in the first field work revisited before conclusions were made.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.1 The operational processes of data analysis 
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4.4.2 Managing the Collected Information 
The collection of information needed to be treated securely because most was confidential 
and sensitive and could not be revealed without the approval of the relevant institutions or 
individuals. In particular for the interviews, any single piece of information gathered during 
the field work was unique and precious, and could not be recaptured in precisely the same 
way, even if the opportunity were available again (Patton, 2002). Issues that should be 
highlighted were the ethical obligation to protect the confidentiality and anonymity of the 
interviewees (Mason, 1996; Patton, 2002). 
Data was stored after sorting to minimize ‘thick’ irrelevant data and unused information. 
Clearly setting the context helped to arrange the data which increased following the research 
flow. Data was grouped as written data and spoken data. Some written data had no digital 
form so only relevant passages were rewritten in digital form. Spoken information was stored 
in both audio and transcriptions files.  
All soft copies or digital forms were stored in a workstation. Those data had two back-up 
files, in an individual computer and an external disk. Hard copies or printed forms were kept 
in secure places where only the researcher had access to them.  
4.4.3 Development of the Coding Structure 
The coding process was guided by the broad assumptions. Three stages of coding were 
applied in this research. First, the data collected were read and coded. This stage was used to 
emerge ideas or thoughts, which seemed related to the broad assumptions, while the data 
were also sorted, allowing the data to reflect the broad assumptions that were coded. In the 
second stage, those codes were revisited, including the references, to derive more possible 
codes that might be defined. This stage was also used to improve understanding about the 
research based on the data collected. The more data reviewed, the larger the understanding 
achieved. Finally, the codes were integrated and classified.  
The process of coding revealed a complex and multifaceted phenomenon in the Indonesian 
air transport. Thus, inductive analytic and deductive approaches were needed to make a 
decision confidently. A broad category was formed by applying an inductive analytic so 
patterns of ideas were able to be identified; likewise a deductive approach was used to form a 
sub-category. Hence, integrating and classifying ideas were about judgments. The higher 
understanding developed from comprehensive analyses, the higher confidence achieved to 
58 
 
make a judgment. This process was conducted continuously until a stage of saturation or new 
categories and sub-categories were not needed. 
4.4.3.1 Coding 
A qualitative researcher uses codes to generate new ideas and gather material by topic 
(Richards, 2005). Qualitative coding occurred throughout the research since the ideas were 
developed from data until the stage where the researcher perceived they had fully 
understanding of the phenomena at hand, which allow them to give reasoned and logical 
explanations (Richards, 2005). Revisiting data from qualitative coding was essential since the 
understanding and explanation of topics developed over time. It was possible to generate new 
categories until the last stages of the research. Therefore, coding was about data retention 
(Richards, 2005) and was carried out iteratively (Le Compte & Schensul, 1999). In addition, 
coding gave an opportunity for the researcher to introduce a new perspective in interpreting 
data so it could be compared with other researchers’ interpretations.   
Coding followed the procedures outlined by Le Compte & Schensul (1999). Coding managed 
and organised data into categories that were relevant to the research questions. By reading the 
entire data, important points, ideas or concepts were able to be captured, so sorting and 
analysing the data ran systematically. Hence, coding made sense of the collected information 
therefore the themes for analysis can be developed and finally a coherent and interesting 
narrative was constructed.  
There are a number of ways to code based on advice from different scholars. Richards (2005) 
distinguishes three ways of coding: descriptive, topic and analytical. Descriptive coding 
involved storing information about the cases being studied. It was not just a process of 
selecting the text to be interpreted. Topic coding was harder because it involved labelling text 
according to its subject. This type of coding often employed software that helped to code 
automatically. But the core to qualitative enquiry was analytical coding (Richards, 2005) 
applied to achieve theory ‘emergence’ and theory affirmation. 
Mason (1996) views the application of coding in three different ways: literal, interpretive, 
and reflexive. At the start of the analysis in qualitative research, the researcher may apply 
literal coding followed by interpreting the coded data. Reflexive coding applied the analysis 
as an integral part of the data that had been generated. Both Mason (1996) and Richards 
(2005) defines the process of coding as going from the initial process until the analytical 
stages emerged and gave a sense to the ideas generated. 
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Coding can be done either manually or using computer software such as NUDIST and 
NVivo. In this research, data from the first field work had two forms: printed data and written 
data in Bahasa Indonesia (the official language of Indonesia). Therefore, the first data 
collected was coded manually. Manual coding was helpful to reduce and sort the huge 
amount of printed data and, at the same time, revealed emerging individual themes to 
understand how the different themes knitted together to form a whole. These important points 
were rewritten in English (with random reverse translation checks on accuracy). Hence, 
generating the themes was much easier since all collected document were standardized.  
The purpose of this stage of analysis was to ensure that the theoretical ideas emerging in the 
first round of coding could be systematically supported in the data, thus addressing the 
validity of research results and this making it ‘easier’ to see if all data were relevant.  
4.4.3.2 Classifying, Integrating Themes and Interpreting Data 
Further analysis involved analysing the coded texts and sorting the most relevant data into 
free nodes. These free nodes were refined, merged, or integrated into tree nodes to describe 
the inter-relationships between the free nodes contained in each tree nodes. The next stage of 
analysis allowed the researcher to tell the ‘story’ and answer the research questions (Le 
Compte & Schensul, 1999).  
Most written texts were in Bahasa Indonesia, including all interviews. To reduce the potential 
of inaccuracy in translations, ideally, the selected texts or phrases such as quotations would 
be presented in Bahasa Indonesia but since this research was presented in English, the 
quotations were in English except for some words or expressions that could not be translated 
into English. The coding process started quite superficially but, through time, a coding 
decision was based on knowledge, as the understanding of the topic developed. So, in time, a 
comprehensive understanding developed the researcher’s confidence to make a judgment.  
4.4.4 Analysis of Collected Data 
Analysing data in qualitative research has no particular template. A discourse researcher, like 
other qualitative researchers, needs to define their own conventions and work approach. The 
approaches must assure logical and convincing justifications to ‘make sense’ of the data, the 
analysis and, finally, the results.  
The phenomena of the Indonesian air transport was investigated by tracing back to determine 
factors that seemed directly linked to the outcomes (Langley, 2009). Thus, the analysis was 
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outcome-driven; giving explanations from the outcomes to prior causes to significant events 
(Aldrich, 2001). 
The analysis of the first data collected aimed to develop an understanding how the outcome 
occurred in the Indonesia air transport system. Two broad assumptions were used as 
guidance. The data collected were then classified and analysed separately. Findings from 
each analysis were then triangulated and the results summarised. There were two stages 
analysis: analyses of the first data collected and the analyses of the second data collected 
(Figure 4.2).  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.2 Data Analysis Processes 
Two types of data were collected from the first field work: written and spoken discourse. 
Prior to analysis, the data was classified according to Wood & Kroger (2000) as shown in 
Table 4.4 while Figure 4.3 shows the distribution of the first data collected according the 
sources. The classification aimed to group the data. The analysis was conducted according 
the source: media articles, the NTSC’s investigations reports and open-discussions. Lastly, 
the research diaries and notes collected while undertaking the field work were used to retrieve 
overlooked information.  
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Table 4.4 Classification of the first data collected (adopted classification of Wood & Kroger, 
2000) 
Types of discourse 
data 
Source of Data Situation of data 
is gathered 
Collected Data 
Written Discourse Publications Gather from the 
organization’s 
database, provided 
by the 
organization 
online  
1438 newspaper and 
magazine articles 
47 reports 
14 cartoons 
Unpublished Day to day 
thoughts and notes 
obtained during 
the field works 
Research diaries 
Notes of field works 
Spoken Discourse Face to face According to the 
appointments 
made with the 
sources 
6 open-discussions 
 
 
The most data collected were from media articles (93%), followed by reports and 
regulations/policies (each 3%). Cartoons comprised only 1% of the whole data collected 
while open-discussions were less than that. The distribution of each source is presented, 
below (Figure 4.3). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.3 The distribution of the first data collected, based on sources 
The first data collected were analysed by tracing the outcome back; a framework to analyse 
the data is shown in Figure 4.4:  
Medias' Articles
93%
Reports
3%
Cartoons
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Regulations/policies
3% Open Discussions
0%
Medias' Articles Reports Cartoons Regulations/policies Open Discussions
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Figure 4.4 Outcome-driven-explanation processes for the research 
The data collected were analysed to determine ‘how’ the processes occurred and ‘what’ 
factors caused the process. The data were analysed separately and corroborated with each 
other to achieve credibility.  
The written texts collected from credible organizations and institutions were not only reports 
but also press releases, announcements and correspondences related to Indonesian aviation. 
There were 47 written texts analysed. The data were collected mainly from the ICAO, the EU 
and the Indonesian authorities. In order to maintain the consistency during analysis, the 
categories developed were similar to the media article classifications. 
4.4.4.1 Analysis of the ICAO Audit Reports in 2000 and 2004 
Indonesia was audited by the ICAO since 2000 according to the Memorandum of 
Understanding (MOU) signed on 30 August 2000 between Indonesia and the ICAO. The first 
audit was the initial audit, from 6 to 15 November 1999, which was referred to Annexes 1, 6 
and 8, the Chicago Convention, and related provisions in other Annexes. It also referred to 
guidance material and relevant safety-related practices in general use in aviation industry. 
The audit identified shortcomings in the Indonesian air transport system; in particular, there 
were differences of implementation of aviation-related activities. The CASR Parts 61, 63, 91, 
121, 135 and 183 did not comply with the Annexes 1, 6 and 8. For example, there were 
schools for pilots that were approved although those did not meet the minimum flight training 
as required by Annex 1 (ICAO, 2001), and CSARs for an accident investigation program 
only apply to Commuter and Air Charter carriers under Part 135 but no similar requirements 
may exist for domestic, flag and supplemental carriers (ICAO, 2001). 
On 18 January 2001, the Indonesian government submitted an action plan to respond to the 
initial audit 2004. The action plan was found to be satisfactory, which then was followed by 
follow-up mission, from 13 to 15 April 2004. This mission identified that the LEI 2000 was 
44.27% and it reduced to 10.95% in 2004, which indicated there was a significant 
improvement in the Indonesian aviation. 
P re co n d itio n s U n sa fe  A c ts O u tco m e
O u tc o m e  –  d riv e n  -  e x p la n a tio n
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However, there were figures that needed to be improved but, in fact, they were not. For 
example, the number of inspectors was reduced from 32 inspectors in the initial audit 2001 to 
12 inspectors in the follow-up audit 2004, the number of technical staff in the DGCA 
headquarter was reduced from 129 staff in the initial audit 2001 to 116 staff in the follow-up 
audit in 2004. The ICAO later criticized these figures in the next audit 2007. 
The audits clearly captured issues on imbalanced growth of the aviation industry and the 
number of people who were responsible to handle it. Furthermore, incompetency of officers 
in the regulatory body, the DGCA, was also highlighted. The ICAO identified there was lack 
of training provided to officers thus although the officers were capable and qualified, their 
knowledge were not maintained and improved. Consequently, after sometime, their 
knowledge was out-of-date compared to the growth of aviation industry. ICAO concluded 
that these issues rooted from lack of finances. The comparisons of findings of the audits are 
presented in Table 4.1, below. 
Table 4.5 The findings derived from the Initial Audit 2001 and the Follow-up Audit 
2004 
Activities Audited The Initial Audit 2001 The Follow-up Audit 
2004 
Technical staff in headquarter 129 116 
Active pilot licenses 3969 4336 
Active flight crew licenses 199 200 
Active licenses other than pilot and crew 5044 9162 
Air transport operators 74 59 
AOCs issued 35 59 
Aircraft operation inspectors 32 12 
Aircraft registered in Indonesia 702 982 
C of A issued 520 608 
AMOs 32 56 
Aircraft maintenance workshop 35 0 
Design organizations 1 1 
Aircraft manufacturing organizations 1 1 
Aircraft type certificate issued 1 1 
Aircraft airworthiness inspectors 42 29 
Aviation training establishments 0 4 
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4.4.4.2 The ICAO CSA Audits in 2007 and 2009 
Following the expanded concept of the USOAP to the Comprehensive System Approach 
(CSA), the second audit was conducted from 6 to 15 February 2007. There were 121 findings 
identified. These findings were related to: primary aviation legislation and civil aviation 
regulations (LEG), civil aviation organization (ORG), personnel licensing and training (PEL), 
aircraft operations certification and supervision (OPS), airworthiness of aircraft (AIR), 
aircraft accident and incident investigation (AIG), air navigation services (ANS) and 
aerodromes (AGA). The Indonesia’s Lack of Safety Implementation (LEI) was 45.88%. The 
figure was higher than the average LEI of 135 States audited (42.6%). Consequently, the 
Audit Result Review Board (ARRB) listed Indonesia under ‘watch list’. 
The highest deficiencies were identified in the CE-4 or Qualification and training of technical 
staff that reached 80%, which was 19.65% higher than the average LEI of 135 States audited. 
This figure was followed by deficiencies in primary aviation legislation (CE-1), civil aviation 
system and safety oversight function (CE-3) and resolution of safety concern (CE-8), which 
these CEs reached 50% and higher than the average LEI of 135 States audit that 26.16%, 
45.02% and 49.02%, respectively.  
The main issue identified was incompetency and quantity of people who were responsible for 
aviation operations. The ICAO highlighted lack of financial support and improper 
recruitment system as the main reasons of these issues. Improper recruitment system existed 
as there was no establish mechanism used to attract qualified and competent people to work 
in aviation related activities in regulatory bodies. Furthermore, insufficient number of 
training and lack of material or guidance to improve knowledge were identified to contribute 
to incompetency of people in the system. While there were regulations or policies or 
procedures needed for operations, but were not existed. Thus, a combination of these factors 
affected performance people to deal with aviation-related activities. 
In response to the audit result, Indonesia submitted a Corrective Action Plan (CAP) on 16 
July 2007. The draft was reviewed and resubmitted with some changes and finalised on 1 
November 2007. As Indonesia had its CAP to improve the State’s aviation safety, the ARRB 
worked closely to monitor the progress made.  
In order to clarify and validate the progress made and reported by the Indonesian authority, 
the ICAO conducted the validation audit named ICAO Coordinated Validation Mission 
(ICVM), from 4 to 7 August 2009. The audit found there was a significant improvement of 
 effective safety implementation
significantly from 45.88% to 19.64%. The improvement had made Indonesia was 
recommended to be removed from the ARRB watch list.
Figure 4.5 Lack of Effective 
(Source: ICAO, 2010) 
Figure 4.6 Average of Lack of Effective Implementation (%): Global v Indonesia
(Source: ICAO, 2010) 
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4.4.4.3 Analysis of the NTSC investigation reports 
Analysis of the NTSC investigation reports aimed to understand ‘how ‘and ‘why’ an incident 
or an accident occurred. Thus, the analyses determined the most probable causes, which 
would later be linked to factual information (e.g., aircraft information, personnel information) 
to determine the preconditions. Ten NTSC investigation reports were selected. The logical 
reasoning for this selection was presented in Section 4.2.1 this chapter.  
There were four stages to analysing the reports. First, the reports were read carefully to 
understand the chronology of the occurrence. There were two incidents, a serious incident, 
and seven accidents. Four events occurred during landing approaches, four events occurred 
while taking-off and two events occurred while cruising. One of two cruising events caused a 
missed landing, and another was a missing flight. In the second stage, how the occurrence 
happened was examined to determine the most probable causes. Seven reports indicated the 
cockpit crew committed unsafe acts. One report described a combination of thermal and 
mechanical failures, and two other reports revealed an instrument dysfunction that led to 
make decision errors. These most probable causes were listed prior to the next stage of 
analysis. Third, factual information was examined. The factual information analysed 
consisted of personnel information, aircraft information, airline information and 
environmental information (e.g., meteorological information, airport). The factual 
information was linked to the most probable causes, and so the precondition of the 
occurrence was determined. The flowchart of the analysis is attached as Appendix C. 
Referring to the NTSC investigation reports, there were deficiencies identified that affected 
the quality of human performances in aviation operation.  In the ten cases analysed, there 
were four cases determined that non-established procedures affected people in operations 
(e.g., decisions taken by cockpit crew, immediate response of the crew during an accident or 
incident occurred), while other three cases revealed how the top and middle level 
management and also regulator did not review and evaluate the existing procedures.  
Consequently, there were out-of-date procedures and no rules identified in the NTSC 
investigation reports. For example, out-of-date AEP in the Mandala Airlines MDL 091 case 
led to poor performance during the accident, which contributed to reduce number of 
survivors. 
In line with the findings revealed in the ICAO USOAP audit report, the NTSC found that 
poor performance in aviation operations (e.g., wrong decision taken by pilots, lack of 
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understanding on instruments at the ATC) were caused by deficiencies related to knowledge; 
for example, less initial or recurrent training provided to cockpit crew. The NTSC 
investigation found that the cockpit crew had no recurrent training for about five years prior 
to accident of the Mandala Airlines MDL 493 aircraft. Inadequate training of the pilots led to 
situational unawareness of the rapid changes of the weather so the PIC took a wrong decision. 
Consequently, the aircraft was floating and touching-down approximately 1000 meters 
beyond the target of touch-down point. 
All deficiencies implied that there was lack of control to the operational levels. For example, 
a case of violation to aviation procedures occurred in the Dirgantara Air Service AW 3130 
accident when the cockpit crew and the ground handling officers manipulated load manifests. 
As there was no control from the authorities, the manipulation had been practiced several 
times prior to the accident. Similarly, the Adam Air DHI 574 missing plane illustrated the 
lack of control over the recurring IRS defects that reached 154 times. However, the aircraft 
was allowed to be operated. Consequently the malfunction of the IRS contributed to the 
accident. 
On the basis of ten NTSC investigation reports analysed, there were deficiencies in the 
Indonesian air transport system identified (see Table 4.6). Although nine cases reported the 
poor human performances in the operational level as the direct causes of those accidents, 
these causes were consequences of deficiencies existed in the system. Hence, accidents 
occurred were not caused by single factors, but there were multiple-causes behind accidents 
as identified in the NTSC investigation reports.  
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Table 4.6 Summary of NTSC Investigation Report Analyses 
Outcomes Unsafe Acts Deficiencies Safety Recommendations Criticism 
Mandala Airlines MDL 493, 
5 April 1999 
The cockpit crew apparently did not 
rely on the flight instrument 
readings, but seemed to trust visual 
observations of the environmental 
and weather conditions. They 
showed a lack of situational 
awareness because of the rapid 
changed of the weather. This led the 
PIC to make the wrong decision 
Inadequate training. 
Unrevised manuals 
No established rules and 
procedures 
Lack of enforcement to comply 
and implement the rules and 
procedures. 
 
No recommendations addressed to the 
DGAC (regulator) that failed to 
enforce rules. Final report was released 
on June 2002 
Awair QZ 730, 19 October 
2000 
The pilot was slightly late in 
reducing the reverse thrust to the 
idle position. Thus an engine stall 
occurred and was followed by tail 
pipe fires on both engines 
No established rules and 
procedures 
Failure to ensure implementation 
of rules 
Inadequate training 
 
All recommendations were addressed 
to the DGAC and none to the aircraft 
or airport operators. Final report was 
released on March 2004.  
Dirgantara Air Service AW 
3130, 18 November 2000 
The PIC had the wrong perception 
on take-off procedures and the 
aircraft exceeded its manufacturer’s 
MTOW limits 
Fail to control and supervise the 
aviation activities.  
Safety recommendations were not 
clearly addressed. Final report was 
released on February 2002. 
Garuda Indonesia GA 880, 
23 November 2001 
The failure mode was a creep-
fatigue (thermal and mechanical) 
combination.  
Controlling and supervising was 
not applied properly by the DGAC 
(regulator) and the aircraft 
operator to ensure the procedures 
were followed. 
Safety recommendations were 
addressed to the DGAC but none to the 
aircraft operator to ensure proper 
maintenance were conducted. Final 
report was released on March 2003 
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Outcomes Unsafe Acts Deficiencies Safety Recommendations Criticism 
Lion Air JT 386, 14 January 
2002 
There were indications that the 
cockpit crew failed to execute the 
take-off checklist while the aural 
warning CB failed to be detected by 
the maintenance personnel and this 
was a contributing factor to the 
accident 
Fail to ensure the implementation 
of rules while the aircraft operator 
did not provide adequate training  
Safety recommendations were 
addressed to both the DGAC and the 
aircraft operator. Final report was 
released on March 2003 
Lion Air JT 787, 31 October 
2003 
The slippery runway and crosswind 
caused the aircraft to drift, while the 
counter action of pilot did not 
follow the procedure of AOM and 
failed to bring the aircraft back to 
the centreline 
The unsafe actions taken by the 
cockpit crew indicated lack of 
knowledge, which may be rooted 
in the lack of the operator to 
provide adequate training for their 
cockpit crews. 
The report mentioned that several cases 
had occurred at Hassanudin airport 
previously. But there was no 
recommendation for conducting a 
study at the airport. The report is only 
few pages on and little information was 
provided.  
Mandala Airlines MDL 091, 
5 September 2005 
The aircraft took-off with improper 
take-off configuration and this 
caused the aircraft to fail to lift off. 
The aircraft’s take off warning horn 
was not heard on the CAM channel 
of the VCR. It is possible that the 
take-off configuration warning horn 
was not sounding 
The DGAC did not review and 
evaluate the operator’s AOM/SOP 
then the operator failed to 
recognise weaknesses in the 
AOM/SOP. Additionally, an out of 
date of AEP had affected 
performances during an 
emergency condition. In this case, 
lack of performance contributed to 
increase number of victims. 
Although there are deficiencies 
determined in the aircraft operator and 
the DGAC bodies, furthermore there 
are also some issues related to 
deficiencies determined in other 
bodies, for example the local authority 
and airport operator. An updated AEP 
was not established so at the time of 
accident there was a lack of 
coordination between those bodies. 
Referring to the recommendation 
addressed by the NTSC, none of 
recommendations were addressed to 
other bodies except the aircraft 
operator and the DGAC. The report 
was released on September 2009 
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Outcomes Unsafe Acts Deficiencies Safety Recommendations Criticism 
Adam Air DHI 782, 11 
January 2006 
The aircraft’s IRS malfunctioned 
resulting in the IRU providing 
erroneous and misleading 
navigation indications. The PIC 
conducted unapproved tests to the 
flight attendant trainee so his 
attention had been diverted to this 
action. The cockpit crews failed to 
recognize the deviation of the 
aircraft from designated point. 
 
Lack of control was revealed in 
this case. Additionally, the 
operator did not have sufficient 
knowledge to understand safety 
needs by resolving the IRU issues. 
Lack of knowledge was resulted 
from inadequate training for 
operation and maintenance 
personnel. Inadequate 
proficiencies to deal with 
technology were also revealed in 
this case.  
Safety recommendations were 
addressed to the DGAC and the aircraft 
operator but none to the airport 
operator. The report was released on 
August 2008 
Adam Air DHI 574, 1 
January 2007 
The pilots faced an IRS 
malfunction. They had inadequate 
knowledge to solve the problems. 
Consequently, the aircraft rolled to 
the right and exceeded 35 degrees 
right bank. The pilots then became 
spatially disoriented, finally, the 
aircraft crashed into the Makassar 
Strait. 
 
The repetitive defects of the IRS 
did not lead the DGAC to force the 
operator to solve the problems. 
The DGAC also indicated a failure 
to ensure that the initial and 
recurrent trainings to maintain and 
improve the operator crew’s 
knowledge were conducted. The 
DGAC also did not ensure that the 
current training programmes met 
the required standard. The DGAC 
also failed to do their functions to 
ensure the quality of the airport 
operator resources, such as 
humans and technology. 
Different from other NTSC 
investigation reports, this reports 
showed the investigation was 
conducted comprehensively. Thus the 
recommendations were addressed 
continuously according to the progress 
of the investigations. The 
recommendations were also addressed 
to the Ministry of Transportation to 
review related law that comply with the 
ICAO Annex 13. Moreover, the 
recommendations were also addressed 
to other aircraft operators to ensure 
their aircrafts did not have the same 
IRS malfunction. The report was 
released on August 2008  
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Outcomes Unsafe Acts Deficiencies Safety Recommendations Criticism 
Garuda Indonesia GA 200 
on 7 March 2007 
The aircraft was flown at an 
excessively high airspeed and steep 
descent during the approach and 
landing, resulting in an un-
stabilized approach. The PIC did 
not follow company procedures 
that required him to go around 
when the approach was not 
stabilised. The co-pilot also failed 
to follow the company procedures 
to take control over the aircraft 
when he saw the PIC ignored the 
procedures. Additionally, the 
condition of the airport did not 
meet the ICAO standard also 
contributed to accident 
The operator should develop a 
safety culture environment, which 
may be needed to enforce the 
rules. The airport operator failed 
to follow the rules, moreover, they 
had inadequate knowledge to 
establish an immediate response 
system to implement if there is an 
occurrence and had a lack of 
control for ensuring readiness to 
handle an occurrence 
Similar with the Adam Air 
investigation report, the NTSC showed 
the investigation was conducted 
comprehensively. Thus the 
recommendations were addressed 
continuously according to the progress 
of the investigations. Report was 
released on August 2008 
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4.4.4.4 Analysis of media articles 
In contrast to the NTSC investigation reports, analysing media articles took longer time 
because there were 1438 newspaper and magazine articles as well as 11 cartoons. The articles 
were grouped by publisher. A descriptive coding was applied to determine information 
related to ten NTSC investigation reports. In this stage, any information related to the cases 
were coded and stored. The second stage coded any data that was not related to the cases, but 
related to aviation activities. These coded data were then labelled according to the group; for 
example, the most probable causes of accidents or incidents (e.g., pilot actions during an 
accident or incident, mechanical defects, colonimbus cloud), the government’s and 
stakeholders’ reactions (e.g., speech after an event, instruction for evacuation), regulations or 
policies (e.g., issuance of a regulation, implementation of a policy). 
The ICAO audit reports revealed deficiencies in the Indonesian air transport system. The 
reports provided comprehensive analysis, but the analysis was mainly at the regulatory level. 
In contrast, the NTSC investigation reports identified shortcomings not only at the regulatory 
level but also at the operational levels. However, the NTSC investigation reports only 
revealed any issue related to accidents, which the investigation conducted according to 
Annex 13. Thus, those reports could not provide clear pictures of other aspects in the 
Indonesian air transport system; for example, reactions of people (e.g., managerial level, 
regulatory level) when an accident occurred. 
Here, the media articles reported some factors that were not identified by other reports. 
Following the DGCA audit to all Indonesian airlines, Kompas and Gatra reported that there 
were deficiencies related to knowledge revealed. For example, airlines cut operational costs 
by reducing number of training in order to survive in the condensed aviation market such 
Indonesia. Similarly, Angkasa magazine also stated there were insufficient numbers of 
training provided by airlines and even there was an airline that manipulated numbers of 
training provided, which involved people in regulatory level.  
However, manipulation was not the only threat identified. Several articles in Kompas 
newspapers reported that there were bribery and collusion practices in the Indonesian 
aviation. These factors were practiced from the operational level to the regulatory level such 
as bribe to speed up licensing approval or collusion to win a tender of procurement goods.  
Here, the deficiencies and threats worked together to affect performances in the system. 
Additionally, socio-cultural aspects were identified from the articles collected; for example, a 
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co-pilot was sungkan  (it means in certain way: shy) to remind the pilot when this pilot made 
a mistake even though the co-pilot knew he put passengers and the aircraft in danger. Here, 
the co-pilot reflected his non-assertive behaviour that was often found in the aviation 
operations in Indonesia. Cultural aspects were also identified when an accident occurred. 
People tended to accept an accident as bad luck instead of a failure of a system that possible 
to be avoided. These examples illustrated influences of culture to affect performances and 
perceptions of people in the system.  
Media articles also highlighted reactions of people after an accident or incident occurred. The 
political of blame was there after an occurrence. Pilot errors were often pointed out as causes 
of an accident or incident by the top level management that, sometimes, was supported by a 
statement from the regulator. The media articles also reported the lack of willingness of the 
regulator to enhance safety, which showed from the lack of sanctions given to the operators. 
Hence, the media articles revealed that there were socio-political factors influences in the 
Indonesian air transport system. 
A. Corroboration of findings derived from the first data collected 
The data collected were corroborated with each other in order to achieve a degree of validity 
and reliability of finding derived from the first data collected therefore final findings were 
determined. The process, concurrently, developed the broad conceptual framework that 
would be explained in details in Section 4.4. The summary of the written data analysis is 
shown in Table 4.7, below.  
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Table 4.7 Summary of Document Analyses 
No Critical Elements Sources  (No of 
References) 
Findings Conclusion 
1 Legislations and Regulations 
The ICAO examined ten primary 
legislations: 
a. The Act No.15/1992 on 
aviation, 
b. Government Regulation 
No.3/2001 on security and air 
transport safety for civil 
aviation, 
c. Government Regulation 
No.70/2001 on airports, 
d. Minister of Communication 
Decree No.1/2004 on civil 
aviation safety regulations, 
e. Presidential Decree 
No.9/2005 on organizational 
unit and duty echelon I of the 
DGCA, 
f. Presidential Decree 
No.10/2005 on job function 
and description of 
government organization of 
the Republic of Indonesia, 
ICAO USOAP 2007 (7) 
Newspaper articles (27) 
Magazine articles (18) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (8) 
Other documents (21) 
Availability and accessibility of the 
primary legislations and regulations were 
limited. Only few legislations and 
regulations that could be accessed at the 
DGCA website but those were only 
available in Bahasa Indonesia. 
Limited access to the legislations and 
regulations resulted in lack of reference 
or guidance to operate the air transport 
system. Here, the regulator was 
indicated fail to socialize the 
legislations and regulations. 
ICAO USOAP 2007 (6) 
Newspaper articles (13) 
Magazine articles (9) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (5) 
EC No.787/2007 (1) 
Other documents (7) 
Unclear regulatory framework to form and 
shape the authority of the DGCA to 
enforce the relevant safety standard in 
aviation. The primary legislations and 
regulations also did not provide procedures 
for enforcing the air transport operations, 
for example; suspension, revocation and 
exemption. 
The unclear function and authority of 
the DGCA had resulted in lack of 
enforcement. Here, the DGCA had not 
been clearly authorised to impose a 
sanction or punishment to any action 
against safety standard that may cause 
unsafe operation. 
ICAO USOAP 2007 (8) 
Newspaper articles (19) 
Magazine articles (38) 
NTSC investigation 
The primary legislations and regulations 
did not comprehensively regulate all 
aspects in air transport.  
Un-established legislations and 
regulations resulted in lack of reference 
or guidance to operate the air transport 
system. 
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g. Presidential Decree 
No.62/2005 on organization 
and functions of the Ministry 
of Transport, 
h. Presidential Decree No. 
105/1999 on establishment of 
the NTSC, 
i. Government Regulation 
No.3/2001 on the 
establishment of an 
independent investigation 
agency, the NTSC 
j. Ministerial Order KM 
43/2005 on organization and 
administration of the Ministry 
of Transport, the DGCA. 
The ICAO also examined twenty 
three CASRs. 
In contrast, the European 
Commission used the ICAO 
USOAP 2007 and the FAA IASA 
2007 as reference for its decision 
to apply the operating ban to all 
Indonesian certified airlines. 
Prof. Saefullah Wiradipradja 
criticised the Act No.15/1992 and 
Government Regulation 
No.40/1995 
reports (21) 
Critics from Prof. 
Saefullah Wiradipradja in 
25th years of PT. 
Dirgantara Indonesia 
(2001) 
Other documents (18) 
ICAO USOAP 2007 (4) 
Newspaper articles (8) 
Magazine articles (17) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (16) 
Critics from Prof. 
Saefullah Wiradipradja in 
25th years of PT. 
Dirgantara Indonesia 
(2001) 
Other documents (11) 
The primary legislations and regulations 
did not comply with the international 
standard (e.g. ICAO SARPs, ICAO 
Annexes). The legislations and regulations 
did not amend and ratify according to the 
international standard. 
Non compliance with the international 
standard indicated the primary 
legislations and regulations had not 
been reviewed, revised and harmonised 
with the international standard thus any 
amendment could not be done. 
 ICAO USOAP 2007 (57) 
Newspaper articles (36) 
Magazine articles (41) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (23) 
Other documents (17) 
The policies, procedures and rules under 
the primary legislations and regulations 
were not established. Although there were 
few policies, procedures and rules 
established, they were not 
comprehensively enough to guide aviation 
operations. Additionally, the existing 
policies, procedures and rules were often 
not be distributed and disseminated in 
effective and efficient manner. 
Un-established and incomprehensible 
rules, policies and procedures resulted 
in lack of reference or guidance to 
operate the air transport related tasks.  
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2 Resources 
 Human Resources (recruitment 
system and required 
qualification)  
ICAO USOAP 2007 (10) 
Newspaper articles (28) 
Magazine articles (31) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (6) 
Other documents (9) 
There was no mechanism to recruit 
qualified and competent human resources 
while the DGCA was not involved in the 
recruitment.    
There was no standard of recruitment 
thus the persons recruited possibly did 
not meet national or international 
standard to fill the positions in aviation 
operations. 
 Maintaining and improving 
knowledge through training and 
providing related material 
ICAO USOAP 2007 (16) 
Newspaper articles (31) 
Magazine articles (21) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (36) 
Other documents (6) 
There were no established continuous 
programmes to maintain and improve the 
human resources through training and also 
providing related materials.  
Un-established and discontinued 
training programmes to maintain and 
improve knowledge resulted in the poor 
performances of the humans to conduct 
their aviation related tasks. 
 A shortage of humans, funds, 
facilities and technologies 
ICAO USOAP 2007 (29) 
Newspaper articles (25) 
Magazine articles (39) 
NTSC investigation 
reports (15) 
Other documents (11) 
There were a combination of shortages 
human, funds, facilities and technologies 
identified.  
The shortages interconnected with 
other deficiencies; for example, lack of 
training, improper facilities.  
3 Threats in the system 
 Manipulation Newspaper articles (17) These threats were ‘sensitive’ to be These threats were not only in aviation 
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Magazine articles (26) 
Other documents (14) 
discussed freely. Only after the 
reformation era in 1998, media wrote and 
published articles about these threats.  
sectors, but also in other sectors. In 
aviation industry, these threats were 
appeared in all levels, from the 
regulatory level down to the 
operational level.  Bribery Newspaper articles (21) 
Magazine articles (19) 
Other documents (11) 
 Collusion Newspaper articles (14) 
Magazine articles (12) 
Other documents (6) 
4 The causes of aircraft accidents 
and incidents 
   
 Human contributions Newspaper articles (36) 
Magazine articles (15) 
These causes founded as the causes of 
aircraft accidents and incidents in the 
Indonesian air transport system. Some of 
the codes founded interrelated with Section 
3, Resources. 
These causes were usually pointed after 
an accident or incident occurs, even 
before an investigation is conducted as 
reported in media. 
 Weather Newspaper articles (14) 
Magazine articles (17) 
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4.5 Revised Model 
The findings derived from the first data collected above were used to develop the initial model. 
There were two categories of findings identified: deficiencies in the Indonesian air transport 
system and barriers to learning. These categories were related to research questions and 
assumptions developed in the beginning of this study.  
The revised model (Figure 4.7) improved the understanding on the Indonesian air transport 
system. However, the revised model could not precisely represent relationship between threats 
and the barriers in the Indonesian air transport system. Therefore, although these factors had 
been identified, there was a need to conduct and determine how their relations in the framework 
developed. Consequently, the second field work needed to be conducted and aimed at not only 
further investigating the findings derived from the first data collected, but also to promote 
further understanding of the revised model.  
4.5.1 Findings Derived from the First Field Work Study 
The first data collected was clearly shown there were ‘deficiencies’ in the quality of resources 
either at the operational level (e.g., maintenance activities, flight operations) or in the regulatory 
level (e.g., establishing rules, controlling implementation of rules). The deficiencies were not 
only technical matters (knowledge, rules and enforcement) but also socio-cultural factors 
(manipulation, bribery and collusion). Additionally, the political aspect was also identified  
In accordance with the first data collected, the deficiencies identified in the Indonesian air 
transport system were categorised as follow: 
1. Deficiencies on quality of human resources referring to personnel competencies and 
capabilities to handle their duties; for example, lack of training provided either at 
regulatory level or operational levels, insufficient number of inspectors; 
2. Deficiencies on regulation/policies/procedures in aviation operations referring to 
regulation/policies/procedures used in aviation operations that were not complying with 
and consistent to international standards; for example, out-of-date CASRs, no Airport 
Emergency Plan (AEP) and no Airport Manual (AP); 
3. Deficiencies on technologies and facilities available to support aviation operations 
referring to inappropriate technologies and facilities needed for aviation operations; for 
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example, design and operation of aerodromes that were not complying with the ICAO 
Annex 14 amendments; and, 
4. Deficiencies on organizational and management resources referring to any safety 
regulatory functions, objectives and safety policies. The organizational and management 
included all aviation-related authorities, which might be established as separate entities 
(e.g., airport authorities, meteorological authorities). Examples of deficiencies in this 
category were: Indonesia had no regional or local offices of the DGCA to regulate 
aviation operations thus the only headquarter office that regulated Indonesian aviation 
with more than 17,000 islands. The line of cooperation between the DGCA and the SAR 
was unclear and seemed to be overlapping.    
Additionally, the performances were also influenced by ‘threats’ that existed as a result of 
interactions among people in the system. Three threats were identified:  
1. Manipulation refers to achieving a purpose by making unfair or artful changes; for 
example, manipulated number of passengers or cargo loaded into an aircraft, 
manipulated number of trainings provided for pilots and crew; 
2. Bribery refers to the bestowing of a benefit in order to unduly influence of action or 
decision; for example, paying some amount of money for getting an Air Operator 
Certificate (AOC), giving money and providing facilities to inspectors during their 
inspections; and, 
3. Collusion refers to secret agreement or cooperation which benefits a particular party; for 
example, direct appointment of procurement of an aircraft that is supposed to follow 
bidding processes. 
The last term determined from the first data collected was ‘failure to learn’ as indicated by the 
high accident and incident rate. The data collected revealed inconsistency of regulator to 
implement aviation-related legislation and regulation to regulate aviation-related operations. 
The ICAO stated that Indonesian aviation authorities were absence to provide comprehensive 
and coordinated approach to implement corrective actions needed in a systematic and consistent 
manner. Similarly, the EU also found the authorities shortcomings to regulate and enforce 
safety in aviation activities, which was supported by the media articles that reported the lack of 
commitment and willingness of the authorities to enhance safety. In addition, political system 
of the country was identified to be another barrier to learning. 
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1. Lack of commitment and willingness to take consistent actions to enhance safety in 
aviation operations. This barrier was revealed at the regulatory level and operational 
levels. The regulator tended to react only if there were media, public and international 
pressures. However, the actions were only temporary to answer the concerns without 
any systematic and consistent approaches. Similarly, as the pressures from the regulator, 
media and public loosened, operators seemed to be released and returned to their past 
approaches; for examples, in cases of Adam Air that the regulator took actions ‘Aircraft 
on Ground’ (AOG) only after there were pressures from media and public. In fact, an 
accident and few incidents prior to the AdamAir missing-plane case were not making 
the regulator to take an action to conduct inspections to all airlines; and  
2. The political system was another barrier identified. Indonesia is a democratic country, 
and has been ever since the reformation 1998 experiment with multiple-parties. Officials 
often have two or more overlapping responsibilities, as well as social and professional 
commitments, across supposedly independent branches of the government; this can lead 
to difficulties in various areas. For example, the regulator identified has insufficient 
budget for improving aviation as the regulator (who is also executive) has to submit its 
budget proposal to the legislator who will approve the budget, including the budget for 
aviation activities (e.g., budget for investigators to conduct their investigation activities, 
budget for socialising regulations). The approval of the budget was often depending on 
lobbying rather than its importance or urgency. This kind of practices also occurred 
when taking a decision; for example, the AOG’s decision to select people to be placed 
on the regulatory level (e.g., Minister of Transportation and his Directors).  
These barriers manifested influence people and erect barriers to learning from the past 
experiences, which were determined to exist in the Indonesian air transport system according to 
the first data collected. 
The findings derived from the first data collected above were used to develop the broad 
conceptual framework. There were two categories of findings identified: deficiencies in the 
Indonesian air transport system and barriers to learning. These categories were related to 
research questions and assumptions developed in the beginning of this study. Thus, a summary 
of the research questions, the assumptions and the findings was used to develop the broad 
conceptual framework. 
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Table 4.8 Relation of research questions, assumptions and findings derived from the first 
data collected 
Research Questions Assumptions Findings2 
What is the origin of the 
Indonesian aircraft accidents 
and incidents? 
There is a deteriorating process in 
the Indonesian air transport system. 
1. There is a deterioration 
process before an accident 
occurs (Reason, 1990, 1997; 
Toft & Reynolds, 1997; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) 
2. There are accumulated, 
unnoticed failures in pre-
conditions (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992; Shrivastava, 
Mitroff, Miller, & Miclani, 
1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 
1997) 
There were deficiencies in the 
Indonesian air transport system 
that could be grouped as 
deficiencies related to: 
1. Human resources who 
design and operate the 
system, 
2. Regulations/rules/procedures 
available to regulate aviation 
operations, 
3. Technology and facilities 
available to support aviation 
operations, and  
4. Organizational and 
management resources 
How did accidents and 
incidents keep occurring in 
the Indonesian air transport 
system? 
A series of accidents and incidents 
indicate failure to learn 
1. Recurrences of the events 
indicate failures in learning 
from previous events 
(Pidgeon & O'Leary, 2000; 
Sagan, 1993; Toft & 
Reynolds, 1997) 
Commitment and willingness of 
either regulator or operators 
were found as barriers to learn 
from the past. Politics was also 
identified play a significant role 
in learning after an event 
 
Referring to Table 4.8, there were deficiencies related to: human resources, regulation or 
procedures, technologies and facilities to support aviation operations and organization and 
management resources. The first data collected identified not only deficiencies but also threats 
that worked together to lower performances in aviation operations so, sooner or later, led to an 
occurrence (accident or incident).  
The second assumption was related to a series of accidents and incidents in the system, which 
indicated failure to learn. Here, the first data collected identified that there was failure to learn, 
which was caused by: lack of commitment and willingness to enhance safety and the political 
system. These were determined as barriers to learn from the past experiences.  
                                                 
2
 This was a summary of findings. The analysis was in Section 6.3. 
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Thus, the findings above were used to develop the broad conceptual framework. The revised 
model (Figure 4.7) was emphasized in this study and improved the understanding of the 
Indonesian air transport system. However, the conceptual framework developed was unable to 
precisely figure out how the relations of the threats and the barriers in the Indonesian air 
transport system work. Therefore, although these factors had been identified, there was a need 
to conduct and determine more closely their relation to the framework developed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.7 The Revised Model 
4.5.2 Elaborating Assumptions 
Referring to the findings and the revised model, assumptions about the Indonesian air transport 
system were developed too. The assumptions were: the operating ban applied by the EU was 
only a consequence of the deteriorating processes in the Indonesian air transport system; and a 
series of precipitating events (accidents and incidents) indicated failures in learning. These 
broad assumptions were elaborated into four assumptions (Figure 4.8) that were then used to 
develop the questions for the second field work. 
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Figure 4.8 The Assumptions Elaborated 
4.5.3 Constructing the Interview Questions 
In line with the development of the broad conceptual framework and elaboration of the main 
assumptions of this study, there was a need to investigate the consistency of the findings 
derived from the first data collected. Furthermore, there were unclear relationships between the 
deficiencies, the threats and the barriers identified in the first data collected. Thus, prior to 
conducting the second fieldwork, four questions were, therefore, constructed according to the 
elaborated assumptions, as shown in Table 4.9, below. 
Table 4.9 Constructing the interview questions 
Assumptions Guiding Questions for interview 
Assumption A: Indonesian air transport has made 
no significant improvement in safety 
Tell me about the current state of Indonesian 
aviation safety? 
Assumption B: The most probable causes of 
Indonesian aircraft incidents and accidents are 
combinations of deficiencies in the whole system 
In your opinion what are the most probable 
causes behind these incidents and accidents? 
 
Assumption C: Failure in learn and act led to a 
series of incidents and accidents 
In your opinion, why have so many incidents and 
accidents occurred in the past 10 years? 
Assumption D: Lack of performances is the main 
issue in Indonesian air transport system 
Currently, what are the main issues in Indonesian 
aviation? 
Assumption 1: There was deteriorating process 
existing in the Indonesian air transport
Assumption 2: A series of incidents and accidents 
indicated failure to learn
Assumption B: The most probable causes of 
Indonesian aircraft incidents and accidents were 
combination of deficiencies in whole system
Assumption C: Failure to learn and act led to a 
series of incidents and accidents
Assumption A: Indonesian air transport system has 
made no significant improvement in safety
Assumption D: Lack of performances was the main 
issue in Indonesian air transport system
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4.6 Summary 
This research investigated the Indonesian air transport system to understand how and why 
accidents and incidents were socially constructed.  The complexities and dynamic changes of 
the system cannot be understood only from a single perspective. Thus, the adoption of the 
qualitative approach to this study allowed exploration of holistic representation of reality 
through written texts and listening research participants expressing their perspectives on the 
social reality of the Indonesian air transport system.  The adoption of a process study approach, 
based around discourse analysis, enabled this study to deal with time and history so it provided 
an explanation of how aircraft incidents and accidents were constructed in the Indonesian air 
transport system.  
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    Chapter 5 
Second Field Study 
5.1 Introduction 
This chapter illustrates the second field work. There are five sections in this chapter. Section 5.2 
explains the method used to generate data in the second field work. Section 5.3 describes the 
second field work data analysis. Section 5.4 presents the results derived from the second field 
work and, finally, Section 5.5 concludes and summarises this chapter. 
5.2 Generating Data 
Spoken information was generated by conducting open-ended interviews with key informants. 
An interview meant having a conversation to obtain information pertinent to the research 
questions, between the researcher and the research participants (Minichiello, Timewell, & 
Alexander, 1990). Here, open-ended interviews were conducted to capture information from the 
interviewees by letting them express their perspectives freely and bring in their thoughts that 
were seen as important to them. In addition, the use of language which was familiar to the 
interviewees would reveal more information.  
5.2.1 Conducting Second Field Work 
The second field work, from February to March 2010, aimed to investigate the consistency of 
the findings derived from the first field work. 
The second field work aimed to gather spoken information by conducting open-ended 
interviews with key informants. The key informants and the open-ended questions were 
determined after analysing the written information. The interview protocol consisted of a brief 
introduction to the study, an abstract and a statement of the anonymity and confidentially of the 
interview. The protocol aimed to solicit the interviewees’ views on all Indonesian aviation 
accidents and, in particular, the organizational influences that led the accidents to happen. 
Therefore, information from the interviewees’ perception about the study was achieved. 
5.2.1.1 Key Informants 
In this study, three factors were used to determine the key informants: their potential knowledge 
and apparent involvement in Indonesian aviation, availability and costs required in visiting 
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them. The intent in using range of interviewees was to capture differences and enrich the 
research. Consequently, six groups of key informants were identified:  Operator Officers, Line 
Management, Investigators, Regulators, Parliamentarians and Observers. 
The method used to develop the research questions was described in Section 4.5.3 
Table 5.1 Significance of the research questions 
Research Topics Logical Reasoning 
1. Current state of Indonesian air transport 
safety 
To assess the interviewees general knowledge and understanding 
about Indonesian aircraft accidents issues 
2. The most probable causes of Indonesian 
aircraft accidents 
To determine the causal factors in Indonesian aircraft accidents 
3. Issues related to the high rate of aircraft 
accidents in the past 10 years (1999 – 
2008) 
To assess the interviewees’ perception of causal factors in the 
past 10 years 
4. Issues in Indonesian aviation that needed 
to be improved 
To capture the interviewees’ perceptions of any issues related to 
aviation safety in Indonesia 
 
5.2.1.2 Interview Approaches 
Prior to the commencement of the second field work, personal communication with key 
informants was developed.  In order to help the participants prepare, an interview protocol was 
sent to them prior to the interviews.  At the commencement of the field work, SMS (Short 
Message Service) was employed to arrange an appointment with the interviewees. SMS is 
commonly used and culturally acceptable in Indonesia, even to communicate with government 
officers and VIPs (Very Important Persons). Approaching key informants using phone calls 
would be less effective since a call from an unknown or unlisted number would be ignored.  
A challenge in this field work was to develop ‘trust’ with the key informants. Accordingly, 
informal conversation was introduced at the beginning of the conversation. Trust was very 
important since talking frankly about the Indonesian air transport system, particularly aircraft 
accidents, would lead to some sensitive issues such as corruption, collusion and politics. 
Moreover, anonymity and confidentially should be stated clearly to eliminate worries about 
revealing ‘sensitive’ information. After a brief explanation, all interviewees were asked if they 
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had any questions about the interview. The interviewees were also asked their permission to 
record the interview; only sixteen interviewees permitted this out of forty-six interviewees.  
The interviews were conducted without knowing how many interviews would be useful prior to 
speaking with the interviewees. According to Strauss and Corbin (1998), the more interviewees, 
observations and documents obtained by a researcher, the more variations of the important 
aspects will be obtained and that process will provide a greater data density.  
In this research, snowball sampling was used as an approach. At the end of an interview, the 
interviewee was asked to recommend other individuals to participate in the study. This 
technique was effective and helpful since the aviation world was a kind of ‘closed’ community 
and recommendations were essential to get access into the community. 
Most interviews took about one to two hours, sometimes longer. Although the interview 
protocol was available, the sequence of questions asked depended on consideration of what was 
most relevant to the interviewees because the interviewees were most comfortable talking about 
something with which they were familiar. The interviewees’ answers were listened to carefully 
so the flow of conversation could be directed to the research questions. With the exception of 
some government officers, most of the interviewees were interviewed individually.  
In the beginning, no more than two interviews were scheduled for a day.  Since most 
interviewees were VIPs, the schedules were dependent on their availability. In total, there were 
46 participants interviewed. The interviewees represented six top level officers in the 
government department, 11 academics, 19 practitioners and 10 academics who were also 
practitioners. They had all worked in aviation for more than 15 years, except for two 
interviewees.   
5.2.2 Summary of Key Informants 
There were 46 of interviewees in this research. A summary of the interviewees is described, 
below:  
1. Experiences in the aviation activities 
a. All interviewees had more than 15 years experience in the aviation activities except for 
two who only have 14 years and 12 years experience in the aviation activities. 
Therefore, the interviewees have been involved with the Indonesian air transport 
activities during the time frame of the research, from 1999 to 2007. 
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b. Thirty two interviewees had more than 20 years experience in aviation activities while 
12 interviews have 15 – 20 years experience in aviation activities. The other two 
interviewees had fewer than 15 years experience in aviation activities. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.1 The distribution of interviews based on experience in aviation activities 
2. Job tasks 
a. Six interviewees were government officers in the top level who were responsible for 
making decisions in their departments. 
b. Eleven interviewees were academics who had good knowledge about the Indonesian 
air transport system since sometimes the government asked for their expertise as 
consultants or key note speakers. 
c. Nineteen interviewees were practitioners who had good knowledge about the 
Indonesian air transport system. The practitioners came from different departments in 
aviation operations, such as pilots, mechanics and CEOs. 
d. Ten interviewees were academics who were also practitioners. All interviewees had 
experience as practitioners before they engaged in academic activities. 
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Figure 5.2 The distribution of interviews based on job tasks 
All recorded interview data were read carefully and crosschecked with fieldwork diaries to 
identify if there was any information that might be overlooked. It has to be noted that there 
were only sixten interviewees agreed to be recorded, therefore thirty interviewees disagreed to 
be recorded so the whole information gathered during the interview sections were written in 
fieldwork diaries. Thus, to avoid and minimize misinterpretation or missing information, the 
interviewees were asked to listen and confirm all information that were written by researcher. 
5.2.3 Acknowledging the Interview Bias 
In order to achieve a degree of flexibility and openness while conducting an interview, there are 
other issues that may possibly emerge as well. Openness may result in data containing 
expressions of feelings and sentiments about issues unrelated to the research questions. This 
may result in a lack of coherence and comparability across a range of interviews. However, the 
short notice given to the interviewees may have led their responses to be about current issues 
and information rather than past historical events. Thus, with the intention of reducing bias, a 
research protocol was established and delivered prior to the interview while questions were 
used to guide the flow of the interview.  
5.3 Data Analysis 
5.3.1 Transcribing 
Once interviews were conducted, there was a need to reproduce the spoken words in written 
text. This process is called transcription or transcribing (Halcomb & Davidson, 2006). 
Transcribing transforms the recorded interview but, at the same time, analyses it. This task 
constituted a different level of analysis. This research conducted in-depth interviews and 
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required ‘in-depth’ listening to the recorded interviews, which gave an opportunity to do a deep 
analysis.  
There may have been some information overlooked during the interview, so transcription 
helped to reduce and sort important and relevant information about the research questions. The 
rest of the information could then be removed (e.g., personal information).   
In order to eliminate loss and misinterpretation of the information from an interview, 
transcription and analysis of the information was carried out on the same day unless the 
interviews were completed late at night. A summary of the day’s interviews was noted, which 
contained difficult encounters and the ‘environmental’ situation during the interview to retain 
the ‘sense and nuance’ of the interview. These summaries served as the data for this study.  
5.3.2 Coding 
The second stage of analysing the interview data was initial coding or coded any data that 
researcher thought relevant to the Indonesian air transport system as, sometimes, there were 
sections of the interviews that out of context. Coding processes were similar to the first field 
study (see Section 4.4.3.1). 
5.3.3 Classifying, Integrating Themes and Interpreting Data 
The third stage was integrating and classifying the data coded from the second stage to 
categories. There are three main perceived categories, from the strongest to the weakest, as 
indicated by a number of the interviewees; they were enforcement-based deficiencies, rule-
based deficiencies and knowledge-based deficiencies. 
 There were ten deficiencies determined, from strongest to weakest, as follows: no control (13), 
out-of-date rules (9), inadequate knowledge (7), lack of sanction (6), non-compliance with 
international rules (5), inadequate training (4), no guidance (4), infirmness or irresoluteness (4), 
not the right persons in the right jobs (3) and unclear rules (3). Furthermore, the quality of the 
system identified had been affected by three threats: manipulation (28), bribery (24) and 
collusion (12).  
The quality of resources led to changes in performance at the operational level. The 
interviewees agreed (89%) that there was a lack of performance in the Indonesian air transport 
system. Only 7% of the interviewees disagreed while the other 4% did not answer the question. 
There were two factors identified that affected performance. These main perceived categories 
were indicated by a number of interviewees, they were perceptions (40) and safety culture (15). 
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This chapter also presents that the interviewees’ opinion who asserted the Indonesian air 
transport system made no significant improvement in safety. Before the operating ban, all 
interviewees agreed that there was no significant improvement in aviation safety. But after the 
operating ban, there were eight interviewees (17%) who agreed there were improvements while 
the other 38 interviewees (83%) disagreed. Four factors were identified as barriers to improved 
aviation safety, from strongest to weakest, as follow: commitment and willingness (33), just to 
fulfil requirements (24), political system (2) and covering issues (18).  
Furthermore, 36 interviewees agreed that failure to learn was a cause of a series of accidents 
and incidents in the Indonesian air transport system. Five interviewees disagreed while another 
five did not answer the question. As the series of accidents and incidents indicated vulnerability 
of the system, the interviews revealed three causes of vulnerability of the system: regulator 
(61), existing system (53) and operators (25). 
5.3.4 Ensuring Rigour and Validity 
Although qualitative research has the potential to produce rich data, it has limitations. It cannot 
be precisely replicated since it is specific to a time and place (Read, 2005). Accordingly, the 
quality assurance methods used in quantitative approaches (assuring, validity, reliability, 
generalizability and objectivity) as stated by Lincoln and Guba (1985), are inappropriate to 
qualitative approaches. 
Objectivity and rigour are issues in this research because of the subjective perspectives of the 
researcher (e.g., designing study and analysing data collected) and participants (e.g., expressing 
their perspectives) which will bias the findings. Enhancing the rigour of this study is achieved 
by assuring its credibility while objectivity is improved through conformability (Lincoln & 
Guba, 1985). Additionally, Yin (2003) stated that various sources of evidence were used in 
order to validate and strengthen the final results. Thus, the strategies to achieve credibility and 
conformability in this study are: clear reporting of the development of the study, develop 
criteria used to obtain data (e.g., written texts, selection of participants), audit trials (e.g., 
writing fieldworks’ diaries, recording the interviews) and the provision of multiple sources of 
evidence (triangulation). Although there were important for considering the level of importance 
information, there is also a need to consider number of sources to validate information. This 
study was considered both factors, importance of information and number of sources to support 
the information. 
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5.4 Results 
5.4.1 Actors in the Indonesian Air Transport System 
On the basis of the interview data, there were significant contributions of people in the 
Indonesian air transport system to cause accidents and incidents in the system. This was 
highlighted by the interviewees, particularly in the context of the regulatory body.  They 
perceived that improvements in the Indonesian air transport system would be possible if the 
regulator improved the quality of their human performances, before improving other sectors 
such as technology and facilities. Examples of their specific statements are presented, below. 
The names in this study were pseudonyms to assure anonymity of the interviewees. 
“[The] quality of human resources is the issue in our aviation system.  I highlight the regulator’s 
resources, which are not good enough. The regulator should improve their officers’ knowledge, provide 
comprehensive regulations and apply strict enforcement. Additionally, the regulator should provide 
adequate infrastructures for aviation operations. As long as the regulator does not improve the quality of 
their resources then it is impossible that sustainable aviation safety will be achieved.” (Madi, an 
academic) 
“[We] need to improve the quality of resources. The improvements should be applied to humans, 
regulations, technology and facilities. The most important is the regulator. They should improve their 
quality before improving the quality of the whole system. There are many issues in the regulator body, 
such as inadequate knowledge [and] poor mentality. Therefore, internal reformation should be applied 
inside the regulator body. A good regulator will establish a good system.” (Arga, an academic) 
Harun, who has been working as a government officer at the Department of Transportation 
more than 15 years up to the present and is one of the decision makers in the Department, 
agreed. 
“The quality and quantity of resources, especially people, are issues that should be prioritised to be 
solved.” (Harun, a government officer) 
This study identified how the quality of some actors was precisely contributing significantly to 
accidents or incidents in Indonesia.  
The interviews revealed how human deviations appeared throughout the whole system, from 
the operational level to the management level and even at the regulatory body. Likewise, human 
errors were often blamed as a cause of an aircraft accident or incident along with the weather. 
An example is: 
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“Human [errors] and weather are the easiest factors to point out. Humans [pilots] are easiest to blame 
because mostly the pilots were killed in the Indonesian aircraft accidents. Weather is also easy to blame 
since it cannot defend itself,..ha..ha... Although we all know how sophisticated weather technology is 
nowadays, here, in Indonesia, it is different, weather is used as an excuse.” (Dian, a CEO of an airline)  
While another interviewee mentioned that: 
“I like it when the regulator gave a statement after an accident or incident because I like to guess which 
one will be blamed, human errors or weather. Ha..ha..ha..” (Wira, an aircraft engineer) 
Human errors and weather were the most common factors to be blamed if there was an accident 
or incident. Pilots often were killed in any fatal accidents in Indonesia while weather, of course, 
was unable to defend itself for being blamed; for example, as stated by Agi and Odi, below. 
“[The cause of Indonesian aircraft accidents and incidents are] Human error because it is easy to blame 
while at most of accidents, the pilots were killed. For example, in Adam Air DHI 574, how an aircraft 
could get lost from radar [MAATS]; it was impossible but it happened. Then all blames went to the pilots. 
Who knows whether the pilots realised the IRS problems before flying but they cannot refuse to fly for 
some reasons such as the management forced them to fly. When I checked the condition of MAATS, there 
was an indication of corruption in operational costs. The case was similar to Adam Air – Tambolaka 
case.” (Agi, a public analyst) 
“They [regulator] said the most probable causes were [always] human errors and weather. 
These[factors] were really easy to be blamed. Here, human errors meant pilot errors. Once an accident 
occurs, then the pilot often is a first person to be blamed. This is similar to weather; it is easy to be 
blamed.. The funny thing in this country is a conclusion was there although an investigation was not 
conducted yet. Thus, public opinions had been developed to accuse someone or something as the cause of 
an accident.” (Odi, an investigator and academic) 
However, the percentage of weather issues in the interviews data was not high, only being 
mentioned by five interviewees.  In contrast, weather issues were found in three out of ten of 
the NTSC investigations reports, while these issues were also revealed as a cause of accidents 
and incidents according to the written documents (see Table 4.6 and 4.7). Since this study 
focused on the organizational factors therefore the external threat, in this case natural causes, 
was not analysed in detail.  
The interview data revealed that the quality of people was the main issue in the Indonesian air 
transport system. Deficiencies of the system were resulted from the quality of humans in the 
system and these were used to develop the categories of the study. The categories developed 
were associated with the establishment processes of the system. Thus, there were three 
categories identified:  enforcement-based deficiencies, knowledge-based deficiencies and rule-
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based deficiencies. There were ten deficiencies determined. Figure 5.3 presents the distribution 
of each category while Figure 5.4 presents the frequency of each factor as determined from the 
interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.3 The causes of the aircraft accidents and incidents in the Indonesian air 
transport system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.4 Deficiencies in the Indonesian air transport system 
In analysing the deficiency factors above (Figure 5.4), some were related to human’s 
capabilities and abilities that were emphasized by the interviewees. For example: 
“We need to distinguish between human error and human factors. Human error is a term used to describe 
deviations in human performances;  for example, ones had to do A, but he did B because he committed 
error. Human factors are complex because those refer to anything where people are involved. People are 
limited by their mental model that is developed by education, experience, environment, values, belief, et 
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cetera. So, I conclude that human error means deviations in ones performance; human factors refer to 
ones’ limitation of something, either thinking or acting.” (Arga, an academic) 
“Human error is any unexpected, unplanned and unwanted action of human. But, human factors refers to 
a study of how those errors occurred.” (Hani, a CEO of an airline) 
“Human error is defined as human’s deviation while human factors are used to explain that deviation.” 
(Harun, a government officer) 
These deficiency factors will be presented according to its category, below. 
5.4.1.1 Enforcement-based Deficiencies 
“There are lack of controlling, supervising, and monitoring to ensure any aviation activities follow 
aviation rules and procedures. The regulator does not have sufficient numbers of officers to conduct the 
tasks.” (Hanung, an academic) 
As Figure 5.3 and 5.4 show, there were deficiencies related to enforcement. This was indicated 
by the highest percentage of interviewees who asserted these types of deficiencies (40%). There 
were three deficiencies revealed: no control (13), lack of sanction (6) and infirmness or 
irresoluteness (4).  
The interviewees clearly identified a’ lack of control’ in the aviation operation. They used two 
cases of the AdamAir fleets as examples. The AdamAir DHI 574 case showed that there was 
lack of control of the DGAC over the operator, Adam Air, caused the airline to keep using the 
IRS (Inertial Reference System) that had 154 recurring defects. Likewise, prior to the AdamAir 
DHI 574 accident, a similar case had occurred in another AdamAir fleet, DHI 782. The aircraft 
used an IRS that had 18 recurring defects and led to a serious incident. 
“The AdamAir DHI 574 case is a really good example for showing a lack of enforcement. I blame the 
DGAC for this case since they failed to control the operator, AdamAir Sky Connection, to replace their 
IRS that had 154 recurring defects.” (Agi, a public analyst) 
“In the AdamAir DHI 574 case, the regulator had to be responsible because the DGAC failed to control 
the use of the IRS that had 154 recurring defects. The DGAC knew there was a similar case, AdamAir 
DHI 782, had 18 recurring defects. So, the DGAC should control all fleets, but they did not.” (Arga, an 
academic) 
These cases showed regulatory ineffectiveness in ensuring the IRS defects had been resolved. 
In-depth conversations emphasized the interviewees’ views on the lack of control. They 
underlined reasons behind this deficiency; for example, there was a combination of shortage of 
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resources and supervision, either at the regulator or operators. Windra (an air maintenance 
officer) explained how the lack of control occurred in operational activities.  
“It is absolute ignorance, operators often did not control their officers thus they did not know if there 
were unsafe actions that might lead to an accident or incident. For example, maintenance works often did 
not being controlled, although there were log forms [reports]. Thus, if a maintenance person did not fix a 
screw properly, nobody knew since he did not write any report in the log. So, supervision is essential to 
ensure the tasks are done in the right manners.” 
Specifically, an interviewee asserted the shortage of resources in the system.  
 “Since the regulator has a shortage of resource, they just choose the case that is most seen by public and 
media.” (Kardi, a pilot) 
Anto (a consultant and academic) suspected cost-efficiency was another reason behinds the 
shortage of resources. 
“The regulator had shortage of inspectors to supervise operators so the operators were easily to commit 
unsafe acts, which were mainly caused by economic reasons, for instance to cut operating costs for 
efficiency.” 
To some extent, interviews linked enforcement with development of safety culture. Darun (a 
government officer) addressed the importance of enforcement to develop safety culture.  
“I agree if knowledge and rules are root causes of the problems in Indonesian aviation, but don’t forget, 
enforcement is another essential factor; it is needed to establish a sense of safety until safety becomes a 
habit and, finally, a culture. At that time, enforcement is not needed any more.”  
Besides underscoring the lack of control, the interviewees expressed their observations 
regarding the regulator’s attitude. The AdamAir DHI 782 case was used to illustrate the fact 
that there was no sanction or punishment imposed on the aircraft operator, AdamAir Sky 
Connection, concerning the recurring defects of the IRS prior to the serious incident that 
indicated the AdamAir management ignored the issue. Similarly, AdamAir DHI 574 accident 
had similar IRS problems. That aircraft is still missing today. One of the causes of accidents 
was the IRS malfunctions. 
“There was no sanction been given by the DGAC over the AdamAir Sky Connection even though there 
were recurring IRS defects founded in the AdamAir DHI 782. The DGAC was careless because if they just 
let go [failure or mistake] without punishments then a fatal event  occur. In fact, it did. The AdamAir DHI 
782 is missing until today at the Makassar Strait, and the aircraft had even 154 recurring IRS defects 
[prior to accident].” (Arga, an academic) 
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“There was no sanction to the AdamAir [DHI 782] that diverted from its original destination [Makassar] 
to Tambolaka Airport. The NTSC revealed there were IRS recurring malfunctions. Thus, the serious 
incident was only a consequence of the IRS problems and the management decision that kept using the 
dysfunction IRS.” ( Madi, an academic) 
Another attitude that was highlighted by a few interviewees was that it is ‘easy to forgive and 
forget’. This attitude could be the possible reason of why the regulator did not enforce any 
mistake or failure in the system.  
“Forgiving and forgetting is a weakness of our regulator. If there was a mistake, often it passed without 
any explanation. Then, it would be forgotten. Consequently, the similar mistakes will reoccur in the 
future. That was happened in our country.” (Dian, a CEO of an airline)  
An interviewee stated that this attitude should not be applied in aviation since it is a high-hazard 
environment organization.  
“To forgive and forget is a good manner but it cannot be applied to aviation activities. The regulator 
should remember, aviation is a high-hazard environment, so it should be regulated and controlled 
properly to minimize any kinds of risks. Fail to prepare, prepare to fail.” (Odi, an investigator and 
academic) 
Undeniably, there were sanctions or punishments applied by the regulator but the interviewees 
underscored that such actions were often applied after pressures from the public and media: 
“The regulator often neglected any cases until media and the public voiced their concerns. Let’s take the 
Adam Air case as an example. The regulator grounded the airline only after the public and media forced 
them to do that even though accidents and incidents that involved Adam Air fleet kept occurring.” (Yoga, 
a consultant and academic) 
“Let see the Adam Air DHI-574 case, only after the media and public forced the regulator [to take 
actions] then the DGAC grounded the airline and the Garuda Indonesia GA 200 alike.” (Agam, an 
academic)  
Delaying actions caused a cynical comment from Dani (the CEO of an airline): 
“That is Indonesia. If there is no enforcement from either within or outside the country, then the regulator 
will not take any action.”  
Indeed, delaying actions reflected an apparent resolve of the regulator not to respond toward 
any issue in the aviation operation. Low integrity of officers to do their tasks in the regulatory 
body was suspected by the interviewees as the explanation of the regulator’s infirmity. For 
example, Beno, a government officer, described that he did just fulfil his tasks but did not care 
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what his tasks are about. He did even not care if what he was doing would affect safety, as long 
as he was able to satisfy his ‘boss’3. Securing his job was most important. Beno said that he just 
thought of his family when he had to approve a license of pilots or aircrafts; if he loses his job 
then he cannot finance his family anymore although he knew that sometimes pilots did not take 
initial tests or aircrafts could not pass some inspections, such as C and D Checks.  He worried 
that he would get caught one day, but he also knew that the enforcement was not strict, and that 
some rules were not easily comprehended, allowing different interpretations. Such issues would 
doubtless help later if he was caught.  
“Honestly, I only did my job. I don’t care much about other things, I only don’t want to argue with my 
Boss. I only think about my family since it is not easy to find a job recently. I know that, sometimes, I did 
unsafe actions or even break the rules but I have no choice.”  
Muli, a government officer, agreed that while some individuals did this practice, he respected 
individuals like Beno who had no choice since it was not easy to get a job in Indonesia. The 
bureaucratic system gave opportunities for these kinds of practices while simultaneously 
allowing persons with power (authority) to abuse their power for gaining benefits for 
themselves or others. In contrast, he, who has worked in the Department since 1988, blamed the 
legal system. He mentioned that incomprehensible rules and the lack of enforcement of the 
existing rules were the reasons for the deficiencies.  
“How did deviations happen? It is nothing more than legal system; it does not work. No control, no 
sanctions. The rules and regulations have never been reviewed while they also can be multi-interpreted.” 
This study revealed that the regulator inability to enforce regulations was most likely due the 
lack of integrity or responsibility of the officers while economic and political drivers were used 
to justify their actions. 
5.4.1.2 Rule-based Deficiencies 
“Our regulations or rules are not continuously reviewed and updated thus we never know whether the 
regulations or rules are still appropriate to be used in the current situation. The vast growth of aviation 
sectors is not followed with the development of resources, in particular, the rules or regulations. Thus, 
through the time, these regulations or rules are unable to guide the aviation activities.” (Yoga, a 
consultant and academic) 
                                                 
3
 Boss is a term used by interviewees to reflect how a bureaucracy system works. A few interviewees described 
working environment in the regulatory body as a ‘don’t ask, just do it’ environment thus the word ‘boss’ also 
implies their unhappiness with their Head of division or department. 
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The data collected suggested that there were rules that were no longer appropriate to the current 
condition. There had been no review to determine whether revision was needed or not. Thus, if 
there was a need to update the rule, it was not done. The interviewees asserted the Act 
No.15/1992 that many actions have not been appropriate to regulate the Indonesian air transport 
system.   
“It had been 15 years since the Act [No.15 year 1992 on aviation] was issued; it had never been 
reviewed, no amendment. The Government Decree No.40/1995 aimed to give a comprehensive 
explanation on aviation since all verses in the Act were not clear enough but it was not better afterwards. 
Academics suggested to review or even substitute with a new regulation as mentioned by Prof. 
Wiradipradja; but, again, it was not done. Then the EU issued an operating ban while the ICAO criticised 
Indonesian primary legislations. Everybody began to be concerned,....ck..ck..ck..” (Hanung, an academic) 
“The Act was inapplicable to current situation; although often academics and practitioners proposed 
some changes, the regulator seemed to ignore the feedback.” (Hani, a CEO of an airline)  
Furthermore, discontinued improvements of rules were also asserted by the interviewees. They 
clearly stated that the growth of aviation was not followed by the improvements of rules. There 
were no reviews to update the existing regulation. Thus, the operational levels also were not 
able to update their policies since there were no changes to the regulations. Examples of 
specific statements were: 
“No changes. Our regulator was too busy with other problems to review the appropriateness of a 
regulation. Sadly, this attitude affects the operational level, the airlines could not update their operational 
rules since the higher level that used to guide were not updated.” (Aman, a Chief operational of an 
airline) 
 “Regulations are the framework of activities. They are like navigators; they guide and lead. They are 
also used as benchmarks. Hence, we can imagine how our aviation regulations are unable to do their 
functions anymore. The system has no benchmark and guidance until,.....BOOM! Accidents and incidents 
occurred.” (Karman, a journalist). 
Yadi, an operational manager of an airline, explained how unrevised rules contributed to the 
Mandala Airlines MDL 091 that killed 100 people on board and 49 on the ground, while other 
41 people had serious injuries. The Airport Emergency Plan (AEP) was determined as a factor 
contributing to reduce the number of survivors. The AEP had never been revised, updated and 
even practised. Therefore, at the time of accident, AEP could not be applied appropriately and 
that led to a lack of coordination in handling the situation.  
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“Why there were many people killed in the Mandala Airlines PK-RIM accident? That was because the 
emergency response from the airport was too slow. The AEP [Airport Emergency Procedures] was 
unrevised and, the worst, it had not been practised for long times.”  
Similarly, a few interviewees asserted that the AEP remained unrevised prior to the Garuda 
Indonesia GA 200 accident at Adi Sucipto airport, Yogyakarta, which killed 21 people. The 
unrevised AEP was found to hinder emergency actions. The interviewees asserted that the 
company policy only used the AEP for getting license approval and, through time, the policy 
was not reviewed so the policies became out-of-date.  
“The airport officers responsible in an emergency failed to conduct immediate response during the 
occurrence. The KNKT [NTSC] investigation revealed a non-reviewed AEP as a reason.” (Budi, a pilot).  
“This is another trick of an airline. They fulfil all requirements for getting license approval, including 
company’s procedures and rules. But, through the time, these procedures or rules had never been 
reviewed until something wrong happened.” (Harun, a regulator officer) 
Beside out-of-date rules, another issue related to rules was that there were rules that did not 
comply with the international rules. The interviewees, especially academics, underscored this 
issue: 
“Air transport is the most regulated transport mode since it is standardised internationally. But, 
Indonesian regulations and rules often did not comply with international rules.” (Agam, an academic) 
“Our standard of practices often did not comply with the ICAO standards [SARPs and CASRs]. For 
example, at the Garuda Indonesia accident in Yogyakarta; after years the NTSC revealed that the airport 
did not meet the ICAO Annex.” (Odi, an investigator and academic) 
In line with compliance of rules with international standards, there was another issue raised. A 
few interviewees recognised some regulations were adapted from another country but two 
interviewees disagreed that the regulations were adapted. They perceived that the regulator had 
‘copied and pasted’ or ‘cloned’ other states’ regulations instead of adapting.  
“I do not agree with the word adapt, for me, Indonesia is cloning other States regulations. The worst is 
the regulations were copied directly and translated to Bahasa Indonesia without having a study whether 
the regulation suits or not to Indonesia.” (Hani, A CEO of an airline) 
“No,..no..! We don’t adapt the international rules but copy paste them [the international rules].” (Banu, a 
retired pilot and academic)  
Besides criticising the existing regulations, the interviewees also emphasised that there were 
inadequate rules and regulations. Two pilots, Kardi and Budi, shared their experiences taking 
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decisions without any reference while Banu specifically explained how no reference could 
easily lead to a dangerous situation. Their statements were: 
“Sometimes we have to take a decision without any reference, but if the execution fails, then anyone will 
blame us.” (Kardi, a pilot) 
“Flying without a reference? Ha..ha..ha..it is not a new issue. I have a few experiences.” (Budi, a pilot) 
“I was a pilot for 40 years and met this issue many times, particularly, at a new born or small airline. 
Ignoring this issue will lead to an accident because in a critical situation, the cockpit crew, needs a 
reference before taking a decision. If there is no reference, the cockpit crew will decide according to their 
knowledge but often intuition. Taking a quick right decision in a critical situation without reference is not 
an easy job, it may easily place passengers and aircrafts in a dangerous situation that possible to lead to 
an accident.” (Banu, a retired pilot and academic) 
However, inadequate rules were not only common in aircraft operation, but also identified in 
Air Traffic Control (ATC), for instance, in the Adam Air DHI 782 accident. The aircraft was 
scheduled to land at the Hassanudin Airport, Makassar but diverted to Tambolaka Airport, East 
Nusa Tenggara, which is over a sea. The NTSC investigation revealed that there was no 
Standard Operational Procedures (SOPs) for the Makassar Advance Air Transport Service 
(MAATS). Beni agreed with the NTSC report. 
“We found there was no SOPs for MAATS as stated in the [NTSC] investigation report.” (Beni, an 
investigator) 
Conversely, there were conditions in which existing rules were not clearly defined and this may 
have led to confusions or misinterpretations. Some interviewees agreed. 
“I am a practitioner. I agree that aviation regulations were not clear enough. If the primary regulations 
were not comprehensive, which is I believe as a cause of unclearness, so the regulator should issue 
regulations that are aimed to provide comprehensive explanations.” (Ani, a CEO of an airline) 
“Our legislation, the Act No.15 year 1992, was not comprehensive while the lower regulations, such as 
the Government Decree No.40/1995, were also unclear and had multi-interpretations. The regulator said 
that there was nothing wrong with our legislations and practitioners said it too. But I do not agree.” 
(Aman, a Chief operational of an airline) 
Moreover, unclear rules will affect performances in the operational level, as stated by Anas. 
“The officers, sometimes, did not know what to do because their job tasks were not clearly defined.” 
(Anas, an academic) 
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Kris (an academic) mentioned that the regulator and the legislator began to concern and pay 
more attention after the EU applied the operating ban to Indonesia. The new legislation, the Act 
no.1/2009, has, finally, been approved by the legislator after more than 10 years. But, he saw 
other problems after the new Act was issued, it was not well communicated. Subsequently, 
many officers, airliners, or users did not know it well.  
“Prior to the EU’s operating ban, none of legislator or regulator paid attention to our legislations. 
Although many academics proposed the regulator to review existing legislation, the regulator always said 
that there was nothing wrong with those regulations. The problem arose was only deviation in 
implementation”  
In agreeing with Kris’s statement, Sukri admitted that communication programmes for 
regulations were not well-established in Indonesia, particularly in aviation industry. As a senior 
journalist, he often received invitations to attend events (e.g., seminars, discussions) that aimed 
to communicate new regulations or rules:  
“These events [communication of new regulations] were often held in luxury places such as four or five 
star hotels, holiday cottages, or high-class restaurants, where the attendees were journalists, 
practitioners, some academics and the government officers. These events often became social events 
rather than formal events. The portions of time for eating or social talking were more than for discussions 
for the regulations. These practices have been done this way for years, and I did not see significant 
improvements about aviation regulations as a result.”  
Similarly, Bima (an academic) stated: 
“How can the regulations and rules be well communicated since the communication programme hosted 
just to waste money. Then, the regulator will invite media to blow up the events.” 
Sukri was not the only interviewee who criticised communication events. Burhan (a regulatory 
officer) agreed with the ineffectiveness of the programmes.  
“I support my department to communicate the regulations by inviting journalists, practitioners, and 
others, because I know they, especially the journalists, will expose that in the news. But I disagree with 
the programme delivery. There were department’s facilities that could be utilised but they [the department 
officers] did not want to use these facilities. They preferred to host the events by wasting money in luxury 
and prestigious places. It was unethical. Doing these practices just to show that the department did 
something, I really feel ashamed as a regulator officer.” 
In sum, there are four deficiencies related to rules: out-of-date rules, no guidance, unclear rules 
and non-compliance with the international rules. These deficiencies drive an individual into two 
scenarios: performing correctly or incorrectly. Bad rules might lead to correct violation or non-
compliance, while no rules could lead an individual to correctly improvise, but also possibly to 
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make a mistake. The data collected revealed that many humans in the Indonesian air transport 
system performed erroneously.  
5.4.1.3 Knowledge-based Deficiencies 
“What system? Recruitment? Oh come on. We have no standard and mechanism to recruit qualified and 
competent officers.” (Ludi, an aviation analyst) 
According to the interviews data, there were deficiencies related to knowledge. Three types of 
deficiencies were identified: inadequate knowledge, inadequate training and not the right person 
in the right job. The interviewees clearly stated that there were the existences of insufficient 
knowledge of people to conduct their task in aviation-related activities that may occur for 
various reasons, which also reflected the knowledge gained before the personnel started their 
job. For example, the improper system to recruit human resources was criticised by the 
interviewees. The improper recruitment system was raised as a possible reason behind these 
deficiencies: 
 “I have to admit that our recruitment system was not well-established. This issue has been criticised by 
the ICAO at the USOAP 2007. We are trying to improve and develop a system thus new officers will be 
qualified people.” (Beno, a government officer) 
Specifically, the interviewees criticised the recruitment mechanism to attract qualified and 
competent pilots. They observed that many airlines recruited unqualified pilots. Agi, a public 
analyst, stated that this practice existed because of an imbalance in the growth of the aviation 
industry and the availability of human resources. 
“It cannot be denied there was pilot karbitan4 in Indonesian aviation. These pilots were co-pilots who did 
not qualify as a pilot but had been forced to become a pilot. Unhealthy competition created this 
phenomenon but the main issue was the regulator. They seemed pretending not knowing this practice 
happened.”  
Another interviewee also mentioned the pilot karbitan issue arose because of the high accidents 
and incidents rate in 2004 – 2006. Another explanation of this issue could be a result of the 
shortage of capable resources. 
“Rapid growth of the aviation industry was not followed by the improvements of quality and quantity of 
resources (people, technology, facilities). Moreover, preparing a qualified-experienced pilot needs years 
                                                 
4
 Karbitan is a term used to describe someone who is not qualified enough for a condition or position but 
supported and/or forced by powerful people or groups. Thus, pilot karbitan describes a pilot who is not qualified 
and proficient enough to handle pilot tasks.  
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so up-grading a co-pilot to a pilot is an easiest way, likewise, it will also reduce cost and time. Thus, a 
term of pilot karbitan came up.” (Anto, a consultant and academic) 
“That was a fact that Indonesia had not enough pilots but the demands of them were very high, so, a co-
pilot would be upgraded to a pilot to solve the issue.” (Ani, a CEO of an airline) 
Operators were not the only actors who had inadequate knowledge in aviation but also people at 
the regulatory body. It was one of the regulator main problems, as stated by Odi. He sometimes 
had to work with the government officers who were decision makers but had no experience or 
idea about aviation. Thus, he had to simplify all terms and conditions for them but often they 
still did not understand.  
“Sometimes I have to find a simplest way to explain aviation terms to them but still they could not get the 
point. The worst part was they did not want to admit that they did not understand so any suggestion or 
recommendation was often refused. Then, when they took a decision and it failed, they blamed us.”  
Likewise, the interviewees observed the legislature had not enough knowledge about aviation. 
Thus, this became a barrier to establishing cooperation with the regulator.  
“We know that our parliamentarians, particularly in Commission V, had insufficient knowledge about 
aviation. It was another dilemma for government and airliners because when they propose having 
hearings or discussions for any topic related to aviation, they often received no relevant feedback but only 
political speeches from the parliamentarians.” (Masya, a retired pilot and academic)  
“Our parliamentarians, especially Commission V, had no knowledge about aviation. That was why when 
an accident or incident occurred; their speeches were often irrelevant. So, with these people, who will 
issue an Act on aviation, I don’t have high expectations.” (Gery, a pilot) 
The interviews clearly identified insufficient knowledge as one of the deficiency factors in the 
Indonesian air transport system. Banu explained how insufficient knowledge led to decision 
errors in the Adam Air DHI 574 accident while Yani concluded the condition as Organizational 
Accident, as defined by James Reason (1997).  
“In the Adam Air case was really clear that the pilot and co-pilot did not know how to react and deal with 
the emergency situation when they detected there were defects at the IRS.” (Banu, a retired pilot and 
academic) 
“That is what Reason’s called an organizational accident. The cockpit crew committed errors because 
their airline did not provide adequate trainings. Thus, there was a chain of failures but often neglected.” 
(Yani, an investigator and academic)  
Echoing the quotation above, Karman (a journalist) underscored the inadequate training at 
Mandala Airlines MDL 493 case: 
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“Inadequate training was not a new case in the Indonesian aviation. Mandala’s accident in 1999 was 
caused by the pilot failing to land his aircraft properly. If I am not mistaken, the airline did not provide 
sufficient trainings either in a simulator or in class.”  
In that case, the cockpit crew made wrong decisions because of inadequate training. The PIC 
misjudged the use of a 30 degree flap setting for landing and this caused the aircraft to land 
approximately 1000 meters beyond the target touch-down point.  
Yani, an academic and investigator, viewed the trend to reduce training as a consequence of 
deregulation. Many of the new airliners have insufficient knowledge of the aviation industry, 
so, to survive in a tightly competitive market, airlines made efficiencies that often cut necessary 
costs, which possibly reduced safety.  
“Deregulation had caused many problems in our aviation. The regulator deregulated the air transport 
system that aimed to stimulate the market because new airlines would be born. But, the regulator forgot 
to prepare the resources either of humans, regulations or facilities. Consequently, the regulator could not 
regulate the aviation operation. The competition became unhealthy and unethical; the airlines did 
anything to survive in the market, such as cost efficiencies which often ignored safety.”  
Kompas daily newspaper quoted Captain Toto Subagyo, a former Chief of Garuda Aviation and 
Training Education as stating that the Indonesian pilots previously were knowledgeable until 
operators reduced training for cost-efficiencies. 
‘The Indonesian pilots’ proficiencies were highly appreciated in Asian regions. That was a reason of why 
Indonesian pilots were in highly demand by various airlines in Asia. “It was until few years ago in which 
the quality of pilots’ trainings was still good. Sadly, in recent years there is a trend, especially with new 
entrants, to reduce numbers of trainings”, said Toto. Toto stated some airlines proposed reduction of 
training programs from the standard for cost efficiency.’ (Kompas, 10/09/2005, p.35) 
The interviewees admitted that there were many competent and capable people in the system, 
but they often did jobs not related to their expertise, thus affecting their performances. For 
example, there were vital positions that should have been filled by experts with qualifications 
appropriate to the area of responsibility, especially if the position required them to take 
decisions; but sadly inappropriate appointments were common. This was also often caused by 
‘senior-junior’ nuances that were very ‘thick’. Seniors were given high priority to fill some 
positions although they were not competent enough. Darun implicitly stated there were leading 
people with insufficient knowledge of aviation. He pointed out his ‘boss’ as an example. He 
and his staff had sometimes argued just to convince their ‘boss’ about one issue:  
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“If a top level person is someone who understands their tasks so he will able to enforce his staffs to learn 
and improve their knowledge. But in our case is vice versa. We are educated enough on aviation but not 
our ‘boss’. It is impossible for us to force him to widen his knowledge because we don’t want to get into 
trouble by criticising him. Honestly, sometimes we have to argue with him and it was not easy to convince 
someone [boss].”  
Similarly, Harun did not deny that many people who have responsibilities with aviation-related 
activities have inadequate knowledge about aviation. He also mentioned the rules were not clear 
enough because the designers (parliamentarians and regulator) had inadequate knowledge of 
aviation. Subsequently, those rules can be multi-interpreted:  
“No..no... I disagree that our regulations are well enough. They, who established the rules and 
regulations, had no knowledge on aviation. That is why they could not see the holes in our regulations.”  
Indeed, there were many people in the regulatory level who were not the right person to fill the 
job. It was not because they were capable but their hierarchy level led them into the jobs. 
“[The] regulatory system for the officers’ position is based on their careers. Instead of capability, level of 
hierarchy is often used for one’s position. Seniorities are also often used to fill a position. So, some 
officers have inadequate knowledge for that position but as a senior he has to fill that position (Sukri, a 
senior journalist).” (Sukri, a senior journalist) 
Agreeing with Sukri, Aman (an airline Chief Operating Officer) also pointed to the bureaucratic 
system. 
“Many vital positions were filled by people with irrelevant background and expertise only because they 
were senior and had higher level in government hierarchy.”  
The Indonesian bureaucratic system made it possible for people who have no background about 
a position, to fill the position according to their grade in the government hierarchy. Hence, there 
were capable and competent persons who did not work in their area of expertise. These factors 
contributed to deficiencies in the Indonesian transport system. This was agreed with the 
interviewees. For example: 
“I am absolutely sure if we [the Indonesian air transport actors] improve our knowledge in aviation, 
those problems such as accidents or incidents, downgraded of safety rating, and the operating ban, will 
not ever happen again. We have lack of knowledge.” (Karman, a journalist) 
“[There was] lack of knowledge. Yes, that was the problem of this country. Knowledge is not only about 
formal education but also informal education and experience. For formal education, we know that we 
have reputable institutions for air transport but formal education is not enough, it should be improved 
and upgraded continuously because of the rapid growth of aviation studies. Furthermore, knowledge 
without implementation may led to deviations. Why? Because we never know the appropriateness and 
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applicability of knowledge without ever apply it. Thus, lack of knowledge shows one’s capability.” 
(Masya, a retired pilot and academic) 
So, although some people were capable in certain areas, they were still incompetent for some 
positions. One example of an interviewees’ specific observation was: 
“I will point my finger to the regulator. Let’s see, there were some vital positions filled by persons who 
should not be there because they had no knowledge and expertise in that area. Aviation is not a simple 
organization but complex. Thus, a decision should be analysed and thought  carefully since it might 
possibly lead to an accident.” (Andi, an academic) 
Dani stated that limited sources and workloads had also contributed to lack of those competent 
people to learn about their new position. 
The Indonesian bureaucracy system allows someone to fill a position that may be irrelevant to his/her 
background. They are capable but in other areas. Likewise they have no time to learn about their new 
position as there are limited resources and the high workloads (Dani, a CEO of airline) 
While Harun emphasized Dani’s statement above: 
“Yes, there were limited budgets to conduct training, workshops or seminars. Usually when a new officer 
fills a new position, they will concentrate with prior and present tasks of that position. But often, while 
they are still learning of their tasks, they should make decisions. Thus with the amount of works and 
limited time to learn, the decision, sometimes, was not good enough.”  
To sum up, deficiencies were identified in the Indonesian air transport. Figure 5.5 presents the 
distribution of each category of deficiency according to the interview data. The deficiencies 
relating to rules had the highest frequency. These deficiencies were mentioned in 40% of the 
total deficiencies revealed, followed by the deficiencies related to enforcement (37% of the total 
deficiencies revealed) and, finally, the lowest frequency was the deficiencies related to 
knowledge, with only 23% of the total deficiencies revealed.  
Of the ten deficiencies identified, those related to enforcement are the main problems; they 
have been clearly demonstrated in this section. To be more specific, the interviewees 
emphasized that deficiencies mostly occurred on the regulatory level. At this point, it can be 
summarised that deficiencies in rules tended to affect the enforcement at the operational level 
while deficiencies of knowledge weakened the enforcement at the operational level. Hence, the 
combination of these three categories of deficiencies clearly influenced performance at the 
operational level. 
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Figure 5.5 Distribution of each type of deficiencies according to interviews 
5.4.1.4 Threats in the Indonesian Air Transport System 
“Yes, people are the causes of accidents and incident [of aircraft] in Indonesia. But, our system 
influenced people. It was not a new story if we heard news that a good person changed to be a bad one 
after he entered the system.” (Yadi, an operational director of an airline). 
Besides identifying the deficiencies as the causes of accidents and incidents in the Indonesian 
air transport system, this study, additionally, identified three threats that were revealed from the 
interview data. The interviewees clearly defined the threats as the results of interaction of 
individuals in the system. These threats were perceived by the interviewees to influence the 
system in parallel with the deficiencies.  
These threats were: manipulation, bribery and collusion (see Figure 5.6, below). A detailed 
explanation of each threat follows. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.6 The threats in the Indonesian air transport system 
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Talking openly about these threats was a sensitive matter, but the practices certainly existed in 
the system. Only the practitioners talked about these threats. They viewed them as rooted in the 
system. Therefore no matter how much improvement to be achieved in human behaviour, a lack 
of reform in the wider socio-technical system meant that human performance improvement 
would be pointless. For example: 
“The [air transport] system is failed; problems are in all levels of the system. To reform people but not 
the system is not a solution. Both should be reformed at the same time.” (Hani, a CEO of an airline). 
 “Our [air transport] system is bad. People changed when they entered it. To focus reformations only 
onto people would not be effective without reformed of the [air transport] system.” (Sukri, a senior 
journalist). 
These threats occurred at the operational level as the result of human deficiencies, either in 
knowledge, rules or enforcement. The following explanations provide a perspective on each 
threat. 
5.4.1.4.1 Manipulation 
The first threat identified was manipulation, referred to as achieving a purpose by making 
unfair or artful changes. Wira (an aircraft engineer) stated there were ‘oknums’5 who did this 
practice to deceive others. He gave an example how oknum manipulated reports to deceive 
inspectors: 
“There were manipulation practices in the aviation activities. There were ‘oknum’ who did changes of 
something for various reasons. For example, they manipulated maintenance reports to deceive 
inspectors.”  
This threat occurred mostly at the operational level. An interviewee, Kris (a journalist), knew 
exactly how manipulation was practised in the Indonesian air transport system. But it was quite 
hard to prove this practice when, in some way, it benefited some ‘powerful’ persons. This was 
not clearly defined by the interviewees but explicitly. 
“Don’t you think there was ‘someone6’ who was backing up this practice [manipulation]? It was 
impossible to manipulate things without a ‘backing7’. If there was no one behind the scene, I don’t think 
an officer dares to commit manipulation.” (Kris, a journalist) 
                                                 
5
 Oknum literally means person. This word has negative connotation to describe a person that does something 
wrong. 
6
 The interviewee stressed this word when he stated it. He implied this word to persons who back-up an individual 
when he committed manipulations thus the individual felt secure and confident to manipulate things. 
7
 This word was used by interviewees to show there were invisible persons who protect an individual committing 
manipulation. 
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“There were oknum whether in the regulatory body or operators. Those people committed to 
manipulations to gain some benefits. But, sometimes manipulations had been done by the officers or staff 
because they were forced to do this practice. Oknum in higher position used their authorities to make 
people in lower position to do whatever they wanted to do though they know the practices were 
prohibited.” (Agi, a public analyst) 
The interviewees clearly observed some manipulation practices in the aviation activities. The 
interviews reflected manipulations often occurred in the operational level, especially 
maintenance. An example of their specific observations was:  
“Two log books are needed to protect the manipulation practices. An original log book records 
manipulation while another book is used to be shown during an inspection.” (Karman, a journalist)  
Budi agreed with Karman. As a senior pilot, he knew of this practice. He said that sometimes he 
had argued with the management or technicians for safety reasons.  
“They (management and technicians) did manipulations to any items; they ignored safety; for example, 
replacing an item with bogus part. It was difficult for us as a pilot who has to fly the aircraft because we 
know how dangerous it is.”  
Additionally, manipulation not only occurred with regard to the aircraft, but also in ground 
handling area. Manipulation at the cargo area was stated by eleven interviewees. They 
mentioned that the cargo area was a ‘basah8’ area. To manipulate the weight of a cargo was a 
common practice. 
“An officer at the cargo area will weight a cargo; for example, a cargo was 30 kg. Then, a customer 
should pay Rp.30,000/kg so in total he should pay Rp.900,000. Here, the officer reported that the weight 
was 25 kg and the payment was Rp.750,000. So, the officer gained Rp.250,000 from a cargo.” (Ludi, an 
aviation analyst) 
Agi had received many complaints about manipulation practices, which caused passengers to 
become victims. 
“Manipulation is anywhere in the system as a result of the badly established system. At the end, 
passengers are people who will lose at the most. For example, how could two tickets that were exactly the 
same issued? Or the payment of excess luggage was not reported so the officers kept the payment in their 
pocket.” 
Although this kind of practice is known and tends to be a contributing factor to accidents, there 
is rarely further investigation after an accident occurs. The issues were not only in the 
                                                 
8
 Basah is a term that is used to express a position, location, condition or situation, where lots of money is 
involved. 
111 
 
regulatory body or the legislator, but also in operators. Wira knew that many unsafe practices 
were applied in the Indonesian aviation. He mentioned some airlines did not know how 
important maintenance was. It was vital, so that spare parts could not be replaced with ‘abal-
abal9’ just for efficiency reasons, and the proper maintenance process should be carried out in 
certified workshops. Using bogus parts has been known widely by the actors in Indonesia, as 
found by the EKKT team10.  
“Using abal-abal or bogus parts is a common practice to reduce costs of maintenance. There is the GMF 
[Garuda Maintenance Facility] that is reputable and recognised internationally but some operators do 
not want to do maintenance over there. Besides costly, of course the GMF does not want to manipulate or 
do illegal services.” (Wira, an aircraft engineer). 
Correspondingly, Harun admitted there were such practices as described by Wira. However, he 
mentioned that these practices could not be only from one side; there could be two sides or even 
more. Thus, the regulator also played a significant role in making this happen. Harun explained 
that many operators viewed safety as something that can be negotiated. For example, in the 
maintenance system for engine load, the inspection period was 2500 hours before the engine 
has to be serviced. Then some concessions were given, even sometimes up to 3000 hours. Both, 
the regulator and operators assumed that a 10% deviation was still safe, but there was no basis 
for this assumption. Undeniably, there were many concessions in the Indonesian aviation 
system and, of course, concession was a source of KKN11. Harun explained that lack of 
knowledge led to these kinds of practices. Both parties did not know that safety has limitations.  
5.4.1.4.2 Bribery 
Bribery was the second threat and it refers to the bestowing of a benefit in order to unduly 
influence an action or decision. Bribery was a common corruption practice in the aviation 
industry as stated by Agi. He viewed this practice as related to the not well-established legal 
system, bureaucracy, and the quality of resources. He mentioned that bribe money was often 
called as ‘pelicin12’ and that it was mainly used to fast track the approval of licenses or any 
matters related to administration. Bribery was often practiced to get licenses. The bribe money 
was needed to accelerate the licensing process, even though an airline fulfilled all requirements. 
Without bribe money, the license will be stuck somewhere.   
                                                 
9
 Abal-abal is a term used to describe something with lower quality or even fake, such as electrical equipments, 
mechanical equipments. 
10
 As described by the members of EKKT team during field work.  
11
 KKN is acronym of Korupsi, Kolusi, and Nepotisme or Corruption, Collusion and Nepotism. 
12
 Pelicin is term used to describe bribery practice. The bribe is needed to fast-track or smooth any bureaucratic 
process. Some scholars (e.g., Vickers) who did study about Indonesia also named pelicin as ‘glossy money’ or 
‘cigarette money’.    
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“You may ask new airlines or airlines that are waiting for licenses approval. There was a need to speed 
up the process so paying some amount of money was common. Without pelicin the licensing approval 
process will take longer time. High pelicin paid often make the process much faster.” (Agi, a public 
analyst) 
Similarly, Odi admitted this kind of practice in the aviation operations but he disagreed that this 
practice was because of lack of enforcement. Both enforcement and bribery have cause-and-
effect relationships, so they are interrelated. 
“The regulator has insufficient numbers of inspectors so an inspector has lots of tasks. Likewise his 
payment rate is similar with other officers who have fewer tasks. This condition is an opportunity for 
nakal13 airlines. Money is the solution. The airline is giving some amount of money to the inspector who 
will approve some concessions. For instance, the inspector found the IRS should be replaced because 
there are recurring defects. Since he received some money then he approved the IRS although it is not yet 
replaced.” 
Moreover, bribery also appeared in aircraft procurement because it needed regulatory approval 
before the aircraft was purchased. Thus, the airline will try to get close with an officer from the 
Department of Transport to get approval easily and, of course, by paying some money.  
“There is a code of practice in bribery, called as ‘tahu sama tahu’. So you should know what you 
supposed to do if you want everything will be proceeding faster.” (Agi, a public analyst) 
“The amount of money involved is varied; the more money, the faster the process.” (Kardi, a pilot). 
The same practice was also revealed in getting a license for a new airline route. Here, the 
amount of bribe money depended on which route had been chosen. The interviewees did not 
talk this issue openly although media articles many times stated about the practices. 
‘A member of the Evaluation of Transport Safety and Security Team, Tengku Burhanuddin, added, the 
potential for bribery to be practiced in licensing, might occur in the licensing process to get business 
licenses, aircraft procurement or license for a flight route.’ (Kompas, 15/08/2007, p. 18) 
‘“It depends on lobbying. Without paying money, SIUP14 is impossible to be issued. Actually we had 
already fulfilled all requirements, but the processes were always being decelerated,” reported a director 
of a scheduled airline.’ (Kompas, 16/08/2007, p. 18) 
‘“If the route is fat, like Jakarta – Surabaya, it can be IDR500 million. But, if the route is thin, like 
Jakarta – Papua, it will less than IDR50 million,” stated a director of airline operation.’ (Kompas, 
16/08/2007, p. 18) 
                                                 
13
 Nakal is a term that is commonly used to define someone or a group who often used illegal ways to achieve their 
objectives. 
14
 SIUP is acronym of Surat Izin Usaha Penerbangan or Airline Business License. 
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Thus, the practices of bribery and the amount of money circulated were different, depending on 
the purpose. However, it cannot be denied that the practices were there although difficult to 
prove. 
5.4.1.4.3 Collusion 
The last threat, collusion, referred to secret agreements or cooperation to benefit a particular 
party.  Harun did not deny this practice in aviation activities. He compared the practices of 
collusion before and after deregulation. Before deregulation, collusion was practised among 
‘powerful’ people; for example, there was no tender process for procurement of goods but 
direct appointments. After deregulation, that was also supported by the reformation era, where 
the practice had shifted slightly. There were no direct appointments as before, but projects for 
certain amounts of money would have an open tender procedure. Here, they often practised 
compromises between the committee for the project and the applicants, so the agreement among 
them will benefit only certain people or groups.  
“Prior to deregulation and reformation, collusion occurred among top level people who have power. 
Nowadays, collusion occurred from top to bottom. At the top level as recently revealed by the KPPU15, 
there is an indication of compromise between some airlines for fuel surcharge. Likewise, direct 
appointment of suppliers of goods still occurred in the bottom line, maybe because the amount of money 
involved is not as much as at the top level.” (Harun, a government officer) 
Agi and Wira stated that some airlines are ‘memelihara16’ government officers, particularly, 
inspectors. By maintaining this kind of relationship both parties, the officers and the airlines, 
would benefit. 
“Everyone knows that many airlines ‘memelihara’ officers for their benefits. Of course, these officers will 
get benefits, too, since they will receive additional income regularly.” (Agi, a public analyst) 
“The officers will get some ‘pocket money’ besides other kinds of gifts such as holiday package or the 
latest gadgets. Likewise the airlines gain benefits too. They will be protected if they are found to break or 
violate the rules or will know any news related to the regulator actions before the news is announced.” 
(Wira, an aircraft designer). 
It was clearly identified that collusion was one practice that still existed in the Indonesian air 
transport system. Although the evidence of this factor was not as high as other factors, the 
                                                 
15
 KPPU is acronym of Komisi Pengawasan Persaingan Usaha or Commission for the Supervisory of Business 
Competition of the Republic of Indonesia. 
16
 Memelihara literally means take care of, protect, raise, keep or maintain. Here, ‘memelihara’ is used to describe 
someone who has paid to protect or guard. 
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practices occurred in the Indonesian aviation activities. For example, direct appointment of 
suppliers for procurement goods was a common practice of this factor as was stated below. 
“Direct appointment of suppliers was preferred practice; they (the regulator or the operator) said that 
direct appointment is easier and faster because they know who the suppliers are.” (Burhan,a government 
officer)   
In sum, these threats are presented in Figure 5.7. The figure presents two threats that were 
mostly practices in the Indonesian air transport system, manipulation and bribery. The 
frequency of the manipulation mentioned by the interviewees reached 44% of total interviews 
while bribery was 37% of the total interviews. The lowest frequency was collusion with only 
19% of total interviews. Manipulation and bribery often work together. Manipulation occurred 
if there were lack of control. The authorities (e.g., regulator) that were supposed to control 
would be bribed to keep them silent. All of these threats affected the performance of the 
Indonesian air transport system. The performance of the system decreased because of 
deficiencies of actors in the system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.7 Threats in the Indonesian air transport system 
5.4.2 Poor Performances in the Indonesian air transport system 
The interview data showed that the deficiencies of individuals affected their performance in the 
aviation-related activities. These deficiencies were also influenced by the threats occurred in the 
interactions of individuals in the system. A combination of the deficiencies and the threats 
resulted in poor performance. The majority of the interviewees agreed there was poor 
performance. The academics and the academics who were also practitioners had the same 
opinion; there was poor performance. All but one of the practitioners agreed that lack of 
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performance was the main issue in the Indonesian air transport system. In contrast, interviewees 
from the regulator were divided equally into three groups: agree, disagree, and did not answer 
the question.  
Figure 5.8, below, shows that performance was the main issue in the air transport system. This 
was agreed by 89% of the interviewees while other 7% of the interviewees disagreed. The other 
4% of the interviewees did not answer the question. Additionally, some of the interviewees 
mentioned the causes of lack of performances. They stated there were at least two factors 
related to the performances, perception and safety culture, as presented in Figure 5.9, below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.8 Lack of performances is the main issue in the Indonesian air transport system 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.9 Factors that affected the performances 
Perception was mentioned many times - 73% of the total frequency of factors affecting the 
performance – by the interviewees while safety culture was only 27% of total frequency of 
factors affecting the performance. These factors, perceptions and safety culture, were developed 
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over time since the establishment of the system and this development process appeared to have 
been overlooked or even ignored by scholars in aviation accident studies.  
5.4.2.1 Perceptions 
The interviewees claimed the Indonesian aviation actors had various perceptions of aviation 
terms. They viewed various perceptions were caused by no benchmark or standard. Examples 
of their specific statements were: 
“Society does not understand about aviation safety. Knowledge is not only the regulator’s responsibility 
but also academics, practitioners and anyone who has better understanding about safety. This function 
does not work, even most of us are not aware of it. So we have no standard or benchmark for aviation 
safety. We have different perceptions about safety. All actors have their own perceptions about safety, 
from the regulator, operators, academics, even users.” (Dani, a CEO of an airline)  
Similarly, Madi (an academic) agreed. 
“Undoubtedly, different perceptions are the main issue in our aviation system. We have different 
perceptions about safety, different perceptions about rules, different perceptions about right and wrong. 
We have various perceptions of many things. Why? Because there is no benchmark, no standard.” 
Hani (a CEO of an airline) disagreed that the regulator and operators have different 
understanding of aviation safety. She saw socio-culture as the main issue, which led to the lack 
of safety sense of passengers. She also criticised the loose enforcement. Thus, safety 
compromises seemed easy to be negotiated by money. 
“In my opinion, the regulator and operators’ understanding of safety was excellent but not the 
passengers. I observed this was coming from family; it is common to break rules in our culture. For 
example, a kid sees how their parents don’t use helmets when they ride a motorcycle. Furthermore, the 
motorcycle for two riders was used for parents and two children. When a policeman saw this practice, he 
often pretended not see it or he stopped them. Stopping them will bring a negotiation for an amount of 
money thus any violation will be forgiven.” 
Besides safety culture, an interviewee underscored how safety perception was diverted because 
of money. 
“Money..money...and money that has diverted perception of safety. Money can change improper 
maintenance into proper maintenance. Money can extend time between overhauls. Money can buy 
airworthiness licenses. So, money is a power to change perceptions.” (Gery, a pilot) 
Beside the changes in safety perception, an accident was still seen as an Act of God although 
there were scientific explanations from the NTSC or the regulator. Those explanations still did 
not change perceptions about an accident.  For example, the Adam Air DHI 574 accident in 1 
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January, 2007; it was a New Year, but an accident occurred. The media reported from many 
aspects and even speculated on the causes of accidents. There were many scenarios and 
misleading information, even superstitions.   
“We like to hear what we wanted to hear, and the more interesting news, the greater enthusiasm will be 
achieved even though the news is not logic.” (Agi, a public analyst) 
“Do you remember the Adam Air [DHI 574] case that was missing in 2007? If you re-read media reports 
of the case, then you will see there were many speculations about it. Maybe you still remember how the 
authorities employed dukun17 to find the aircraft. In Addition, people tended to view the accident that it 
occurred because of God’s action to punish our elites.” (Deni, a journalist and academic) 
Odi (an academic and investigator) agreed that the accident was often viewed as punishment of 
God so the leaders had to be ‘ruwat18’. He argued that an accident or incident is a fate but he 
did not deny this paradigm in Indonesia.  
“This is a fact in our country. Cultural and religious perspectives are so thick, so these perspectives are 
also used to solve any problem; for example, the public wants our leaders to be ruwat.” 
Some people to avoid responsibilities often used this paradigm as an excuse. For example, a 
religious slogan, “we do our best but God is the decision maker” was often used to claim there 
were actions to prevent an accident or incident but God had decided differently, so, the accident 
happened. Additionally, once an accident occurred then the media were more interested in 
writing about the human aspects instead of educating the public with knowledge about the 
accident, such as its technical and environmental aspects.  
“I think to write about human aspects is easier than technical and environmental aspects.” (Madi, an 
academic)  
“We cannot deny there were journalists who wrote reports without conducting investigations before they 
released the reports to the public while their objectives often were just for gaining more profit. Thus, 
reporting human aspects so far attracted more customers.” (Hani, a CEO of an airline)  
Agi (a public analyst) also viewed this paradigm in similar manner. But he blamed the 
dysfunctional nature of the regulator who did not provide the public with appropriate 
knowledge. Public knowledge was a responsibility of the country as stated in Indonesian 
legislations. Even the regulator has slots to be used in the media for educating people but Agi 
                                                 
17
 Dukun is similar to a Shaman. 
18
 Ruwat is Javanese tradition. Literally ruwat means to destroy, to clean, and to eliminate bad lucks. It aims to 
prevent and avoid bad luck by conducting ritual ceremony included prayers or spraying with water that has been 
blessed. 
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rarely read or watched any programmes from the government that delivered knowledge to the 
public. 
“The regulator has to be responsible for education; that is their responsibility. They can use the media to 
educate people because the media is a useful tool to deliver information. But, I didn’t see the regulator 
using them [medias].” 
In contrast, Burhan argued that the regulator was the most responsible body. He admitted that 
education was the regulator’s function but also the responsibility of academics, practitioners 
and anyone who had knowledge about aviation. This function was not working and was not 
well-understood. If there was an accident, each party started to blame others and argued, 
because they thought they had done nothing wrong. As a senior government officer, Burhan 
denied that the regulator did nothing to educate the public about accident and safety. He gave 
examples of seminars of aviation safety that were held by the regulator, advertisements and 
brochures that were distributed to the public.  
“Everyone blames the regulator. Hey, it’s not only the regulator who is responsible for education; but all 
of us, from academics, practitioners, and also persons who have knowledge on aviation. In my opinion, 
the regulator held workshops, seminars, distributed pamphlets and brochures, to deliver knowledge. We 
did well enough!” 
However, Odi and Agi viewed that the regulator’s efforts to educate the public were only lip 
service to show that they did do the work. But there were no significant results since the 
programmes had never been evaluated and monitored. Therefore, there were no outcomes and 
the programmes could not be judged to see if they failed or succeeded. Dian agreed that there 
was no evaluation or monitoring from the regulator to their programmes. She felt the 
regulator’s programmes just wasted money and did not achieve the objectives to educate the 
public about safety.  
“Ah...I don’t trust them [the regulator]. Too many lies or if there were some works to educate people, but 
no monitoring and even evaluation.” (Odi, an investigator and academic) 
“I don’t know which program to educate people about aviation. They [the regulator] were only 
communicating aviation programs to limited people but not to the public. Limited people at high class 
places, did those actions called communication?” (Dian, a CEO of an airline)  
Accordingly, she agreed that knowledge was a main issue. As a practitioner, she described 
difficulties in dealing with safety issues. She noted it was often easier to deal with mechanical 
and technical matters than humans. For example, a passenger’s companion was often allowed to 
enter the arrival lounge where it should be ‘clean’ from people except for passengers and 
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authorised people. Sometimes porters, taxi drivers and other people could be seen entering 
these areas. Letting unauthorised people enter this area decreased the security and safety of the 
airport.  
To sum up, they all agreed that Indonesians often view an accident or incident as fate, and 
people who were injured, or even killed, are viewing as having bad luck. The inability of the 
regulator to deliver knowledge to the public was seen as one of reasons for this paradigm.  
5.4.2.2 Safety Culture 
Safety culture was the last factor mentioned by the interviewees. The interviewees perceived 
that safety culture was related to knowledge, rule and enforcement; for example, 
“I will say the main issue is the safety culture. The root is humans, of course. In my opinion, if I ask to do 
something to improve our air transport system, then I will focus on safety culture. So, knowledge about 
aviation safety should be delivered, rules should be clear and comprehensive, and the most important is 
enforcement. If these all can be established and practised daily or routinely, through the time, safety 
becomes a culture.” (Odi, an academic and investigator) 
Hence, safety culture developed over time. Knowledge in aviation safety was a base with rules 
used to guide. Enforcement needs to ensure implementation of knowledge was in the 
framework. Through time, these three factors developed culture. 
“We need to establish a safety culture. A safety culture is about letting safety become a need and a habit; 
it is like breathing which needs oxygen. If the safety level of every individual has improved then they will 
bring this into a small group, then society and, finally, it becomes a national culture. No doubt, to develop 
culture takes a long time. It is not about a year or two, but even hundreds.” (Yadi, an operational director 
of an airline) 
But, one interviewee felt that these three factors were not applied properly in Indonesia. 
“I believe safety culture is the main reason of all troubles in our aviation system. There are three terms 
that can be used to define the condition of human in this system. First, they know but ignore. Second, they 
know but are not doing. And the last one is that they obey only if they are being controlled. So, with these 
kinds of attitudes then how can a safety culture be developed since the regulator was not properly 
enforcing the rules while they also were not educating public” (Ani, a CEO of an airline)  
Catur, an academic, agreed that enforcement was a factor in discipline and developing a safety 
culture. The rules should be enforced until enforcement was not needed anymore. At that level, 
safety would already have become a habit and, finally, become a culture. 
“Enforcement is essential. Rules should be enforced until they do not need it anymore.” 
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Additionally, Beni (an investigator) stated: 
“Safety culture should be generated and driven from the top level to the bottom line so it should be forced 
until it is a self-working behaviour. At the same time, safety management should be introduced as 
knowledge for a foundation of the safety culture.” 
The interviewees perceived that leaders, whether at the regulator or airlines, often did not show 
good attitudes to support safety implementation. For example, before taking off, those people 
often did not turn off their electronic devices although they had been warned by flight 
attendants several times. 
“I experienced that some VIPs did not want to follow the instruction to switch their electronic devices off. 
Often they still kept talking by their mobile, while we interrupted them; they were angry.” (Didi, a senior 
flight attendant) 
Therefore, enforcement of rules and procedures was an issue to the establishment of a safety 
culture in Indonesia. The interviewees highlighted the importance of leaders’ commitments to 
develop safety environment.   
Furthermore, the Indonesian political system, with ‘separation of power’ into legislative, 
executive, and judiciary may, in some way, have affected the performances of the executive 
because lack of knowledge and certain political interests tended to put low priority on aviation 
safety. Thus, legislation in aviation took decades to be approved.  
“Organizations, including air transport, are always influenced by economic and political trends. The 
Indonesian ‘separation of power’ system is a dilemma in aviation, especially for the regulator. The 
budgetary control held by the legislature limits the regulatory actions in the system. Often the legislature 
disagrees and rejects proposals from the regulator only because they think that the government allocates 
too much money to aviation. They do not know that safety is costly, because most of them, especially in 
Commission V that is responsible for transportation, have no background on aviation.” (Sapta, an 
academic) 
Reviewing the factors affecting the performance of the Indonesian air transport system, there 
was strong evidence of the influence of knowledge, rules and enforcement. The deficiencies in 
the system that were looked at, significantly influenced the performances and, through time, 
became integrated into the system to negatively influence the safety culture. Likewise, the 
deficiencies produced various perceptions that were developed in conjunction with the quality 
of resources.  
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5.4.3 Safety Improvement 
“This is a crisis, a climax of problems of aviation in our country.” (Budi, an academic). 
Previous sections presented there were deteriorating processes occurred in the Indonesian air 
transport system. According to the interview data, the EU’s operating ban in 2007 was viewed 
as a result of the accumulation of precipitating events in the Indonesian air transport system. 
The interviewees precisely stated about that:  
“The operating ban is an iceberg effect. It is a top event of accumulating events in our aviation system.” 
(Windra, an aircraft maintenance officer)  
 “Refers to crisis cycle,..this is called a crisis, while accidents and incidents are preconditions.” (Dani, a 
CEO of an airline). 
Another interviewee said the operating ban was a consequence of unrecovered and unsolved 
problems in the system: 
“All accidents and incidents happened without explanation. Those events are warning signasl of failures in 
the system. But since all happened without adequate and proper explanations, those failures are 
accumulating. The EU concerned on this, consequently, the operating ban was imposed to all Indonesian 
airlines to enforce our regulator. Hence, the operating ban is a consequence of our vulnerable system.” 
(Andi, an academic) 
Nevertheless, all interviewees had the same opinion that the operating ban was only the result 
of the many events in the system, such as accidents and incidents that were unsolved.  
Accidents and incident should be investigated to understand how and why accidents occurred 
(and what caused it), so corrective and preventive actions can be formulated to avoid similar 
events happening again. The philosophy of investigation is ‘nothing but the truth’ to reveal the 
most probable causes of an accident. However, they are not only the direct causes, but also 
indirect contributing factors. The founder and the former Chief of the NTSC of the Republic of 
Indonesia stated, 
“…our method or approach is based on and similar to the academic and scientific approach to discover 
the reasons and mystiques of the existence of life and the universe.  
But with an engineering mind to construct an effective and efficient way of finding the truth, and nothing 
but the truth about what, how, and why an accident happened.” (Diran, personal communication, 2010).  
This statement implies that an investigation aimed only to reveal the truth to prevent 
recurrences. Therefore, an accident or incident investigation is used as a tool to understand the 
phenomenon behind an event and so enable preventive actions to be proposed.  
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The interviewees suspected three reasons for unsolved accident and incident cases in 
Indonesian aviation: dependency on the NTSC, politics and shortage of resources.  
The dependency issue rose because of the possibility of a conflict of interests between the 
NTSC and the Ministry of Transportation (the regulator).  Some examples of the interviewee’s 
statements follow. 
“......how the NTSC is able to criticize the regulator; since the NTSC is inside the system. Even the NTSC 
has no their own budget while some investigators also work for the regulator. Hence, it is clearly seen 
there are conflicts of interest.” (Masya, a retired pilot and academic)  
“I do not believe in the NTSC investigation report. The NTSC is under the auspices of the regulator; and 
we all know that the regulator plays a significant role to cause troubles in the Indonesian aviation.” (Agi, 
an aviation expert) 
“It is impossible that a son betrays his father; the one who raised and provided his needs.” (Yadi, an 
aircraft technician) 
The second reason revealed was politics as stated by the interviewees, below.   
 “This issue rose long time ago; it was voiced out after a series of accidents and incidents in 2004 to 
2006. Finally, there were three fatal accidents in 2007. But, there is no willingness from the government 
to establish an independent NTSC until today. Why? There are many interests; one of them is politics.” 
(Odi, an academic and investigator) 
“I believe the truth was not revealed to the public to cover some ‘powerful’ people. Of course, the NTSC 
is being controlled for that, because they are not independent.” (Koko, a pilot) 
Other interviewees viewed shortage of resources as an issue, 
“A shortage of resources meant the NTSC could not accomplish its investigation tasks.” (Masya, a retired 
pilot and academic)  
“The NTSC with their current resources had an inability to carry out all accident and incident cases. 
Consequently, some cases were not investigated by the NTSC, such as incidents.” (Oki, an investigator 
and academic) 
Although there were some interesting factors revealed in line with unsolved accident and 
incident cases, some interviewees claimed there were improvements in the Indonesian air 
transport safety. The operating ban was used as the indicator to justify their statement. 
However, none of the interviewees agreed there were significant improvements in the 
Indonesian air transport system before EU applied the operating ban to Indonesian airlines. 
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Figure 5.10, below, presents the interviewees opinions of safety improvements in the 
Indonesian air transport system. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.10 Improvements after the operating ban – agree or disagree 
Their claims were based on various reasons; for example, there was the CAP prepared by the 
Indonesian authorities to respond the ICAO USOAP 2007 findings in order to enhance safety. 
All interviewees agreed that there were no improvements before the operating ban. In contrast, 
some interviewees agreed there were significant improvements in the Indonesian air transport 
system after the operating ban, as shown in Figure 5.11, below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.11 Improvements after the operating ban – interviewee groups 
Figure 5.11 shows the breakdown by category of those interviewees who agreed there were 
improvements in the Indonesian air transport system after the operating ban. The government 
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officer stated there were safety improvements in the Indonesian air transport system; for 
example,  
“I think there are many sectors that need to be improved. Without a doubt, Indonesian aviation is getting 
better, especially after the operating ban applied by the European Union. The condition has forced the 
regulator to improve its roles in the aviation world.” (Novi, a government officer)  
“Currently, Indonesian aviation accidents have reduced significantly since the government commits to 
improve  aviation safety and it is guided with a motto, “road to zero accidents”. Therefore, I conclude that 
Indonesian aviation has improved recently. The regulator reviewed and revised the regulations. There are 
improvements in the [quality and quantity of] human resources. The ICAO criticised our human resource 
capability, so, the regulator established formal training programmes that comply with the international 
requirement.” (Beno, a government officer) 
The operating ban was also viewed that brought a positive impact to the whole system. It gave 
considerable the momentum to improve aviation safety:  
“Honestly, our air transport has improved compare to the last three years. There is improvement of the 
regulator’s mentality as well as operators’ mentallity. Currentlyothe regulator and operators have the same 
visions on safety as the being more important than other things. The organization did internal reformation 
and the Safety Management System or SMS has been applied, which complies with international standard. 
Previously, safety was not important but profit is the most important until the EU banned all Indonesian 
airlines. Then, we woke up.....Hellloooooo....!!!” (Ani, a CEO of an airline)  
In contrast, six of 11 academics agreed there were improvements after the operating ban in the 
Indonesian air transport system. For example: 
“We have lack of knowledge about what aviation is about. So we need to have a same perception about 
safety, then we will have the same framework to improve aviation safety. Undoubtedly, after we were 
banned by the EU, many improvements have been done.” (Lase, an academic) 
“Yes, there are some improvements in our aviation.” (Genta, an academic) 
Another five academics clearly stated their disagreement. Examples of their statements are 
below.  
“Bad, it is very bad. The regulator said there are improvements, but not for me. Before or after the 
operating ban, our air transport system is still bad.” (Anas, an academic) 
“I do not see any significant improvements so far.” (Madi, an academic) 
Most practitioners agreed there were some improvements in the Indonesian air transport 
system, only two practitioners disagreed because both saw that an improvement meant fulfilling 
the international safety standard and Indonesia was far from that.  
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“No, there are no improvements. What was happened in our aviation system is only look likely  better in the 
surface but weak in the bottom.” (Yono, a maintenance manager of an airline) 
Furthermore, there was one interviewee from the academic and pracitioner group who 
disagreed there were improvements in the Indonesian air transport system after the operating 
banned was issued by the EU, while the other nine interviewees agreed:  
“Indonesian aviation safety is getting better compare to three years ago, in particular after the EU banned. 
Aviation is the most safe transport mode as long all ICAO regulations are followed. But those 
improvements do not convince me to trust all Indonesian airlines.” (Desta, a flight trainer and academic). 
In summary, all interviewees agreed that there were no significant improvements before the 
operating ban. Although the majority of interviewees agreed that there were significant 
improvements in the Indonesian air transport system after the operating ban, some of the 
interviewees disagreed.  
Additionally, the interviewees also elaborated their statements of the safety improvements in 
the Indonesian air transport system. They addressed some barriers to improve the system; 
commitment and willingness, political system, covering issues and just fulfilling the EU’s 
requirements. Figure 5.12 presents the frequency of each barrier as mentioned during the 
interviews. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.12 Barriers to improve the Indonesian air transport system 
Commitment and willingness were identified as the strongest barrier to improve safety aviation 
with 35% of the total frequency. Just to fulfil requirements and political system were also 
mentioned at 25% and 21%, respectively. The weakest barrier was covering issues, with 19% of 
the total frequency. Each barrier was described in following section. 
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The interviews revealed there was a lack of commitmment and willingness of Indonesian 
leaders (e.g., the elites, top level management of arlines) to improve aviation safety. Most of 
interviewees said the willingness and commitment of the leaders to improve aviation safety 
were not good enough. They suspected personal or group interests as the reasons. The existing 
condition has given benefits to some people, particularly in the regulatory body, as mentioned 
by an interviewee: 
“......but, improvements without commitments cannot last. So, commitment and willingness from all parties, 
especially the regulator and operators are needed. Honestly, I can see this willingness from some leaders 
but not from the regulator as an institution because there are some interests. Their interests result from 
self-security. Some actors are not willing to improve aviation safety because they do not want to lose their 
current benefits. So, these kind of people become a barrier to improving Indonesian aviation safety.” 
(Catur, an academic) 
Likewise, such concern was also addressed to the operator.  
“So, there is no improvement. The system is weak and vulnerable. This will never be improved until the 
regulator and operators learn what an aviation system all about. To achieve those things need commitment 
and willingness to learn, implement, and develop the system continuously.” (Banu, a retired pilot and 
academic) 
Another interviewee also mentioned how the system also contributed to commitment and 
willingness of the persons inside the system: 
“...working environment in the government sectors are not condusive, the officers have lack of commitments 
and less integrity to do their jobs. They are doing their tasks because they have to, mostly for economic 
reasons; need for money. The condition is also supported by our bureaucratic system. Although we did 
reform, it was only in the top level and the operational level was not touched.” (Anto, a consultant and 
academic) 
In contrast, other interviewees observed the Act No.1/2009 was issued just to fulfil international 
requirement without having an understanding the appropriateness of the Act to the Indonesian 
air transport system. 
“The Act No.1/2009 was issued just to fulfil the ICAO recommendation, but it does not reach the root 
causes in our system. The Act was adopted from Australia. I am not against it, but the regulator and the 
legislator did not conduct an appropriate study together with academics and practitioners to determine the 
root causes in our system. So, when they adopted the regulation, I suspect, they were unknowledgeable to 
know whether the Act contents are appropriate to improve the quality of our aviation system.” (Dani, a 
CEO of an airline) 
Other two interviewees implied they were unimpressed with the improvements,  
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“I cannot deny that we have a comprehensive Act now and the regulator did internal reform as well. But, I 
hope these improvements are not only to answer the international concerns.” (Lase, an academic) 
 “But, as usual, after no more pressures from the international bodies then we will come back to our old 
tradition.” (Gyan, an aircraft engineer) 
The regulator saw the Indonesian political system as a barrier to improve the Indonesian air 
transport system. Convincing the legislator to issue a comprehensive legislation on aviation was 
a tough job. 
“Let’s see our new regulation. We have a comprehensive regulation right now, the Act no. 1/2009 that 
amended the old Act no.15/1992. I have been worked for more than 20 years, and I know how difficult to 
convince the legislator to issue an Act. But after the operating ban, the legislator supports the regulator to 
improve our air transport system; they issued the new Act which is more comprehensive, as recommended 
by the ICAO in USOAP 2007.” (Muli, a government officer) 
Other interviewees stated that the Indonesian political system affected the improvement in 
Indonesian air transport system. 
“Our political system with separation of power contributes to corrective actions of the regulator to improve 
aviation safety. For example, the regulator cannot increase the amount of budgets for improving aviation 
because it has to be approved by the legislator. As we all know, the legislator also comes from multi-
political parties, different backgrounds and, in my opinion, none of them are knowlegeable enough about 
the air transport system. So, if the legislator does not prioritise air transport, it may be caused by interests 
and unknowledgeable.” (Hanung, an academic) 
Another interviewee stated this issue cynically: 
“ The Indonesian regulator and legislator do not work together for the country, but tend to fight each other. 
They are too arrogant, so no wonder the EU banned all Indonesian airlines from flying to European 
countries.” (Aman, a chief operational of an airline) 
Some other interviewees highlighted the ‘unhealthy relationships’ between the operators, the 
regulator and even the legislature. For example, Agi (a public analyst and academic) defined the 
regulator as a ‘mafia’ group and untouchable. He also implied the power of the regulator helped 
them to cover any activities that benefitted themselves.  
“I fly often and I always monitor the condition of aircrafts that I fly in. I am scared and trying to avoid 
flying with some airlines. If I have a choice, I will not fly with those airlines because I really know how 
those airlines do maintaince to their aircrafts, such as C check, D check, et cetera. Likewise, the regulator 
seems like a ‘Mafia’ group and untouchable by anyone since they are the only institution that regulates our 
aviation. Thus, this is our aviation weakness because regulator has ‘hanky panky19’ relationship with 
                                                 
19
 Hanky panky is an idiom used to express trickery, deception, double dealing, or cheating. 
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airlines. [Some] people in airlines more concerns with trading than providing service. This is another 
reason why airlines like ‘warung tegal20’. They think just to gain profit, and that is enough. So, that is why I 
said the regulator is a ‘Mafia’ group, because they maintain this relationship to gain individual benefits. 
The regulator will react to cover any issues that possible to affect this relationship.” 
Furthermore, some interviewees addressed their criticms toward the legislator: 
“People in aviation organizations do not know what the aviation is all about. Unknowledgeable people with 
low levels of safety sense will create lots of safety issues. This is even worse since the regulator is not able 
to regulate the organization because they gain personal benefit from their relationship with the operators. 
Additionally, we cannot deny there are some individuals in parliament who back up the operator. So, when 
safety is negotiated,...then, finally, boom..!!! An accident occurs and results in loss, either life or financial. 
This kind of power, I mean ‘the relationship’, influence the finding and the truth because these powerful 
people will cover the truth.” (Odi, an academic and investigator)  
Hence, the operating ban imposed by the European Union to all Indonesian airlines had 
improved the Indonesian aviation safety. However, the improvements seemed likely were not 
optimum due to barriers faced. Due to the complexity of the air transport system alike in 
Indonesia, it gives opportunities to people who were involved to commit actions for their own 
benefits. This was because the system was difficult to manage as a number of parts interacted 
and, as such, deviations often tended to be overlooked or undetected. At this point, an accident 
or incident was highly possible to occur since the deterioration processes already existed.  
 
Figure 5.13 presents that 78% interviewees agreed failure to learn led to a series of accidents 
and incidents. Specifically, Figure 5.14 shows that none of the interviewees from the regulator 
agreed that failure to learn led to a series of incidents and accidents. This was quite different 
from the practitioners.  Nine academics agreed that failure to learn was the cause of a series of 
events but two did not. Furthermore, eight academics that were also practitioners agreed there 
was a failure to learn while another two did not answer the question. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Warung tegal is a food stall that provides economical types of foods. 
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Figure 5.13 Failure to learn led to a series of incidents and accidents - responses 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.14 There was failure to learn that led to a series of incidents and accidents – 
interviewee groups 
The regulator pointed to operators who were behind the series of accidents and incidents instead 
of identifying failure to learn as a cause: 
“There was unhealthy competition after deregulation. We wanted to attract more airlines to enter and 
compete in the system, but they disobeyed the rules and regulations.” (Muli, a regulator officer) 
 
“Many airliners do not know how to do aviation business. They think aviation is high profit business. They 
think only about money but forget to improve safety.” (Harun, a regulator officer) 
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Another interviewee also mentioned deviation of implementing regulations as the cause of a 
series of accidents and incidents: 
“Deviation to implement the rules and the regulations are the main causes here.” (Novi, a regulator 
officer)  
 
In contrast, practitioners clearly stated that the regulator was the cause of this phenomenon: 
“...because the regulator never really,...really work to improve the system by learning from the previous 
events.” (Gyan, an aircraft engineer) 
 
“I think our regulator fails to learn, so, they also fail to act. That is why there were recurrences.” (Dani, a 
CEO of an airline) 
 
“No doubt there are recurrences. Those indicate that the system fails to learn and fails to implement 
corrective actions.” (Yono, a Chief of maintenance of an airline) 
The interviews revealed that there were three agents in a series of accidents and incidents. The 
agents were the regulator, the operators and the existing system, as shown in Figure 5.15, 
below.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5.15 Causes for a series of  incidents and accidents in the Indonesian air 
transport 
The regulator was singled out as the main reason behind a series of accidents and incidents in 
the Indonesian air transport system. The practitioners addressed the cause of the series of events 
in Indonesian aviation to the regulator. Excluding the regulator, other interviewees also 
identified the regulator as the cause. The regulator exhibited a failure to learn and a failure to 
act, as stated by one interviewee. 
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“Here, I think the regulator fails to learn and also fails to act. Of course, there are other factors but these 
two factors are the main causes. If an accident occurred, the NTSC will conduct an investigation to 
determine causal factors and propose corrective actions in order to improve aviation safety. But the 
regulator actions are only until that stage, there is no follow up. We only work until we formulate 
conclusions to answer public concerns then we leave it and shift our attention to another case. There is no 
intention to learn and act from the regulator; everything just to fulfil their tasks.” (Ani, a CEO of an airline) 
 
Some interviewees argued that the regulator failed to learn and failed to act as they viewed 
conducting an investigation after an accident or incident as a way to learn. However, the 
government did not act to implement the safety recommendations: 
“We learn but fail to act. We act but the actions were not appropriate to solve the problems. We learn but 
we chose what we want to learn. I conclude that we just tried to improve anything that was effortless, but it 
seemed we did much. We rotated officers once an accident or incident occurred, but never improved the 
system. Hence, the same failures kept happening. We improved in the surface, but not solve the roots of the 
issues.” (Lase, an academic) 
The operators were also implicated playing a significant role to cause an accident or incident to 
happen, as highlighted during the interviews. Some interviewees addressed that the cause was 
the condensed market after deregulation in 1999 that attracted new airlines to enter the 
Indonesian aviation market:  
“Deregulation gave opportunities for new airlines to enter the aviation market, so, new entrants might 
establish a competitive market. But, some players committed to having ‘unhealthy’ activities at competing 
in a condensed market. For example, initial training was reduced to cut operational costs, and the 
maintenance cycle time was extended.” (Novi, a government officer) 
 
Other interviewees stressed knowledge as an issue of the operators, as stated by Yoga (a 
consultant and academic): 
“Many airlines have inadequate knowledge of aviation. Deregulations gave the opportunity for traders who 
have money, but no aviation knowledge to enter the market. Aviation was seen as a glamorous and 
prestigious business that involves lots of money. In fact, they forget that safety is costly and one of priorities 
in the aviation industry. So, the lack of knowledge led them to seek ‘efficiencies’ that often compromised 
safety.” 
 
The weak and vulnerable system was stressed by some interviewees; for example: 
“Our air transport system is weak and we have inadequate knowledge to improve it, we even do not 
recognise that our system is weak. So, that is why our transport system, in particular air transport, is 
vulnerable. We faced with many accidents and incidents but did not learn.” (Masya, an academic and 
retired pilot)  
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Another interviewee mentioned the system for other reasons: 
“I will say that the accidents and incidents in Indonesia are caused by our weak and vulnerable system. 
This kind of system is established by low quality of resources that, unfortunately, also did not want to 
learn.” (Wahyu, a transport analyst and academic).  
As stated by the interviewees, the vulnerability in the Indonesian air transport system was 
caused by the regulator, operators and the existing system. Therefore, these issues need to be 
concerned in order to improve the system. 
5.5 Summary 
This study revealed that the causes of accidents and incidents in the Indonesian air transport 
system were attributable to the deterioration of the system since its inception. There is verified 
by empirical evidence that human contributions were the root causes of the deficiencies. These 
deficiencies were related to knowledge, rules and enforcement. Furthermore, there were threats 
identified in the system. These threats (manipulation, bribery and collusion) occurred in the 
interactions of humans in the system. The combination of human deficiencies and threats were 
leading to the lower levels of performance in the system. Moreover, the interviewees stated that 
the poor performance in the system was also influenced by system perception and safety 
culture. Those multiple causalities worked together to weaken the system into the state of 
vulnerability, where it was easily attacked by unsafe acts or conditions to create an accident or 
incident. 
The results of this study determined there were deficiencies which existed at the establishment 
stage, but tended to be ignored or overlooked thus while the system was running (the 
operational stage), these deficiencies were adapting to the system, but created holes in the 
system’s defences. These ‘earlier deficiencies’ met, throughout time, with other deficiencies 
besides some threats that also arose, in unintended ways. Thus, the system was weakened and 
then an accident or incident occurs. Furthermore, the interrelated causes in the Indonesian 
aircraft accidents and incidents illustrate the complexity of how such a complex socio-technical 
system works.  
The phenomena in the Indonesian air transport system reflect multiple-causalities of an accident 
or incident which is generated from a combination of cognitive, organizational, technical, 
socio-cultural, and elite’s interests. These causes cannot be solved just from a single 
perspective; for example, by providing adequate training to maintain and improve knowledge or 
by issuing comprehensive rules and policies to guide the operations. No doubt that these 
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countermeasures help against poor performances, but they are not enough to improve the 
system safety as the system is dynamic while time will increase its complexities. Hence, 
constant and comprehensive assessments are essential to determine shortcomings or 
vulnerabilities in order to enhance safety.  
However, the operating ban applied by the EU to all Indonesian airlines gave a positive impact 
to the system. There were significant improvements identified, which were contradictive with 
condition before the operating ban applied. There were four barriers to learn identified in this 
study: commitment and willingness, political system, covering issues and limited/poor intention 
to learn as indicated the improvements made just to fulfil the EU’s requirements. Failure to 
learn was indicated by series of accidents and incidents in the system that was reasoned by the 
regulator, operator and the existing system. 
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    Chapter 6 
Discussion 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses the findings derived from the data collected with the existing theories. 
Four sections are presented. Section 6.2 discusses the causes of accidents and incidents in the 
Indonesian air transport system. Section 6.3 gives an explanation on high accident and incident 
rates that indicated failure to learn. Section 6.4 provides an insight of crisis happened in the 
Indonesian air transport system and, finally, section 6.5 summarises this chapter. 
6.2 The Origin of Indonesian Commercial Aviation Accidents and 
Incidents  
Understanding after-the-facts, accidents and incidents, should considered an aspect that was 
often overlooked by many scholars: ‘historical aspect’. Thus, time played a significant role in 
this process. Considering this aspect provides better understanding on how values, beliefs and 
norms adopted by the system were developed.  This study considered this aspect. The raison 
d’etre of this study was the operating ban applied to the Indonesian air transport system by the 
European Union. Therefore, the study traced back the system from the European Union 
operating ban until deregulation of the Indonesian air transport system in 1999 that was also the 
year of the establishment of the National Transport Safety Committee (NTSC) in Indonesia. In 
sum, this study analysed the Indonesian air transport system from 1999 to July 2007.  
6.2.1 Incubation Period 
Incubation period occurs before a system reaches its vulnerability stage. Analysing the time 
frame of this study provided knowledge on development processes of the system. According to 
it, the development processes were grouped into two periods: the establishment period and the 
operational period. 
The establishment period was from 1999 to 2000. The period was started by an issuance of the 
Act N0.5/1999 on antimonopoly. The Act aimed to stimulate the Indonesian economic by 
giving opportunities of privatization in industries, including aviation. Following the Act, there 
were several Ministerial Decree (MD) issued; for example, MD No.77/2000 on requirements 
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for aviation operations, MD No.11/2001 on aviation operations. This period called as 
deregulation era that stimulated the Indonesian air transport system. 
Ever since the deregulation, new airlines prepared to enter the Indonesian aviation market. In 
2000, the new entrants entered the market and introduced a new system in aviation business: 
Low Cost Carrier (LCC); for example, Jatayu Airlines and Lion Air.  However, the actors in 
aviation, especially the regulator, was not anticipated the fastest growth of the system. The 
regulator was not prepared well. There was no plan to improve resources; for example, the 
numbers of infrastructures, the numbers of inspectors. Therefore, the next period – the 
operational period – there were negative consequences happened as the results of lack of 
preparation. 
The operational period was started from 2001 to July 2007, prior the announcement of the EU’s 
operating ban. The operational stage refers to the period after the establishment era in which the 
system has developed (e.g., deregulation, privatisation). In this period, accidents and incidents 
followed the growth of the system. This study viewed these events as warning signals that 
tended to be overlooked and even ignored until international bodies such as ICAO and FAA 
recognized the problems and downgraded the Indonesian aviation safety rate. Finally, the 
European Union applied an operating ban to all Indonesian airlines.    
Examining each stage has identified deficiencies in the system. These deficiencies were 
grouped into three groups: knowledge-based, rule-based, and enforcement-based deficiencies. 
In the first period, the establishment period, there were two deficiencies identified. These 
deficiencies were inadequate knowledge that was related to knowledge-based deficiencies and 
unclear rules that was related to rule-based deficiencies. More deficiencies were identified in 
the second period. This might be caused by there were more activities in this period so the 
deficiencies led to visible negative consequences, in this case, incidents and accidents. The 
deficiencies in the second period were: knowledge-based deficiencies (inadequate knowledge, 
inadequate training, and not the right person in the right job), rule-based deficiencies (unclear 
rules, out-of-date rules, non-compliance with international rules, and no guidance), and 
enforcement-based deficiencies (no control, lack of sanction, and infirmness/resoluteness). 
These deficiencies are presented in Table 6.1, below. Each deficiency is discussed in Section 
6.2.2. 
 
136 
 
Table 6.1 The deficiencies at the Indonesian air transport system 
Resources Establishment Stage Operational Stage 
Knowledge Inadequate knowledge Inadequate knowledge 
Inadequate training 
Not the right person in the 
right job 
Rules Unclear rules 
 
Unclear rules 
Out-of-date rules 
Non-compliance with 
international rules 
No guidance 
Enforcement  No control 
Lack of sanction 
Infirmness or irresoluteness 
 
In referring to failure theories (e.g., Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Theory, Man-made 
Disaster Theory), there is a precondition stage called as incubation period (Turner, 1978; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) or latent condition (Reason, 1990, 1997, 2008, 2009), in which 
unintended and complex interactions of contributory factors defeat safety system. The 
following section presents those deficiencies identified in the Indonesian air transport system 
that already existed since the establishment of the system. 
6.2.2 Deficiencies in Incubation Period 
The deficiencies determined in this study inseparable from human factors. The data collected 
identified that there was a tendency to blame someone or something in the Indonesian air 
transport system as causes of an accident or incident, which was called as ‘Eureka parts’ by 
Langewiesche (1998). Human error was one of causes of an accident or incident that often to be 
pointed. Here, this label – human error – was often used to blame people in the sharp-end level; 
for example, pilots, ATC controller. But according to this study, human factors were there in all 
levels, from the regulatory level down to operational level, or in other words, from the blunt-
end level to the sharp-end level.    
6.2.2.1 Knowledge-based Deficiencies 
Three deficiencies related to knowledge were identified by this study. They were inadequate 
knowledge, inadequate training, and not the right person in the right job.  
Inadequate knowledge refers to a condition in which someone has insufficient knowledge or 
incapable to handle specific tasks. This study revealed that there was no mechanism to attract 
qualified and competent people so there were improprieties in the recruitment system. This 
137 
 
condition affected people who had been recruited, often those people had not qualified enough 
to handle specific tasks; for example, ATC controller had no knowledge on reading radar thus 
he could not identify if there was something wrong in the radar, pilots who just graduated from 
flying school got positions as PIC in which need more knowledge gained from flying hours. 
Consequently, those people were vulnerable to any trigger that could lead them commit to err. 
There was a significant relationship between non-existent mechanism to recruit competent and 
qualified people with inadequate knowledge. Recruitment system is very important and one of 
strategies to minimise human error. By proper recruitment only people who are least likely to 
make mistakes to enter the system (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003, p. 172).  
Non-existent mechanisms for recruiting competent and capable people were also supported by 
highly condensed aviation markets like Indonesia’s. The findings showed that there was 
resources and activities imbalance in the operations. For example, in the establishment period, 
there were only two officers in the DGCA headquarter who were responsible for crew licensing 
while there were insufficient numbers of pilots to operate 982 aircrafts. These numbers could 
not provide best services to check all pilots meet requirements or not. Non-existent mechanism 
for recruitment made the officers’ works harder. Consequently, when the operators recruited 
some abal-abal pilots who were not qualified or competent enough, this issue was undetected. 
The condition reflected lack of awareness of the regulator to anticipate the growth of the 
system.  
On the other hand, focusing just to recruit pilots reflected a lack of awareness by operators that 
aviation operations are not a single man show, but the work of aircrew teams. Polham and 
Fletcher (2010) found that the development of recruitment mechanisms in aviation initially 
focused on the selection of pilots rather than on other aviation personnel, which was reflected in 
the Indonesian air transport system. Anyone who works in a complex system, not only pilots, 
like air transport should have sufficient knowledge to cope with its complexities. However, 
recruitment issues are relatively new phenomenon (Polham & Fletcher, 2010), ideally, limited 
tolerance for errors should be a key requirement of recruitment and selection. 
Deficiency in recruitment was combined with inadequate training. This deficiency refers to a 
condition in which people should get knowledge to help them to do their tasks, but they did not 
get the knowledge. Westrum and Adamski (Westrum & Adamski, 2010) state that knowledge is 
essential in aviation activities. It should be maintained and improved in various ways; for 
example, providing training and written documents. Training will provide knowledge for a 
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specific identifiable job (Polham & Fletcher, 2010). Thus, reducing the number of training 
sessions just for cost-efficiencies, in fact, risked the aviation operations, as reveaed in the 
Mandala Airlines MDL 493 case.  
Training is also proposed by Wells and Rodrigues (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003, p. 172) as 
another strategy to reduce error and it is agreed by Ballesteros (2007). He stated that 
technological development has created a gap between necessary knowledge in an earlier phase 
of development and the latest knowledge that is needed in current situation. The gap has 
possibility to affect human performances in the system. This deficiency occurred at the 
operational period as the system was begun to grow. 
However, the actors in the system did not realize that a recruitment and selection system work 
in conjunction with training – the more precise the recruitment and selection mechanism, the 
higher the level of qualified and competent persons that may be recruited. Consequently, in the 
long-run, it reduces training requirements. 
The last deficiency related to knowledge was not placing the right person in the right job. At 
the establishment period, this deficiency was not founded, this might be caused the system was 
just begun. Following the growth of the system, more tasks need to be done and, at this time, 
this deficiency was identified. This deficiency refers to a condition in which a person fills a 
position that he/she has not competent and capable enough to handle the job. This was 
happened not only because ones had insufficient knowledge or even no knowledge about their 
new position, but often their knowledge insignificant to the position. Here, in the Indonesian air 
transport system, the condition occurred as a result of bureaucratic system. Seniority was often 
used as a reason for a decision to appoint to a position rather than expertise. So, the 
bureaucratic system often does not place the right people to the right job. 
Two deficiencies, inadequate knowledge and training, were founded in either the regulatory or 
the operational level, but the last deficiency, not right person in the right job, was only founded 
in the regulatory level.  
These deficiencies affected human performances to handle their tasks. These deficiencies 
supported Rasmussen (1982) and Reason (1997) study on human performances. They found 
that knowledge-based performance was often resulted from shortage of information or 
inadequate training to deal with a new task. This study revealed that limitation of knowledge 
was not only resulted from shortage of information or inadequate training, but it was started 
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from recruitment. Improper recruitment affected the quality of people who enter the system 
thus, in long run, will affect human performances in the system. 
6.2.2.2 Rule-based Deficiencies 
Four deficiencies identified in this study were related to rules. These deficiencies were unclear 
rules, out-of-date rules, non-compliance with international rules, and no guidance. 
The first deficiency related to rules is unclear rules. This deficiency refers to ambiguity of rules 
because the rules could be interpreted in various ways.  The Act no.15/1992 was issued to 
regulate the Indonesian air transport system in 76 verses. But, the Act only provided 
explanations of terms used in the system and framework of the system. There was a lack of 
comprehensive explanations of each term and the framework, neither in the Act, itself, nor in 
other regulations or policies that are lower than the Act. Consequently, at the operational 
period, there were multi-interpretations on the Act although the regulator issued several rules to 
provide more explanation.  
The condition affected people in the operational level (the sharp-end level) because the blunt-
end levels took any decision was depend their interpretation to the rules. As there were 
ambiguities on interpretation of meanings of the rules, the blunt-end levels tended to take a 
decision that had more benefits to them. For example, the applications of A, B, C Checks that 
could be negotiated as unclear explanations on the procedures. Furthermore, this study 
identified that the regulator did not communicate the rules effectively, even their officers often 
did not know well about the rules. Thus, the rules could not well regulate the Indonesian air 
transport system. 
The second deficiency was out-of-date rules. So, this study, found that besides unclear rules, 
often these rules were out-of-date. Deficiencies were not only existed in the primary 
legislations, but also at the operational level; for example, there were often found accidents or 
incidents caused by out-of-date rules. Two cases, Mandala MDL 091 and Garuda Indonesia GA 
200, evidenced similar problems – unrevised rules. The AEPs were not reviewed, updated and 
even practiced thus at the time of accidents affected the number of survivors. The existence of 
this issue showed that there was no established mechanism to periodically review existing rules 
so a need to update the rules could not be applied. 
Non-compliance with international rules was the third deficiency identified by this study. 
International rules; for example, Annexes and CASRs issued by ICAO, US FAA policies, are 
periodically reviewed to determine a need to update the rules. The amendment will be issued 
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and distributed to the ICAO’s contracting states and any countries that applied the FAA rules. 
However, the Indonesian air transport system often did not comply with these rules. The rules 
in the system often only considered about national interests but forgetting international 
standards. Consequently, at the operational period, activities in the system did not meet 
international standards; for example, numbers of inspectors for inspecting the aviation-related 
activities, the infrastructures of airports, the navigation systems. 
The last deficiency in this group was no rules. This study revealed that at the operational 
period, sometimes there were no rules to guide the aviation-related activities. This deficiency 
led to uncertainties to people at the sharp-end levels. Those people faced with complexities, but 
had to take any actions, which there were no guidance. So, there was not a surprise if their 
decisions fail. Some rules cannot be written – known as tacit knowledge (Westrum & Adamski, 
2010) – there were many rules that were supposed to be written but were not. 
At the establishment period, the Indonesian air transport system only had an Act, the Act 
No.15/1992, which was not comprehensive enough to regulate the system. Therefore, at the 
operational period, there was lack of guidance because the regulator did not provide 
comprehensive rules and also did not periodically evaluate a need for updating the existing 
rules. These deficiencies might be resulted in people who make error or correct performances as 
were stated by Reason (1997). On the other hand, Rasmussen (1983) viewed errors in human 
performances that related to rules are often occurred in sophisticated activities with lots 
procedures, which were not happened in Indonesia as all deficiencies existed because lack of 
guidance.  
6.2.2.3 Enforcement-based Deficiencies 
Three deficiencies related to enforcement were revealed by this study. The deficiencies were no 
control, lack of sanction, and infirmness or irresoluteness. These deficiencies were only existed 
at the operational period. 
In air transport system, there are complex interactions among parts so control is essential to 
manage errors, from engineering level (e.g., automation) until administrative level (e.g., 
procedures) (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003). Here, the regulator seemed did not do their job to 
control the aviation operations. Control refers to exercise restraining over procedures or policies 
so if there is loose control over the procedures or policies, any defect will not be anticipated and 
solved earlier. This study founded that lack of control existed as it resulted from a combination 
of shortages of resources and supervision. Thus, monitoring, cross checking or ensuring were 
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not properly applied; for example, the IRS issues founded at the Adam Air DHI 872 and DHI 
574 cases which although the operator received reports of the recurring defects on the IRS, 
there was no action taken to resolve it while the lack of control of the regulator over the 
operator led to allowing the aircraft to be operated.  
Referring to the Adam Air DHI 872 incident investigation report, there was a contribution of 
the IRS to the incident that caused the aircraft did not landing at its designated airport. 
However, there was no sanction applied to the airline although there were recurring defects on 
the IRS. The regulator did not apply any sanction because they did not know there were IRS 
defects. So, lack of control often worked in conjunction with lack of sanction. This deficiency 
was also caused by the regulator’s attitude to easily ‘forgive and forget’. Consequently, defects, 
errors, or violations passed without sanctions or punishment and it was not surprising that 
similar defects, errors or violations happened again, as in the Adam Air cases. Hence, applying 
sanctions or punishments to enforce the system, as suggested by Wells & Rodrigues (2003), 
was not well done in the Indonesian air transport system. This contention is also supported by 
the fact that many officers were working just to fulfil their job tasks without integrity. 
Therefore, as long as they did their tasks to satisfy their boss, they did not care whether what 
they did might affect safety or not. Thus, here, the officers concerns were more about avoiding 
any conflict and just let things go without getting involved. They need to secure their positions. 
Bureaucratic system and politics contributed to this practice because moving and replacing ones 
position was not hard to do by the top level people, especially those people who tended to 
disobey their orders. 
This study also revealed there was a significant relationship between lack of sanction with the 
last deficiency that related to enforcement – infirmness or irresoluteness. This deficiency refers 
to a condition in which ones are unsure how to react or take an action over an issue. This study 
founded that the regulator often did not take any action over something; for example, in Adam 
Air DHI 574 case, the regulator decided to grounded the airline was only after pressure from 
public and media. Thus, there was a tendency that the regulator chose to whom sanctions or 
punishments applied.  
In sum, deficiencies-based enforcement had relationships each other. One deficiency influenced 
the others. These deficiencies mainly existed in the regulatory level as their tasks had to 
regulate the system.  Thus monitoring, evaluating, and managing the system are the regulator’s 
responsibilities (Wells and Rodriquez, 2003). However, a shortage number of people, 
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bureaucratic system, lack of integrity, and attitude were a combination that created deficiencies 
in the system. 
6.2.3 Threats in the System 
There were complex interactions in the Indonesian air transport system. People who interacted 
with the system were founded influenced by threats that contributed to the degeneration of the 
system. There were three threats identified: manipulation, bribery, and collusion. These threats 
worked contributed to affect human performances in the system. 
Manipulation is defined as achieving a purpose by making unfair or artful changes. For this 
kind of practice once it was started, it was often followed by the next practice, over and over 
again. It was likely a vicious cycle of breaking the rules. People practiced this threat founded 
the benefit gained from practicing it while they also needed to cover their previous actions. 
Consequently, they had no care if their actions would affect safety or lead to dangerous 
situation. For example, manipulation of cargo weight in the airport because the officers wanted 
to get some cash. This practice placed the aircraft in a dangerous situation because if the 
MTOW of the aircraft exceeded its limit, an accident or incident was possible to occur.   
The threat, manipulation, was often inseparable from bribery - the bestowing of a benefit in 
order to unduly influence of action or decision. For example, at the operational period, the 
airlines needed more pilots to fly the aircrafts, but there were not enough pilots available. The 
cheap and fast way to solve this issue was by upgrading co-pilot to become a pilot. So, that was 
why there were abal-abal pilots in the system. 
This study also revealed that this threat was often practiced for speeding up or smoothing 
procedures in the regulatory level. For example, pelicin or ‘glossy money’ was needed to speed 
up getting an Air Operator Certificate (AOC). This threat was practiced mostly at the 
operational period because the regulator wanted to attract new entrants to the Indonesian 
aviation market. Some people viewed these as an opportunity to gain benefit. They requested 
new airlines to pay some cash in order to get a license to start an operation. If they request was 
rejected, the procedures would be longer than usual although the airline filled all requirements. 
So, longer waiting period would lead to loss thus the airline would do the request.  
The last threat was collusion. This threat refers to secret agreement or cooperation, which 
benefits particular parties. Similar to two threats above, collusion was practiced also to gain 
benefits. But, this practice benefited not only one side; it benefited all parties that committed to 
practice the threat. For example, arrangement for bidding on a project to allow particular party 
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to win in bidding processes. Here, the bidding committee and a bidder had cooperation to 
arrange the bidding processes so the bidder won the project. Through this arrangement both 
parties, committee and bidder, gained benefits. 
Table 6.2 summarises the deficiencies existed in the Indonesian air transport system and also 
the direct and indirect drivers that caused the deficiencies existed. Those cause and effect 
relationships were influenced by threats in the system. There were three threats identified that 
contributed to the degeneration of the system. These threats controlled and steered the system 
from the decision making level to the operational level.  
This study identified there were deficiencies related to knowledge, rule, and enforcement. There 
were direct and indirect drivers that caused these deficiencies occurred while there were also 
threats that interacted with these drivers. Direct drivers refer to the causes that were connected 
directly to the deficiencies. Indirect drivers were defined as the causes that were not directly 
connected to the causes and often hidden in the system.  
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Table 6.2   The causes of aircraft accidents and incidents in the Indonesian air transport system 
Deficiency Factors Drivers  Threats 
Direct Direct/Indirect 
Enforcement-based deficiencies 
Lack of control A shortage of resources Cost-efficiencies Manipulation 
Bribery 
Collusion 
Lack of sanction/punishment Attitudes (forgive and forget) 
Low integrity 
Legal system 
Politics 
Self-security 
Bureaucratic system 
Infirmness/resoluteness 
Rule-based deficiencies 
Out of date rules/procedures   
Lack of knowledge 
Manipulation 
Bribery 
Collusion 
Non-compliance with the International 
rules 
No guidance 
Unclear rules Lack of communication  
Knowledge-based deficiencies 
Inadequate knowledge Improper recruitment system Imbalance in the growth of the 
aviation industry and the availability 
of human resources 
Bureaucratic system 
Political system 
Manipulation 
Bribery 
Collusion 
Inadequate training  Cost-efficiencies 
Not right person in the right job  Bureaucratic system 
Political system 
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In this study, deficiencies were found throughout the whole system, from the blunt-ends level to 
the sharp-ends level. Those deficiencies were not only at the final stage where an unsafe act 
was committed, but also began at the decision-making level. This thesis identified some of 
organizational influence, at least with respect to the Indonesian air transport system from 1999 
to 2007.  
The summary of the deficiencies factors existed from the regulatory level to the operational 
level is presented in Table 6.3, below. All deficiencies existed in all levels, except for sanction 
or punishment. For this kind of deficiency, operators were more firm compare with the 
regulator. This might be caused by operators dealt directly with customers. If they failed to 
satisfy their customers then they could not survive in a condensed aviation market like 
Indonesia.  
The present study has also identified how the deteriorating process affected human 
performance, which in the air transport system, like other complex socio-technical system, 
reflected the performances of skilled experts. I acknowledge, of course, that people have 
limitations to their capabilities and abilities. So there was a need to maintain and improve these 
limitations, which worked concurrently with the growth of technology. Hence, the deficiencies 
and threats led to lower levels of performance since the system was not ‘aware’ of the 
deficiencies caused by enforcement, rules and knowledge.  
Those deficiencies and threats existed in the system and whether noticed or not, they adapted 
and integrated with the system (as presented in table 6.2). So, the system kept running with 
those notices and unnoticed failures, as said by Boin (2005) that how error often undetected as 
due of pervasive human tendencies to cope ill-structured problems, which here was the 
Indonesian air transport system. In the long-term, these practices became habits and then 
culture. Thus, it became common to deal with safety instead of dealing with risks. Safety then 
could be bargained for although with that bargain, risks were increased. Hence, this study 
revealed that the causes of accidents and incidents in the Indonesian air transport system were 
not as simply as revealed in the NTSC’s investigation reports, but existed deeper in the system.  
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Table 6.3   The deficiencies and threats in the regulatory body and operators 
Deficiency Factors Actors Threats 
Regulator Operators 
Lack of control √ √ Bribery, manipulation and collusion were 
identified at the regulatory body and operators. 
These practices existed in interactions of the 
regulator and operators. 
Lack of sanction/punishment √  
Infirmness/resoluteness √ √ 
Out of date rules/procedures √ √ 
Non-compliance with the International rules √ √ 
No guidance √ √ 
Unclear rules √ √ 
Inadequate knowledge √ √ 
Inadequate training √ √ 
Not right person in the right job √ √ 
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The condition of the Indonesian air transport system was reflected in the multiple causalities of 
aircraft accidents and incidents that occurred from the regulatory level, the legislature level to 
the operational level. For example, inadequate knowledge of the legislature and the regulator 
caused them did not recognize the needs of a new legislation or regulation. A lack of legislation 
or regulation caused people at the sharp-end had to adapt with the complexities of the 
operations with limitations they have. However, people, naturally, have ability to cope with 
complexity (Rasmussen, 1986), thus people at the sharp-end will try to find best strategies to 
adapt with the condition (Woods et al., 2010). Consequently, sometimes their efforts to adapt 
with complexities are successful, but sometimes are fail that might lead to an accident or 
incident. 
The results of this study determined there were deficiencies existed at the establishment stage, 
but tended to be ignored or overlooked thus while the system was running (the operational 
stage), these deficiencies were adapting and integrated to the system, but created holes in the 
system’s defences. These ‘earlier deficiencies’ met, throughout time, with other deficiencies 
besides some threats that were also arose, in unintended ways. Thus, the system was weakened 
then an accident or incident occurred. In some ways, the results are strengthening the 
conceptualisation of the incubation period (Reason, 1990, 1997, 2008, 2009; Turner, 1978; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), but a linear sequence of accident causation used in their original 
formulation does not clearly explain the reasons behind the system breakdown, particularly 
from the threats that arose in unintended ways, socio-cultural aspect (e.g., sungkan), and elite’s 
power (e.g., political system). Although Toft & Reynolds (Toft & Reynolds, 1997) refined that 
there is a complex combination of technical, individual, group, organizational, social factors, 
and together with culture, affected assumptions and practices, the influences of elite’s power 
remain unclear.  
Furthermore, the interrelated causes in the Indonesian aircraft accidents and incidents illustrate 
the complexity of how a system works. Therefore, applying the theories of failure to examine 
Indonesian aviation might be suited, but, in fact, both NAT and HRT also cannot clearly 
explain the phenomena at the Indonesian air transport system. The existence of threats as 
products of interactions of people in the system, socio-cultural aspects, and a fact of thick 
nuance of political system seem unrevealed. Although Perrow (1984, 1986a; 1999) states 
politics’ and power’s influence to human errors, he does not explicitly explain the terms. 
Moreover, the terms of threats and socio-cultural remain conceal.   
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6.3 Failure to learning 
This study departed from high a series of accidents and incidents, which was indicated by 
frequency of occurrences from 1999 to July 2007. Although studies showed there were no two 
events were the same, the frequency of the events and also the reasons behind the events 
indicated that the system had failed to prevent recurrences. There were reasons behind this 
failure and this study identified that there were contributions of all actors in the system, 
including the NTSC, to this failure as will be discussed, below. 
6.3.1 The Analysis of an Event 
Investigating an accident in a complex socio-technical system was not easy, each accident is 
unique: As stated by Reason (1997) an accident has its own very individual pattern of cause and 
effect. Thus, Reason (1997) proposed that researchers should conduct deep investigation into 
the common underlying structures and processes to find the right level of explanation. This had 
not been carried out in Indonesia.  
In-depth investigation was not applied in Indonesia. The investigation was only done by the 
NTSC according to the ICAO Annex 13. The Committee was unable to investigate all events, 
accidents and incidents.  Dependency of the Committee to Department of Transport created 
shortages of the NTSC resources either facilities (e.g., equipments, funds) or investigators. So, 
the condition affected the objectives of an investigation, to determine the probable causes and 
to recommend control measures (Wells & Rondrigues, 2003, p. 134). 
Investigating an event, the NTSC prepared two reports: preliminary investigation report and 
final investigation report. The analysis applied in the report is started from an event backward 
to determine the causes of the event. This type of analysis is called, event-chain approach (Dien 
et al., 2012). The common method used by the NTSC to investigate an event was FTA that 
deductively analyse an event to identify causes that lead to that event. 
This study also revealed that there was a tendency of an investigation to find the unsafe acts 
instead of considering latent failures. For example, with the Adam Air DHI 782 and DHI 574 
cases, the NTSC determined the cockpit crew made wrong decisions because of the 
dysfunctional IRS and they had not received any training to deal with this kind of problem. 
Although the investigation report the NTSC addressed the lack of control conducted by the 
regulator that resulted in the repetitive defects in the IRS, the NTSC did not reveal how the lack 
of control happened. This tendency has supported Langewieche (1998) argument that stated 
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how study on failure tends to seek ‘eureka parts’, the direct causes of an accident or incident 
happened.  
This study founded that the investigation reports found the causes of accidents on pilot 
performance (an overly frequent finding), which strengthens support for the views of Reason 
(2009) and Dismuskes (2009) who found that studies of human errors often focused on pilot 
performances instead of other errors committed by other aviation personnel. Looking back on 
the cases in the Indonesian air transport system – for example the two Adam Air cases – clearly 
showed that people in the organizational and the regulatory levels tended to be overlooked. It 
was clear that investigations carried out by the NTSC that were supposed to change ill 
structured problems, by examining the system, failed to improve them into well-structured 
ones. 
6.3.2 The Investigators 
The Committee had lack of experts to conduct deeper analysis to an event. Analysing an event 
consumed time and funds, which these were issues in the NTSC body. Dependency of the 
committee to Department of Transport caused their budget was depended on the Department. 
Furthermore, the members of the NTSC were not sufficient while investigators worked in 
voluntary based. Consequently, a combination of resources (method, humans and funds) 
resulted in impossibility to investigate all events.  
Lacking to investigate all events might be possible for the NTSC for not recognizing early 
warning signals as indicated by incidents. Thus, the potential hazards could not recognize 
earlier than preventive actions cannot be proposed. Hence, it seemed reasonable to assume that 
the investigation objectives were not optimally achieved since accidents and incidents kept 
occurring. 
Furthermore, pressures to the NTSC by media and public were also very strong in Indonesia. 
Once an accident occurred in Indonesia, then media would wrote every single angle of the event 
and often with harshly comments.  
Information about an event often revealed into the media or public, which that information was 
highly confidential. For example, the black box of the missing plan, Adam Air DHI 574, had 
been uploaded to YouTube and revealed to national media. The recorded was not to be 
disclosed and only could be accessed by few people such as investigators. In fact, people in 
Indonesia knew all conversation although the authority, the NTSC, stated the recorded was not 
the right data. Consequently, public opinion had been developed because people knew the result 
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of the event – a missing plane – and by hearing the black box data, people thought they knew 
exactly what was going on in that plane and questioned why the pilot took a decision that 
placed the aircraft and passengers in danger. At this point, people used their judgment because 
they knew the consequence, in fact, what they thought they knew might be different in the 
event.  
This condition was often founded in the Indonesian air transport system as data was easily to be 
released to media and public. As a consequence, the NTSC worked with pressures from public, 
media, and even authorities, which might be possible for them not to reveal the truth and tended 
to follow public opinion. A combination all factors above put lots of pressures to analysts who 
worked in investigations.  
6.3.3 Barriers to Learning 
After an accident or incident occurred in Indonesia, there were lots of speculations of its causes. 
A statement from the regulator and operator often developed public opinion although a formal 
investigation did not yet conduct. Therefore, public opinion would be easily developed, 
especially if there were public figures who gave statements on the event.  
The findings indicated that by forming public opinion after the event, the all truth behind an 
accident or incident would not be fully revealed although, later, the NTSC investigation 
determined the causes of the accident or incident.   
The lack of willingness and commitment to enhance safety was identified in the Indonesian 
aviation. The actions taken by the regulator were often after there were pressures from public 
and media. Moreover, the recommendations proposed by the NTSC were often not 
implemented and almost no evaluation on the recommendations. The importance of 
commitment to improve safety was also mentioned by Reason (1997). He also highlighted the 
importance of competence and cognisance, which were largely absent at the regulatory level.  
Nevertheless, other two barriers: the political system and covering issues, were implied by 
Perrow (1994), who suspected that there were power and interests that drove the elite 
(regulator) not to put safety first. These barriers seemed likely to drive the regulator to choose 
what they wanted to learn and how they wanted to act. Although there were some barriers to 
learning identified by scholars; for example,  information difficulties, regulatory hypertrophy, 
while Sagan (1994), Turner and Pidgeon (1997), Perrow (1986a) and La Porte (1996) suspect 
there are power and interests behind failure to learn. In fact, this present study identified all 
barriers to learn are related to ‘elite’ matters (politics and the promotion of self-interests). 
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6.3.4 The Implementation of Lesson Learn 
Studies on aviation accident only relied to the NTSC as an authorised organization to conduct 
investigation on aviation accidents and incidents. Thus, here, there were no monitoring and 
evaluation conducted by the regulator to examine the system. Safety recommendations 
proposed by the NTSC seemed adequate to answer safety issue if an accident or incident 
occurred. In fact, there was no single document informed that the regulator did monitoring and 
evaluating application of the recommendations. So, there was no benchmark that provided a 
picture if there was an improvement in the system after the safety recommendation had applied.  
The problems of investigation on an accident or incident in the Indonesian air transport system 
were complex. If  Perrow (1994) saw air transport as error-avoiding system, it seemed not 
likely in the Indonesian air transport system because it was most likely due to a combination of: 
problem of analysis, analysts, and implementation of lesson learn. The condition was also 
strengthened Perrow’s statement of how power and interests led the elite to not put safety first 
(Perrow, 1994). 
This study identified that the Indonesian air transport system was unable to learn from the past 
experience as indicated by the high accident and incident rate. The condition was not only 
because of the barriers identified by this study, but also the deficiencies existed in the system. 
The system was already vulnerable since the beginning therefore people inside the system had 
been integrated with those deficiencies. Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that people in the 
system did not recognize the deteriorating processes happened since the deficiencies existed 
had affected their perceptions and, of course, influence the development of safety culture. An 
accident or incident occurred did not see as a consequence of processes inside the system but as 
deviation of human performances.  
Learning after an event is highly recommended by scholars (for example, Roberts, 1990; 
Perrow, 1984; Reason, 1997), but since the regulator seemed likely to take on learning solely to 
answer public concerns, then they lose the objectives of learning (again evidenced by frequency 
of accidents and incidents in aviation). These facts continuously occurred in the system, and the 
vulnerabilities were not detected because there were poor/limited intentions to learn from any 
event. 
Referring to theories of failures and complexity theories, these scholars stated the importance of 
learning after an event. The HRT scholars propose to learning extensively from the experience 
of accidents, incidents and near misses (LaPorte, 1996; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) and 
translating the lessons learnt into practices (Pidgeon, 1997) will improve the organization’s 
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reliability. Thus, comprehensively and extensively learning reflect the organization awareness 
to unexpected, unwanted and any surprise in the future.  
Here, examining the Indonesian air transport system and learning theories, there are different 
perspectives of learning. The learning theories establish concepts that lessons from an event do 
not prevent the system from failing or predict future hazard eventuation, but should improve a 
system’s reliability, so countering the effects of future unplanned or unwanted events.  
The system seemed to apply iconic learning (Boin et al., 2005), however, as the case of the 
Indonesian air transport system indicates, learning from an event may just be a ‘list’ to be 
ticked or a requirement to be fulfilled in order to answer public concerns, i.e., superficial or 
‘surface’ learning. It is not alike passive learning – knowing something, but doing nothing (Toft 
& Reynolds, 1997); rather, the organization learned but with poor or limited intentions.  
6.4 Indonesian Aviation: A Crisis 
The previous sections clearly defined that the deficiencies in the Indonesian air transport system 
existed since the beginning of the system established. However, those deficiencies were 
integrated with the system and the interactions of people in the system created threats which 
were later also integrated to the system. Throughout the time, people inside the system became 
comfortable with those deficiencies and the threats practiced thus although there were accidents 
and incidents occurred, the system unseen those as warning signals of problems in the system. 
A combination of deficiencies and threats in the system developed perception and safety culture 
of people in the system. Furthermore, as there were barriers to learn existed in the system, 
investigations carried by the NSTC did not achieve their objectives. Consequently, the system 
worked with these deficiencies and threats inside the system which the condition had weakened 
the system and, throughout the time, it became vulnerable.  
The condition prior to the operating ban was suit with the concept of preconditions (Pauchant & 
Mitroff, 1992; Shrivastava, Mitroff, Miller, & Miclani, 1988; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997). Thus, 
at the time of announcement of the operating ban by the EU, the Indonesian aviation was in 
shock as the announcement affected perceptions, values and beliefs of people on the Indonesian 
air transport system.  
This study clearly determined the process of the development of crisis in the Indonesian air 
transport system.  Here, there were interrelationship between deficiencies and threats, which 
also affected people to learn from the past.  
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A clear picture of the crisis process in the Indonesian air transport system is presented in Figure 
6.1, below, and essentially summarises the whole study.  
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6.1 Crisis Process in the Indonesian Air Transport System 
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Figure 6.1 presents the Indonesian air transport system prior to the EU’s operating ban applied 
to Indonesia. The system had been deteriorated by deficiencies related to knowledge, rule and 
enforcement which those deficiencies met threats (manipulation, bribery and collusion). A 
combination of the deficiencies and the threats affected people perceptions of matters related to 
aviation and at the same time was developed a safety culture. Here, there was a clear 
relationship of degradation process that was working in conjunction with the establishment of 
safety culture. The time was a very critical element here, since the process of development was 
not immediate but lengthy process until any elements was integrated into the system  
Here, accidents and incidents in the system were not seen as warning signal thus people in the 
system seem likely not seeing the importance to implement safety recommendations proposed 
by the NTSC after there was an occurrence. It might be caused by the deficiencies and the 
threats existed in the system, which were also supported by barriers occurred that affected 
people to learn from the past. Thus, people tended not to do any actions in order to enhance 
safety. The condition was consistent with Uttal (1983) who state that values (what is important) 
and beliefs (how things work) will result in behavioural norms (the way we do things).  
Consequently, throughout the time, the system had been weakened and it became vulnerable. 
As the accidents and incidents kept occurred in the system, the EU saw the condition as serious 
deficiencies all Indonesian airlines and the insufficient ability of the Indonesian authorities to 
perform its safety oversight responsibilities. Accordingly, the EU imposed all Indonesian 
airlines not to conduct commercial services to all European countries.  
The operating ban was an event that shocked Indonesian aviation and damaged national pride 
and credibility. The process of deterioration occurred slowly, over the time, and was found 
likely to be more severe as values, beliefs and norms that had been practices were affected. 
Thus, it seemed reasonable to conclude that the Indonesian aviation crisis was not caused by a 
single accident or incident but an accumulation of accidents and incidents. The crisis was not 
acute, but chronic because of the system began to deteriorate even as it was established. 
6.5 Summary 
There were deficiencies occurred in the Indonesian air transport system since its establishment. 
Those deficiencies worked together with threats that appeared through interactions of people in 
the system. A combination of the deficiencies and the threats had affected performances in 
operations so accidents and incidents kept occurring, which later led the EU to impose all 
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Indonesian airlines not to conduct commercial services to all European countries. The 
announcement of the operating ban was a crisis event for the Indonesian aviation. 
The operating ban applied by the EU to all certified airlines in Indonesia has given a positive 
impact to the Indonesian air transport system as were indicated by significant improvements 
identified, which were contradictive with condition before the operating ban as there were no 
significant improvements after an event. There were four barriers to learn identified in this 
study: commitment and willingness, political system, covering issues and limited/poor intention 
to learn as indicated the improvements made just to fulfil the EU’s requirements. Failure to 
learn was indicated by series of accidents and incidents in the system that was reasoned by the 
regulator, operator and the existing system. 
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    Chapter 7 
Conclusions and Contributions 
7.1 Introduction 
This chapter discusses and concludes the findings derived from the data collected with the 
existing theories. Four sections are presented. Section 7.2 is revisiting the research objectives. 
Section 7.3 concludes this study. Section 7.4 presents implication of this study. Section 7.5 
proposes recommendation from this study. Finally, Section 7.6 describes thoughts for future 
study. 
7.2 Revisiting Research Objectives 
The operating ban applied to all Indonesian airlines aroused my curiosity about the Indonesian 
air transport system. High accidents and incidents rate indicated the system was faced with 
problems that were not yet resolved and that, through time, this had led to a crisis. Prior studies 
on complex socio-technical systems (e.g., Perrow, 1984; La Porte, 1996; Robert, 1990) and 
aviation studies (e.g., Wiegmann & Schappel, 2003; Reason, 1997, 2000) did not consider 
enough about the importance of historical aspect, in this manner; - the aspect of time. 
Although analysis of a failure in a system such aviation would be started from that failure, there 
was no consensus on how far the analysis should be traced back. Consequently, some studies 
stopped when the causes of the failure were identified; but the root causes were there and 
seemed untouchable. 
Prior studies analysed similar systems separately; for example, at micro-level (analysed only 
accidents and incidents) or meso-level (from accidents and incidents to organizations). 
However, there were limited studies that analysed the whole system such as the Indonesian air 
transport system.  
The approach of this study was similar to Turner (1978; 1997) who analysed 84 accident and 
disaster reports in UK. This study was also related to Strauch (2004) who analysed the aviation 
from the human error perspective. But, both studies were not considered about ‘time’ and 
historical aspect. Therefore, this study added these aspects to provide comprehensive analysis in 
order to understand how accidents and incidents developed over time and deficiencies 
weakened a complex system. 
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This study was developed from the organizational learning and failure theories. While applying 
crisis theories was led by the assumptions that accidents and incidents in the system were 
warning signals of vulnerability in a system and also notified the presence of problems in the 
system (Fink, 1986). These signals or preconditions occurred during a period called incubation 
(Reason, 1997; Toft & Reynolds, 1997; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), but tended to be overlooked 
or even ignored by the system. Subsequently, accidents and incidents kept occurring and, 
throughout the time, led to a crisis.  
To enrich the data collected and capture more perspectives, discourse analysis was employed. 
Thus, various sources of data developed a step-by-step understanding of the Indonesian air 
transport system as there were many issues identified. Two fieldwork phases were conducted in 
order to obtain data. The first phase aimed to explore issues on the Indonesian air transport 
system and concurrently develop an initial model that was then used to guide the research. The 
second phase aimed to investigate the consistency of the findings derived from the first data 
collected and resulted in a final model.  
7.2.1 Systemic Causes of Vulnerabilities in Indonesian Aviation  
Chapter 6 presented evidence concerned with the incubation period in the Indonesian air 
transport system. At this period, there were deficiencies and threats that affected people 
performances in the Indonesian air transport system. The combination of deficiencies and 
threats had created poor performance and, trough the time, led to accidents and incidents. 
In referring to failure theories (e.g., Swiss Cheese Accident Causation Theory, Man-made 
Disaster Theory), there is a precondition stage called as incubation period (Turner, 1978; 
Turner & Pidgeon, 1997) or latent condition (Reason, 1990, 1997, 2008, 2009), in which 
unintended and complex interactions of contributory factors defeat safety system. Both 
Reason’s and Turner’s theories developed their concepts from industrial safety improvements 
thus risk is viewed in terms of energy (Woods et al., 2010). Consequently, propagations of 
dangerous and unintended ‘energy’ transfers are needed to be controlled, contained or even 
stopped, which according to these theories by applying multiple layers of barriers.  
The results of this study determined there were deficiencies existed at the establishment stage, 
but tended to be ignored or overlooked thus while the system was running (the operational 
stage), these deficiencies were adapting and integrated to the system, but created holes in the 
system’s defences. These ‘earlier deficiencies’ met, throughout time, with other deficiencies 
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besides some threats that were also arose, in unintended ways. Thus, the system was weakened 
then an accident or incident occurred.  
In some ways, the results are strengthening the conceptualisation of the incubation period 
(Reason, 1990, 1997, 2008, 2009; Turner, 1978; Turner & Pidgeon, 1997), but a linear 
sequence of accident causation used in their original formulation does not clearly explain the 
reasons behind the system breakdown, particularly from the threats that arose in unintended 
ways, socio-cultural aspect (e.g., sungkan), and elite’s power (e.g., political system). Although 
Toft & Reynolds (Toft & Reynolds, 1997) refined that there is a complex combination of 
technical, individual, group, organizational, social factors, and together with culture, affected 
assumptions and practices, the influences of elite’s power remain unclear.  
Furthermore, the interrelated causes in the Indonesian aircraft accidents and incidents illustrate 
the complexity of how a system works. Therefore, applying the theories of failure to examine 
Indonesian aviation might be suited, but, in fact, both NAT and HRT also cannot clearly 
explain the phenomena at the Indonesian air transport system. The existence of threats as 
products of interactions of people in the system, socio-cultural aspects, and a fact of thick 
nuance of political system seem unrevealed. Although Perrow (1984, 1986a; 1999) states 
politics’ and power’s influence to human errors, he does not explicitly explain the terms. 
Moreover, the terms of threats and socio-cultural remain conceal.   
7.2.2 Continuous Failure in Indonesia Aviation 
Learning after an event is essential thus an investigation is conducted in order to determine 
probable causes and recommend control measures (Wells & Rodrigues, 2003, p.134). However, 
this study identified that there was a contribution of investigation to ability of the system to 
learn from the past. It was because the problems of investigation on an accident or incident in 
the Indonesian air transport system were complex. The complexities existed not only because of 
internal factors (e.g., lack of resources, dependency issue) and external factors (e.g., public and 
media pressures), but also the existence of deficiencies and threats in the system. So, it seemed 
reasonable to conclude that the investigations in the system did not achieve their objectives, 
which was proved by accidents and incidents kept occurring (as shown by frequency of 
accidents and incidents in 1999 – 2007). 
Although there were recommendations proposed by the NTSC, there were no evidences that 
these recommendations were implemented. The condition implied that the regulator seemed to 
take on learning solely to answer public concerns. The actions taken by the regulator seemed 
160 
 
likely an ‘iconic learning’ (Boin et al, 2005), which the whole system worked together to 
implement corrective actions. In fact, learning from an event was only to answer public 
concerns and international requirements. So, learning was a fulfilment of requirements for 
answering all pressures. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that the regulator chose what 
they wanted to learn.  
This study concluded that the recurrences of events were not because the regulator was failure 
to learn. The regulator learned but with poor or limited intentions; or the learning was only in 
particular spots. So, strategies to enhance safety by learning extensively from the experience of 
accidents, incidents and near misses (LaPorte, 1996; LaPorte & Consolini, 1991) and 
translating the lessons learnt into practices (Pidgeon, 1997) were not applied in Indonesia.  
Furthermore, there are some barriers to learning identified by scholars; for example,  
information difficulties, regulatory hypertrophy, while Sagan (1994), Turner and Pidgeon 
(1997), Perrow (1986a) and La Porte (1996) suspect there are power and interests behind failure 
to learn. In fact, this present study identified all barriers to learn are related to ‘elite’ matters 
(politics and the promotion of self-interests). 
7.3 Conclusion 
The general aim of this study was to develop a logical explanation of the causes of accidents or 
incidents, a series of accidents or incidents and, organizational learning in an air transport 
system.  
This study concluded that there were complex interactions of deficiencies and threats in the 
Indonesian air transport system that were ignored and overlooked. The period of these 
interactions weakened the system was an incubation period. In this period, the accidents and 
incidents kept occurring and were not seen as warning signals of problems in the system so it 
kept operation as usual.  
By time, the system was weakened until a stage of vulnerabilities in which accidents and 
incidents frequency increased and, of course, the fatalities arose significantly. These conditions 
were recognized by international bodies (e.g., ICAO, FAA). So, that was why the operating ban 
was applied to all Indonesian airlines by the EU as a consequence of vulnerabilities of the 
system. 
The announcement of the EU’s ban on all certified Indonesian airlines was seen as a crisis 
event. The announcement was filled the criterion of crisis: the creation of fears, uncertainty, and 
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reputational risks (see Seeger et al., 2003; Seymour & Moore, 2000). Subsequently, this study 
investigated the process that occurred in the development of the crisis event.  
This study revealed that the crisis in the Indonesian air transport system was not acute, but 
chronic because of the system began to deteriorate even as it was established. Thus, the impacts 
of the crisis were even more severe and affected all levels of the system, from the regulatory 
level, the operational level and, of course, the public. According to the results of this study, it 
seems reasonable to assume that the operating ban affected people’s perceptions and beliefs of 
Indonesian aviation safety. But this assumption needs to be further examined since this study 
only examined preconditions or pre-crisis.  
7.4 Implications of the Study 
The phenomena in the Indonesian air transport system reflects multiple-causalities of an 
accident or incident in which generate from a combination of cognitive, organizational, 
technical, socio-culture, and elite’s interests. The complexity of this system should be 
understood comprehensively so recommendations will solve not only problems in the surface 
but also problems that were rooted in the bottom. 
Therefore, deficiencies that were identified by this study cannot be solved just from a single 
perspective; for example, providing adequate training to maintain and improve knowledge or 
issuing comprehensive rules and policies to guide the operations. No doubt that these 
countermeasures help against poor performances, but not enough to improve system safety as 
the system is dynamic while time will increase its complexities. Hence, constant and 
comprehensive assessments are essential to determine shortcomings or vulnerabilities in order 
to enhance safety.  
There were academic and practical values determined by investigating the Indonesian air 
transport system. From the academic perspective, this study gave empirical evidence of: (1) the 
origin of the Indonesian aircraft accidents and incidents, (2) the deteriorating process in the 
Indonesian air transport system, and (3) how the vulnerability of a system, sooner or later, will 
led to a crisis.  
Specifically, this present study contributes to accident studies, especially aviation studies. This 
study was started from the perspective that there were deficiencies in the Indonesian air 
transport system.  Thus, this present study investigated the system for a period of ten years to 
identify the vulnerabilities. At this point, this study stresses the need to consider ‘time’ and 
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‘historical aspects’ to understand how a system is developed. These aspects need to be 
underscored since values, beliefs, and norms are developed by time. 
This study identified a combination of the deficiencies and the threats arose in the Indonesian 
air transport system. The deficiencies were related to knowledge, rule and enforcement while 
the threats were manipulation, bribery and collusion. Although deficiencies related to 
knowledge and rule has been identified by prior studies in aviation, deficiencies related to 
enforcement remain unclear.  Similarly, the threats and socio-cultural factors (e.g., sungkan) 
and elite’s interests identified in this study provided new perspective on aviation causation 
studies. This study also reveals that there is a significant relationship between both factors that 
led them to conduct only ‘spot learning’.   
However, the main contribution of this study is a model of crisis process in the Indonesian air 
transport system. The preconditions cycle prior to a crisis addresses new insight on crisis 
theories. This model can be extended or replicated to analyse organizational factors in other 
areas of study, in particular in Indonesia. 
Practically, this study offers insight into policy makers’ understanding of causes for the 
vulnerability in the Indonesian air transport system. This study provides a need to continuously 
examine the system in a period of time. This is necessary since a better understanding is 
essential to enhance aviation safety so recognition of the root causes will assist in formulating a 
more appropriate air transport policy. Hence, this study reflects that investigations of aircraft 
accidents cannot only examine the event but also include organizational, social, and historical 
perspectives so any hidden factors can be detected sooner.  
7.5 Recommendations from the Study 
This study showed multiple-causalities of aircraft accident, which is possible to be a crisis if 
these causes remain unsolved. Therefore, the following recommendations are proposed to the 
regulator, practitioners and academics. 
Regulator 
Specific recommendations to the regulator include: (1) improving the quality of human 
resources in the regulatory body, particularly, in the Department of Transportation; (2) 
reviewing existing aviation regulations; (3) strengthening enforcement of air transport 
regulations; and (4) improving development planning in the air transport system. Each 
recommendation is elaborated below. 
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First, the quality of human resources can be achieved through: (a) providing continuous 
trainings and workshops to the officers; (b) reviewing the bureaucratic system, place the right 
person to fill a position; (c) providing sufficient salary to the officers, particularly those who are 
working as inspectors and licensing officers; (d) establishing a safety culture in the regulatory 
body. 
Second, reviewing aviation regulations is necessary since it was identified as one of causes of 
deficiencies in the system. Thus, it is necessary to: (a) collaborate with academics to review and 
examine the existing regulations; (b) develop a communication strategy with the legislative 
about the importance of aviation regulations to improve aviation safety. 
Third, strengthening the enforcement of air transport regulations is essential but needs to be 
done at all levels, from the policy makers to the operational levels (e.g. inspection level, 
investigation level, licensing level). This can be achieved through: (a) socialising regulations 
through the media; (b) comprehensively developing coordination with practitioners and 
academics to eliminate ambiguity in the regulations; and (c) applying sanctions or punishment 
to any safety violations, but also rewarding any safety improvements to foster safety awareness, 
a climate of openness and encourage safety reporting. 
Fourth, the regulator should design and plan the future development of the air transport system. 
Therefore, they should: (a) examine past and present conditions of the air transport system so 
weaknesses and strengths can be determined to improve future planning; and (b) intensively 
collaborate with international aviation bodies (e.g., ICAO, IATA) to improve system safety. 
Practitioners and Academics 
To develop a sustainable aviation safety culture there is a need for all actors to work together 
and collaborate. Therefore, practitioners and academics should also: (1) develop a safety culture 
by delivering knowledge on aviation safety; for example, publishing information on airlines’ 
websites, providing information on board the airport, hosting seminars on aviation; (2) be 
involved in accident investigation by conducting the investigation together with the NTSC so 
the various perspectives will give new insights while also giving control over decisions; (3) 
ensuring that the regulations are enforced; for example, by encouraging safety reporting and 
developing an open culture, and (4) considering ‘time’ and ‘historical aspects’ to analyse the 
system. 
164 
 
7.6 Thoughts for Future Study 
There are some thoughts addresses for future study: 
First, the study of accident causation, especially air transport system, may include history and 
time into the analysis since this study identified how vulnerabilities of a system had developed 
over time. Prior studies in disasters; for example, Turner (1978; 1997) analysed 84 accidents 
and disasters in UK, he analysed only the reports. Toft (Turner’s doctoral student) and 
Reynolds (1997), extended this type of analysis to include a wider body of data, which 
strengthened their findings, but they did not strictly account for time and history in their 
analysis. Thus, by considering more perspectives (e.g., socio-cultural, political) into accident 
causation studies will bring greater understanding of how an accident occurs.  
Second, this study revealed hazards in the system that contributed to accidents and incidents in 
the Indonesian air transport system, but the data collected implicitly reflect there might be 
relationships between these and the elite’s interests. Therefore, this phenomenon should be 
examined further and linked to organizational failure and learning studies.  
Third, this study revealed perception and safety culture are also influenced the poor 
performances in the Indonesian air transport operations. Thus, these two aspects, perception and 
safety culture, also need to be investigated further from socio-cultural perspective since the data 
collected reflect how threats (e.g., bribery) and socio-aspect (e.g., ruwat for bad luck) 
influenced these aspects.  
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     Appendix A 
Selected Primary Legislation on Aviation 
No Indonesian Legislations on Aviation Contents 
1 Regulation on Aviation 1932 (Luchtvervoer-
besluit) was issued by Dutch government on 
13th February 1933. It had been revised by 
Staatsblad No.118/1933. 
The regulation provided general framework in 
Indonesian air transport. 
2 Ordinance on Aviation 1934 (Luchtvervoer-
ordonnantie) was issued by Dutch government 
in 1934. It had beed revised by Staatsblad 
No.2005/1934 and Staatsblad No.36/1942). 
The ordinance provided framework in air transport 
operations. 
3 Ordinance No.100/1939 (Luchtvervoer-
ordonnantie) was issued on 1st May 1939 by 
Dutch government.  
The ordinance provided framework for air transport 
activities in Indonesia. It has five sections and forty 
verses that regulated the air transport system. 
4 Act No.83/1958 on aviation was issued on 27th 
December 1958. The Act was the first 
legislation in aviation after the Indonesian 
independence day. 
The Act replaced Luchtvervoer-besluit 1934 and 
Luchvervoer-ordonnantie 1934. It consists of eight 
sections and twenty eight verses that provide general 
framework for air transport activities in Indonesia. 
5 Act No.52/1992 on aviation was issued on 25th 
May 1992 and in conjunction with the 
Explanation of the Act. 
The Act replaced the Act No.83/1983. It has 15 
sections and 76 verses that provided more detail to 
regulate the Indonesian air transport system. The Act 
also provides definitions of terms used in the 
Indonesian air transport system, vision and mission, the 
Indonesian airspace territory, registration of an aircraft, 
airport, environmental impact, investigation and 
criminal court. 
6 Government Regulation No.40/1995 on air 
transport. It was issued on 17th November 1995 
and in conjunction with the Explanation of the 
Law. 
The regulation was aimed to provide more detail of the 
Act No.15/1992. It has 10 sections and 49 verses. The 
regulation aimed to provide operational guidelines for 
commercial airlines. It gives explanation in detail, for 
examples: an airline definition, an airline registration 
and airline operations, routes and hubs. There are 
explanations on licensing requirements, sanctions, 
tariff, responsibilities and special services for disabled 
customers. 
7 Government Regulation No.3/2000 on aviation. 
It was issued on 28th January 2000. 
The regulation amended the Government Regulation 
No.40/1995. It amended verse 6(2) about 
representative of a foreign airline in Indonesia. The 
regulation has only two verses. 
8 Government Regulation No.12/2000 on Search 
and Rescue was issued on 23rd February 2000. 
The regulation provides search and rescue operations 
for an accident or incident in air transport or water 
transport. The regulation has six sections and 21 
verses.  
9 Government Regulation No.3/2001 on aviation 
safety and security. It was issued on 5th 
February 2001 and in conjunction with the 
Explanation of the Law. 
The regulation provides framework for aviation safety 
and security, for example; definition of terms related to 
aviation safety and security, accident investigation and 
sanctions. The regulation has fourteen sections and one 
hundred and four verses.  
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10 Presidential Decree No.3/2007 on establishment 
of the National Committee of Evaluation of 
Transport Safety and Security. It was issued on 
11th January 2007. 
The Decree was issued to investigate high accident and 
incident rate in all transport modes during the last five 
years. Therefore, the government formed a national 
committee to investigate the Indonesian transport 
system comprehensively including regulations, 
transport safety standards and procedures. The 
objective was to determine the problems and propose 
recommendation to improve safety and security in all 
transport modes in Indonesia. 
11 Presidential Decree No.16/2007 on extension of 
working period of the National Committee of 
Evaluation of Transport Safety and Security. It 
was issued on 3rd August 2007. 
The Decree No.3/2007 stated that the working duration 
of the committee was for three months from the 
issuance date. The Decree No.16/2007 extended the 
working duration of the committee from 11th April to 
11th October 2007 or for another six months. The 
extension was needed to provide longer time to 
conduct in-depth investigation. 
12 Ministerial Decree No.1/2004 on reporting 
accident, incident or delaying of aircraft and 
aircraft accident/incident investigation 
procedures. It was issued on 13th January 2004. 
The Decree provides explanation related to an aircraft 
accident, incident or flight delay. The Decree has five 
sections: definitions, notification the event, protecting 
any items related to the event, reporting the event and 
investigating procedures. 
13 Ministerial Decree No.46/2004 on the NTSC 
organization and structure 
The Decree stated the establishment of new units in the 
NTSC organizations. It has five sections and nineteen 
verses. The new unit, the Secretariat of the NTSC, has 
three sub-units: secretariat, research and investigation, 
and information and external affairs. 
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     Appendix B 
An Example of Written Evidence Coding 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Undeveloped mechanism of 
recruitment 
Lower quality of human resources 
Non compliance with the 
international standard 
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     Appendix C 
An example of the Causal Events for the NTSC Investigation Report Analysis  
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     Appendix D 
An example of the Caricature Analysis 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A caricature published at Kompas newspaper on 10th March 2007, three days after Garuda Airlines GA 200 exceeded its landing speed at Adi 
Sumarmo Airport and killed twenty one people. The caricature implies failure to learn. The adult said, “....all incidents must have their lessons..!” 
while the kid curiously answered, “...there were lots of incidents....But, what are the lessons?” 
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     Appendix E 
Interview Package 
A second fieldwork session is needed to compare and cross-check the consistency of 
information derived from the first data collection. By conducting interviews, it is hoped that 
corroboration of the current findings, which were derived from written evidence (e.g. 
government reports, Medias report). The written data and interviews will be triangulated with 
the theories relating to aviation and organization, in order to illuminate causal phenomena in 
Indonesian aviation accidents.  
 
Thus, there are two main objectives of this interview: 
1. To investigate the consistency of findings from the written evidences 
2. To develop reasonable explanations from written and spoken data to achieve the overall 
credibility of findings  
 
Based on criteria inherent in the research objectives in my Ph.D. proposal, I identified six 
groups of people who have been involved in aviation related activities: Operator Officers, Line 
Management, Investigators, Regulators, Parliamentarian, and Observers.  
 
The first data collection analysis and a review of the literature have been used to develop the 
open-ended interview protocol. The protocol was designed to solicit the interviewees’ views on 
overall Indonesian aviation accidents and, in particular, the organizational influences that lead 
the accident to happen. In order to help the participants prepare for the interview, an 
information package will be sent to them prior to their interview.  This package will include a 
brief description of research. It will also explain the how confidentiality and anonymity will be 
maintained.  
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Interview Protocol 
 
Interviewee : _________________________  
Organization : _________________________ 
Date  : _________________________ 
 
Research Abstract 
This research aims to understand the phenomenon in Indonesian Aviation Accidents by 
analysing the organizational influences that lead an accident to happen. Currently, there is 
inadequate study in aviation accidents related to organizational influences; this research aims to 
help fill that gap. This research will determine the organizational factors that contribute to an 
aviation accident by exploring and discovering how the phenomenon is socially constructed. It 
will be particularly focused on understanding the accidents, the direct causes, the latent failures, 
interactions and relationship of actors in Indonesian aviation. The research is situated in the 
ontological position that Indonesian aviation is a social system. It incorporates traditional and 
non-traditional hermeneutic elements, in as much as it interprets both written and verbal sources 
of information. Thus, a qualitative approach to the overall research method is the most 
appropriate, with discourse analysis being the most suitable analytic approach.  
 
Prior to Interview 
1. I will give a brief description of the research 
2. I will state how anonymity and confidentially of the interview data will be maintained.  
a. In particular, I will inform the participant that their name will be removed from 
written and electronic files to eliminate any link between the interviewees and 
their responses. 
3. I will ask them if they have any questions.  
a. If so, then I will answer them as fully as possible. 
4. I will ask either they permit me to record the interview or not. 
a. If so, then I will begin recording the interview. 
b. If not, then I will take notes during the interview. 
i. At the end of the interview, I will briefly summarise my notes and ask 
the participant if there are any corrections to them that he or she would 
like to make. 
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Core Questions 
1. Tell me about the current state of Indonesian aviation safety. 
2. Currently, what are the main issues in Indonesian aviation? 
3. In your opinion, why have so many accidents occurred in the past 10 years? 
4. Can you speculate on the most probable causes behind these accidents? 
 
Other questions will supplement those above. These supplementary questions will depend on 
the participant’s responses to the core questions. 
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     Appendix F 
Interviews Information 
No Interviewee Date of Interview Role in Aviation 
1 Harun 2 February 2010 Government officer 
2 Burhan 2 February 2010 Government officer 
3 Arga 3 February 2010 Academic 
4 Hani 5 February 2010 CEO of an airline 
5 Budi 6February 2010 Pilot 
6 Agam 6 February 2010 Academic 
7 Dani 8 February 2010 CEO of an airline 
8 Beno 9 February 2010 Government officer 
9 Catur 10 February 2010 Academic 
10 Banu 10 February 2010 Retired pilot and 
academic 
11 Yadi 11 February 2010 Operational Director of 
an airline 
12 Ani 13 February 2010 CEO of an airline 
13 Genta 14 February 2010 Academic 
14 Muli 16 February 2010 Government officer 
15 Bima 16 February 2010 Academic 
16 Wahyu 18 February 2010 Transport analyst and 
academic 
17 Novi 18 February 2010 Government officer 
18 Ardian 18 February 2010 Aircraft Engineer and 
academic 
19 Kardi 19 February 2010 Pilot 
20 Aman 19 February 2010 Chief operational of an 
airline 
21 Hanung 20 February 2010 Academic 
22 Ludi 20 February 2010 Aviation analyst 
23 Lase 22 February 2010 Academic 
24 Odi 24 February 2010 Investigator and 
185 
 
academic 
25 Desta 24 February 2010 Transport analyst and 
academic 
26 Andi 25 February 2010 Academic 
27 Yono 27 February 2010 Maintenance manager 
28 Masya 1 March 2010 Retired pilot and 
academic 
29 Gyan 2 March 2010 Aircraft engineer 
30 Didi 2 March 2010 Senior flight attendant 
31 Dian 4 March 2010 Executive director of an 
airline 
32 Karman 4 March 2010 Journalist 
33 Anto 4 March 2010 Consultant and academic 
34 Wira 5 March 2010 Aircraft engineer 
35 Agi 6 March 2010 Public analyst 
36 Deni 6 March 2010 Journalist and academic 
37 Windra 8 March 2010 Aircraft maintenance 
officer 
38 Beni 9 March 2010 Investigator 
39 Gery 9 March 2010 Pilot 
40 Sukri 11 March 2010 Senior journalist 
41 Kris 11 March 2010 Academic 
42 Yoga 11 March 2010 Consultant and academic 
43 Yani 12 March 2010 Investigator and 
academic 
44 Anas 13 March 2010 Academic 
45 Madi 13 March 2010 Academic 
46 Darun 14 March 2010 Government officer 
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     Appendix G 
An example of Interview Coding 
Original Interview in Bahasa Indonesia Transcribing to English Coding 
P: Jika kita analisa kondisi dunia penerbangan Indonesia 
dalam 10 tahun terakhir dimana banyak terjadi 
kecelakaan dan insiden, bagaimana ini semua terjadi? 
 
J: Permasalahan utama adalah system birokrasi kita yang 
sudah tidak sesuai dengan kondisi saat ini. Contohnya, 
para pegawai mengeluh tentang gaji dan menyebabkan 
menurunnya kualitas kerja mereka sementara itu orang-
orang yang duduk di level atas tidak mengindahkannya. 
Kemudian, ketika para pegawai ini tahu bahwa ada 
kesempatan untuk ‘memperoleh’ sesuatu , mereka 
menggunakan kesempatan itu. Disini, siapa yang bisa 
‘bermain’ dan ‘memanfaatkan’ kondisi, maka akan 
memperoleh keuntungan. Nuansa korupsi dan kolusi 
sangat kental disini, khususnya, jika itu berhubungan 
dengan pengurusan izin.  
Setelah deregulasi, pemain-pemain baru berdatangan dan 
berkompetisi di pasar penerbangan Indonesia. Booming 
juga didukung dengan krisis ekonomi global yang 
menyebabkan harga pesawat turun. Kondisi ini 
dimanfaatkan oleh para pebisnis yang bukan orang 
penerbangan dan tidak tahu tentang penerbangan untuk 
ekspansi bisnis mereka ke penerbangan. Sementara itu, 
regulator tidak cukup siap karena mereka tidak memiliki 
pengetahuan bagaimana meregulasi bisnis penerbangan. 
 
Q: If we analyse the Indonesian aviation condition in the 
past 10 years, there were lots of accidents and incidents. 
Why did those happen? 
 
A: The main problem is our bureaucracy system that is 
not appropriate for current condition. For example, 
government officers complain about the salary and affect 
their working quality while people in higher level ignore 
it. Then, when they know there is an opportunity to 
‘gain’ something so they will use that. Here, who is able 
to ‘play’ and ‘use’ the condition, then they will get 
benefits. The corruption and collusion nuances are really 
thick here, especially if it is related to license approval.  
After deregulation, the new entrants entered and 
competed in the Indonesian air transport market. The 
vast growth [of market] was also supported by global 
economic crisis and resulted in decreased of aircrafts. 
The condition was used by the traders who are not 
airliners and do not know about aviation to expand their 
business and enter airline market. Furthermore, the 
regulator unwell-prepared because they have no 
knowledge of how to regulate aviation business.   
 
 
 
 
Bureaucracy 
Corruption and collusion 
Lack of knowledge 
